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Chapter 1: The Power of the State Over Minority Constituents 
 
 In April 2018, Zarema Kulametova was sentenced to 250 hours of community 
service and a 20 thousand ruble fine for insulting a police officer. The incident occurred 
while she was questioning an officer about the whereabouts of her son Girai, a Crimean 
Tatar, who had just been taken from her and his family by armed officers following an 
armed search in January. Kulametova, an activist as well, was called into the Kirov police 
department a few weeks later, under the suspicion of insulting a police officer. The claim 
was that she had threatened his life and insulted him, leading to the officer developing 
depression, which kept him from working. Kulametova denied these accusations, 
claiming that the officer goaded her while she was in distress by filming her with his 
phone and smirking (Coynash 2018, QHA 2018). After receiving her sentence and 
starting her community service, which was finished on October 22, 2018, Kulametova 
found herself surrounded by others helping her do her court-mandated work (QHA 2018; 
UATV English 2018). She knew none of them, but these strangers were all Crimean 
Tatars who supported Kulametova. Under Russian occupation and Russian governance, 
Crimean Tatars, like Kulametova, believe that their rights, freedom, and identity are 
under threat and repression.  
Kulametova’s sentencing and Girai’s arrest are not the first nor the last examples 
of repression under Russian rule. In reality, repression has been a mainstay of the Russian 
state. Within the Twentieth Century, the world bore witness to the collapse of colonialism 
and communism. Following the end of these systems of repressive rule came the division 
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of large states into many smaller nations. The states that resulted from the creation 
of new borders and geographic placement became hotbeds of potential ethnic and 
minority strife. Peoples found themselves displaced in new countries and separated from 
their homeland. As solidarity around national identity amongst the minorities and the 
core group of the resulting countries coalesced, so did the risk of conflict and repression 
from the state. These phenomena were perhaps the first cases in modern human history, 
given nationalism and national identity’s enlightenment origins and the recent end of the 
colonial and communist power dynamic. As such, I venture to ask why and how might a 
state, having just acquired an ethnic or minority group, repress rather than make honest 
efforts to integrate the said group following its acquisition?  
 To answer this question and others similar to it, it is imperative to break down the 
question into its component parts, and then survey the current academic literature on 
those components. By doing so, the literature may reveal the current and historical 
understandings of each concept and theme within the question. Understanding the 
concepts and themes that surround the question, the question can be addressed in light of 
the literature. My research question attempts to understand state repression of ethnic and 
minority groups within its borders. There are parts of the research question that of course 
will not be the focus of the literature review. As an example, the conceptualization of the 
state, ethnics, and minorities will not be researched, as there are stable definitions of them 
for the sake of this research, and hence, focus on those terms will only distract from the 
main research questions. For the purposes of this research and literature, “states” are the 
representation of the conduit of political power within a territory, acting in the favor of 
the state and subjects, or as it pertains to the agendas of the governing political elites. 
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Taking from Weber’s understanding of the state, the state as a primarily political actor 
has administrative and legislative authority with regulatory power and maintains a 
monopolization on the use of force within its jurisdiction (Weber 1978, 55-56). To add to 
Weber, the state as a political actor impacts not only the political and institutional, but 
also the cultural aspects of society. Ethnic, as well as minority groups, exist as enclaves 
within a territory in which the state has authority, and may or may not possess identities, 
values, and desires that run counter to the identities, values, and desires of the state’s 
elites in which they reside. These groups are not limited to ethnicity or minority status; 
they would also include religious identities and linguistic groups. 
 My research question can be divided into two basic questions: “why” and “how.” 
The first base question, “why,” follows the course of the independent variables of the 
research. The independent variables would explain reasons for the state to follow and 
implement such policies of repression towards ethnic and minority groups. The why 
question is very critical to understand the motivation of the hegemonic elites to embark 
on a policy of repression and those motivations can vary widely from case to case. My 
literature review will explore in greater depth the current range of explanations why 
states repress and my case study will be a study and analysis of patterns. 
The second base question that exists within the research question is “how.” This 
question examines the instruments/modalities of repression that a state adopts to enforce 
its repressive policy against the targeted ethnic and minority groups. This is key because 
modes of repression range an entire gamut from gradual subordination of the group to 
outright coercion, and elimination. My literature on this aspect of my research question 
focuses more on the individual case studies of Crimean Tatars. By examining the 
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literature on states that follow repressive policies broadly and in the specific context of 
Crimean Tatars, I will be able to discover and explain trends that would help answer both 
of my research questions. This literature review will work through the current trends 
among scholars to establish patterns emanating from acts of state repression and their 
effects on ethnic and minority groups, placing the literature in a light that will both reveal 
the stances of the current work and where the research still ought to be advanced. 
Literature Review: 
 The literature, which spans over multiple disciplines and fields, reveals a number 
of trends researchers and scholars have returned to time and time again in the discussions 
of state repressions, as well as those repressions towards ethnic and minority groups. 
Within the literature, trends relating to the reasons for state repression are identified as: 
state cultural repression, state institutional repression, regime type, and state repression as 
an arbiter.  
Within the Independent Variable: State Cultural Repression 
 There are a number of variations on the initial trend of state’s repressing ethnic 
and minority groups, with states acting as the perpetrators. In these types of trends, the 
state is the one who represses initially without acting as an arbiter of ethnic conflict or 
any divides within a country. Here, the state directly involves itself with the ethnic or 
minority group. Within the initial trend, there are two types of direct state repression: 
cultural reasons for repression and institutional reasons for repression. State repressions 
from cultural angles have appeared to be of less importance in the literature compared to 
political and institutional explanations (Daly 2013, 402; Khmelko and Wiegand 2010, 
27). With Khmelko, Wiegand, and Daly, cultural determinants of state repression are far 
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less satisfactory and accurate than structural, institutional factors. States have more 
agency in institutional action versus cultural, and states are more likely to repress for 
national security reasons than for cultural ones. While these articles downplay the role of 
culture, it is necessary to discuss because culture, for others, does have a heightened 
effect on the state’s resort to repression (Turner and Singleton, Jr. 1978, 1001-2). The 
role of the youth bulges within authoritarian states is one example of culture possessing 
explanatory power in state repression (Nordås and Davenport 2013, 937). According to 
Nordås and Davenport’s findings, youth bulges represent the cultural elements. Their 
existence is one that thrives on culture, and can easily change culture, even against the 
state. Thus, the state, when implementing repression, would be doing so also through 
cultural means. Kevin Mulcahy defines cultural repression as the “official action (by 
party or state) in which certain forms of artistic expression are censored (e.g., atonal 
music), certain subject matter forbidden (e.g., pessimism or decadence), and certain 
thematic material favored (e.g., the heroism of the class struggle)” (Mulcahy 1984, 70). 
In his work discussing the repression of Dmitri Shostakovich’s work in Stalinist and 
Post-Stalinist Soviet Union, cultural repression is assumed to be more pervasive in 
nondemocratic societies like the Soviet Union, especially if that subject repressed would 
question the State’s legitimacy and/or galvanize dissent. The case would be even more 
severe in State’s possessing strong ideological factors. Cultural repression not only aimed 
to impact the arts or creations of culture, but also changed laws through vagueness, 
giving the government a stronger say in the interpretation of works and culture. This 
allows culture to be deemed subversive or offensive, as seen with Argentina during the 
from the late 1960’s to early 1980’s, fighting against subversion, which would address 
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topics like “abortion” and “unionization,” and “Marxism” through cultural repression 
(Arrigoni and Bordat 2011, 7-8).  Culture also, for other scholars, is inherently tied to 
ethnic groups, including religious groups, as “ethnicity is a cultural phenomenon based 
on biological and social heritage; but it includes elements of class and territory as well” 
(Foster 1982, 563). Repression of the culture of an ethnic or minority group would also 
take form of language punishment as an example, seen with Native Alaskan populations 
in the early 20th century, leading to the groups themselves to discourage the youth from 
learning about their own ethnic culture in fear of prejudice (Wyatt 1987, 131-132). For 
the recipients of the repression to be linked with cultural values and ideals, then it would 
make sense for the state to repress based on culture, especially if the repressed people’s 
culture differs or threatens the state’s culture (Rørbæk and Knudsen 2015, 27).   
State Institutional Repression 
 Much of the research declares that institutional claims are more likely to be the 
cause of state repression. Institutional claims can both be from the state itself and from 
the ethnic or minority group (Cornell 2002, 249). Those who theorize in favor of the 
institutional model usually find that culture does not play a large enough role to garner 
repressive action from the state (Khmelko and Wiegand 2010, 26). Institutional purposes 
for state repression can vary from case to case. In some cases, territorial change, disputes, 
and expansion can be the factor that directs repression, as ethnic and minority groups 
either vying for more territory or judging the legitimacy of state sovereignty over a 
particular territory can result in repression (Wright 2014, 378). 
Similar to territory, elections can also be institutional factors in state repression 
(Khmelko and Wiegand 2010, 17). The quality of the institutions as well as the 
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relationship between the institutions and the ethnic and minority groups also play a huge 
role. Institutions can take that which the culturalists called culture, ethnicity, and make 
them institutionalized, thus changing that link from culture to institutions (Lieberman and 
Singh 2012, 2). Ethnic structures can be used to explain repression as well, demonstrating 
that ethnic grievances might not have the strength to lead to conflict, thus supporting the 
case of institutional priority over cultural (Kustov 2017, 672). Other institutions that have 
an impact on state repression include democratic institutions and war, through military 
engagement and homefront regulations, as an institution to quell current and potential 
conflict. These institutions have at the very least some, albeit incomplete, explanatory 
power of state repressions (Hill, Jr. and Jones 2014, 676-7). Ultimately, the argument for 
state repression based on institutional factors over cultural factor has a strong backing 
among scholars from multiple fields. 
Regime Type 
 Another commonality found within this research is the distinction of regime type. 
Most specifically, the degree to which democracies or autocracies impose repression on 
ethnic and minority groups. Regime types play a role in the academic sphere regarding 
state repression for a long time. Regime type carries importance in the reasoning behind 
state repression because of the procedural and ideological differences between 
authoritarian regimes and democratic regimes. Authoritarian regimes tend to have more 
power over all aspects of the state, power that is held within a singular point, whereas 
democratic regimes have power which is more representative of the people, and not 
collected in one person, but spread among many. Because of the distinctions between and 
natures of authoritarian and democratic regimes, it comes as no surprise that a majority of 
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scholars within the literature on state repression find that democratic regimes are the less 
likely to impose repressions upon ethnic and minority groups (Capellan and Porter 2014, 
255; Davenport 2007, 488-9; Earl 2011, 283; Gurr 2000, 153; Sarkissian 2015, 23).  
There is an equal amount of research that focuses on authoritarian impacts on 
repression, mainly because of the variation and uniqueness that lie within 
authoritarianism, as seen with Sarkissian’s specific focus on non-democratic regimes’ 
preponderance of religious repression (Sarkissian 2015, 17-19). Authoritarian regimes are 
all about control, however, control can refer to many aspects, or all aspects, of a state, 
and as such making it the much more interesting regime for study (Bhasin and Gandhi 
2013, 620). Davenport uses authoritarian peace as potential alternatives to democratic 
peace, demonstrating that levels of repression can match those of democracies 
(Davenport 2007, 500). Inconsistencies among types of repression in authoritarian 
regimes also provide evidence of the strangeness of these regimes, as seen with the 
lessening of repressions before voting periods, but spike just before the actual election 
(Bhasin and Gandhi 2013, 628). Even some scholars theorize that there are situations 
where the roles are reversed, and democratic regimes are the more repressive ones, as 
seen with work of territorial revisionism (Wright 2014, 379-80). Here the trend of regime 
type, while at first seemingly determined in one direction, appears to waver in its 
determination. 
Repression as an Arbiter 
 The final thread that pertains to the independent variable is state repression as a 
third party, with the state acting as some sort of arbiter to ethnic or civil conflict within 
the state. Different from the first two trends, state repression as an arbiter places the state 
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not as the direct oppressor of the ethnic and minority groups, but as the entity that 
represses to solve some dispute or conflict, thus doing something for the greater good 
rather than something selfish. In the literature that supports this trend, scholars seem to 
focus first on the origins on ethnic conflict, and then on the state’s actions towards that 
ethnic conflict. Repression just happens to be one of the state’s means of control over this 
dire situation. The state in this research is more of an independent variable rather than the 
dependent variable, making state action conditional and reliant (Carment, and Taydas 
2009, 80). The state can act either violently or nonviolently in ethnic conflict, and their 
actions can help to change the “distance” between ethnic groups, making conflict less 
likely in the future (Caselli and Coleman II 2013, 189). States act in these regards 
because they are trying to maintain public order, first and foremost. If ethnic and minority 
groups engage in activity that upsets the status quo, be it anything from rebellion to 
protests to violent conflict between different groups, the state in this instance is acting as 
a mediator (Gurr 2000, 127-31). And while it may appear that state repressions against 
conflict are less reliable and usually have the opposite impact than the one believed, the 
state undeniably represents not the instigator of repressions out of its own control, but as 
a way to hopefully maintain the status quo of order (132). 
Within the Dependent Variable: Violence 
 The second set of trends within the literature follows the dependent variable and 
pertains to measures of repression and their consequences. One consequence of state 
repression that has been a mainstay within the literature is the resulting violence that 
comes with repression. These incidents of violence as a result of repressive policies are 
not violence perpetrated by the repressed, but the violence from the state’s repressive 
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policies. States will implement violence as their means of repression when they are 
responding to violence in kind (Daly 2013, 404). If the perceived threats from ethnic or 
minority groups are violent or believed to be violent, then the state will act as such 
(Hewitt 1997, 157). This is seen in the case of Northern Ireland, where violence was the 
repressive answer to violence (White and White 1995, 348). The literature also makes a 
regime distinction with violence, noting that authoritarian regimes, when resorting to 
violent repression, are much more brutal in their violence than democratic regimes (Daly 
2013, 397; Davenport 2007, 488; Hill, Jr. and Jones 2014, 670-2). Regardless of the 
differences in regime type, repressions of a violent nature are present in all regimes, and 
in any era (Ruddell and Urbina 2004, 906).  
Nonviolence 
 Nonviolent policies as repressive actions are also present in the literature, 
especially amongst those states with nonviolent ethnic and minority groups, as well as 
those states with strong state security apparatuses. In these states, the repression 
manifests itself as policing and imprisonment of ethnic and minority groups, especially 
those who threaten the social order. Here, the nonviolent repressions are linked to 
institutional and social factors of both the state and society (Ruddell 2005, 10-12; Ruddell 
and Urbina 2004, 924). Other types of nonviolent repression can be observed in the study 
of religious repression and feminist literature on the subject. “Soft repression” is less 
studied, but is by no means less important, pointing out techniques and policies of 
silence, ridicule, and stigmas. Each approach is incorporated in a different part of society 
and the state. Additionally, religious repression reveals other forms of repression as the 
removal of rights to gather, worship, and general discrimination (Ferree 2005, 150-1; 
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Sarkissian 2015, 28-9). Unlike the trend of violent repression, nonviolent repression has 
the most potential in terms of future research because of the history of focus on violent 
instead of nonviolent repression. 
Resistance and Cycle 
 The final trend is the actions taken by the targets of repression, their reactions and 
actions to counter their oppressors. Ethnic and minority groups faced with repressions 
can choose to respond in a number of ways: violent and nonviolent reactions. Violent 
reactions, such as minority radicalization, militias, and revolutions, represent actions 
taken in response to usually violent repressions, or at least repressions that drive the 
ethnic and minority groups to such lengths (Asal, Early, and Schulzke 2017, 488-9; 
Hewitt 1997, 155; Jenne, Saideman, and Lowe 2007, 555; Saxton 2005, 106). While 
there is plenty of literature that covers violent reactions, nonviolent actions in response to 
repression also occur, usually in the forms of ethnic grievances and protests, often times 
acting as precursors to the violent reactions just covered (Recktenwald 2000, 60; Saxton 
2005, 104). Perhaps the most intriguing insight from this trend is the admission of the 
cyclical nature of repression and violence. Violent repression from the state can increase 
the threat of ethnic conflict, which in turn, as seen in an earlier trend, can cause even 
more violent repressions from the state. Both the state and the ethnic and minority groups 
mobilize each other, can cause a cyclical status of violence (Gurr and Marshall 2000, 
237,260; Hultquist 2017, 519-21). This trend of resistance offers a different consequence 
of state repression, as this trend observes ethnic and minority groups working as actors, 





 After examining the literature for trends and themes, and all of the parts of the 
whole research question contently conceptualized, it becomes necessary to determine the 
quality and relevancy of the research towards my research question from the introduction. 
By restating the question, why and how might a state, having just acquired an ethnic or 
minority group, repress said group following acquisition, the trends within the literature 
can be properly analyzed for their relevance. Doing so will determine the strengths, 
weaknesses, and gaps within the current literature, opening it up for new directions and 
further study. To be clear, the state of the current literature is strong, and seems to 
encompass a wide range of theories and studies regarding state repression on ethnic and 
minority groups. However, that does not mean that the literature is without its share of 
problems, as will be displayed. 
 It must be noted that there is a strong balance in analytic types of data and 
research. Neither qualitative nor quantitative analysis overpower the other over the 
breadth of the literature. Qualitative research has been conducted by Sarkissian, Cornell, 
Earl, and White to name a few. The same can be stated about quantitative research, as 
researchers including Gurr, Davenport, Capellan, Porter, and Saxton provide 
contributions to the literature. The strong balance of types of analysis give the literature, 
and the trends that emerge from the literature, a sturdy backbone of data and content 
analysis.  
Another strength that follows the analytic strengths of the literature is the strength 
of its case studies. The cases that the literature considers are mostly all post-colonial, 
post-soviet cases, presenting topicality, but also include cases from more “stable” 
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countries, such as the United States and other Western nations. The diversity among the 
case selections in the literature provides evidence that the researchers lack bias in favor or 
against any type of case. This lack of any real bias can also be seen in the trend of regime 
types, as there are scholars that suggest that democracies are less violent and repressive, 
and autocracies are violent and repressive, but on the other hand, there are also those 
scholars that demonstrate that violence and repression are not characteristics of one type 
of regime, and both occur in all regime types (Wright 2014). With a wide selection of 
cases, the literature provides many different situations and occurrences of repression, 
with each case adding to the analysis, thus, providing the literature with a rich stream of 
data and case material to develop stronger theories and stronger concepts.  
Further strength of the literature lies within the trends that became prevalent in the 
research. The trends themselves demonstrate not only that different approaches have been 
taken towards questions of state repression and ethnic and minority groups, but also that 
the current literature and the scholars within it have healthy communication with each 
other. The trends cover a wide array of potential angles to the issue of state repression, 
looking at it from a cultural viewpoint, an institutional viewpoint, from the view of 
regime type, to mention a few. Using both perspectives demonstrates the literature’s 
completeness in its narrative view of the phenomena.  
The second strength within the trends lies with the interaction the literature has 
with itself. None of the literature is isolated, or without influence or commentary from 
some parts of the preexisting literature. The trends fully display this, as the trends on 
cultural and institutional origins of state repression both point to the flaws of the other, 
where cultural origins do not hold enough explanatory power in the eyes of those 
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standing for institutional origins, and institutional origins fail to address the cultural 
aspects.  
There are also a number of weaknesses that must be addressed. First, there 
appears to be a lack of synthesis of the cultural and institutional approaches to state 
repression and its origins. There is plenty of debate in the literature over the roles of both 
approaches, but literature that synthesizes the approaches is hard to come by. This exists 
as a weakness because of the claims from both sides regarding the validity of their 
supported approach. Both those who argue for institutional origins and those who argue 
for cultural origins of state repression have valid points about their respective approach. 
Because this synthesis does not exist in a strong capacity, the strengths of both 
explanations can never exist to complement the other, or work to explain cases where 
culture and institutions are deeply intertwined, resulting in any analysis of the repressions 
in that state potentially ending incomplete and flawed. Unless synthesis of the influence 
of culture and institution on state policies of repression is achieved, this weakness will 
remain. Another weakness lies within the original research question. The problem 
rests with cases studied and the nature of the question. The question queried in the 
introduction denotes a sense of immediacy with its understanding of repression, meaning 
that there is no real time for tensions to be allowed to boil, which is the case with a large 
percentage of the case involved. White and White’s case of Northern Ireland is the result 
of tensions between the state and the minority reaching a point of no return which 
eventually erupted in violence. Repression in this case did not occur immediately upon 
Northern Ireland’s acquisition of the minority. For most of the cases in the literature, this 
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is the reality. Because the literature does not cover cases of the type requested in the 
question, it cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the research question posed.  
 Moreover, there is at least one hole in the literature that needs to be underlined 
and calls for further research. This gap has already been mentioned as the lack of a 
synthesis of the cultural and institutional origins of state repression. Without this 
synthesis, this gap will remain. By focusing on a synthesis, the understanding of national 
identity may also be addressed, as it cannot simply be relegated to only cultural identity, 
but is a much more complex synthesis of group identity. National identity, as well as 
nationalism, blossomed in Eastern Europe during the Cold War, and found root and 
grounds following the fall of the iron curtain and the collapse of the Soviet Union. And 
with case studies in the literature focusing on these regions, national identity, a synthesis 
as well, should be a focal point of analysis in some regards. 
 
Methodology and Research Design: 
 Noting the gaps in the literature, the first direction that my research ought to take 
is the study of the causal link between the state, national identity, and repression. 
National identity can provide a potential answer to the research question, why and how 
might a state, having just acquired an ethnic or minority group, repress said group 
following acquisition. If both the state’s interests, or leaders, and the ethnic or minority 
group possess strong national identities, or both have strong national identities with 
opposing goals and values, then there is a strong likelihood that the group with the most 
power to act, the state, will repress the weaker national identity, the one held by the 
ethnic or minority group. This satisfies the immediacy of the question, as differing 
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national identities with opposing desires and unity supports the idea of immediate 
repression, at least more so than the previous research on state repression on ethnic and 
minority groups. It is directions like this one that further research into the role of national 
identity in repression can take the literature.   
 National identity also addresses the lack of synthesis of cultural and institutional 
approaches to repression. If there was to be a synthesis of institutional and cultural 
research, then that would indicate the mixing between national identity based within 
institutions and culture. The synthesis provides greater depth to the immediacy of the 
research question, as the national identities’ relations to the state might not be centered 
only in the culture or the structure, but in potentially both. National identity leads to more 
complex relations, possibly resulting in repressive acts of the state.  
 In order to address these areas of research that have been exposed, this thesis will 
require the use of certain types of data and data collection. The research that will occur to 
support the theory is that of a single case study done with qualitative methods and work. 
The data that will be needed to support this direction and eventual hypothesis requires in 
depth research of a single case, as it looks for indicators of repression amongst a singular 
case over time, and the potential causal link between the conflicting identity and 
repression. Results will therefore be researched in a specific case: the 2014 annexation of 
the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation. 
 As demonstrated by the case of Kulametova presented earlier, there exists not 
only a sense of unity, but also a national sense of identity amongst the Crimean Tatars. 
From Kulametova’s arrest under charges of “alleged” threats and insults of an officer and 
sentencing to the help she received from fellow Crimean Tatars, there is an 
 
 17 
understanding, reported by UATV and Crimean Solidarity, that, as Kulametova see it, 
“unity is the only way to confront Russian aggression” (UATV 2018). The case of 
Crimean annexation and Russian occupation, especially regarding its ethnic minority, the 
Crimean Tatars, is under-researched, and demonstrates the importance of national 
identity and the synthesis within the literature. In this case, both the Crimean Tatars and 
the Russian Federation claim a cultural and institutional connection to the Crimean 
Peninsula. For the Russians, the peninsula is Russian soil, home of a large Russian 
population with support from the Kremlin and leaders like Sergei Aksyonov, and it is 
strategic territory on the Black Sea. For the Crimean Tatars, Crimea is their homeland, 
which is tied to their blood and culture, and is where their population physically lives 
after decades of attempting to return. For both parties, their national identity and national 
movements revolve around cultural, ethnic, and territorial ties, with the latter representing 
institutional connections. For Crimean Tatar identity, their identity is in a state of 
homeward bound-ness, that is, their identity is directly tied to the Crimean Peninsula as 
their homeland and their sense of unity. There is a synthesis of culture and institution, in 
this case in the form of land. In this case, there is the Crimean Tatar national identity, 
which holds a negative view of Russian occupation and rule; and the Russian state 
priorities and Russian national identities in Crimea, and both oppose the other in asserting 
their claim over the territory. The Crimean Tatars are at a huge disadvantage, lacking any 
real hegemonic power, thus leading to the repression of the Crimean Tatars by the 
stronger power, the Russian Federation, which supports the Russian identities within the 
region. The history of Crimean Tatar status under Russian rule will also be a preliminary 
focus of at least one chapter, as that history contains Crimean Tatar’s under different 
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forms of Russian rule, from the Russian empire through to the end of the Soviet era. The 
historical data will provide the context for recent Crimean Tatar and Russian actions, 
track the development of Crimean Tatar national identity, and the historical significance 
of the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian state and the Crimean Tatars. 
It is through this case study, the Russian occupation of Crimea, that allows for my 
research to flourish, and it is where I propose to continue my own research on state 
repression of ethnic and minority groups. Beginning with the conceptualization of 
national identity, which I have deemed important to answering the research question, the 
literature looks towards Benedict Anderson and Rogers Brubaker. While both have 
expertise in nationalism, aspects national identity can be garnered from their definitions 
of nation, nationalism, and the conflicts that can exist in between. In his 
conceptualization of nationalism, Anderson takes an anthropological approach, and 
deems it to be closer to “’kinship’ and ‘religion,’ rather than with ‘liberalism’ and 
‘fascism’” (Anderson 2006, 4-5). This definition of nationalism maneuvers it within the 
community of the people, where it exists alongside them, instead of existing as some sort 
of high concept or ideology. Nationalism becomes a concept of culture and history, as 
does the nation and national identity. Anderson understands this and moves forward to 
then define “nation,” having first historicized and cultured nationalism, as “an imagined 
political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (5-6). He 
breaks this down, as they are limited regarding their conceptual and spatial size, which is 
finite and exclusive. They are sovereign as the concept originated during the 
Enlightenment and the fall of divine-right, and they are communities as they are “always 
conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (6).  National identity plays a part in 
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nationalism, which regarding the Crimean Tatar side of the case is relevant and a part of 
the history of their struggle in their homeward bound-ness during the Soviet era. By using 
Anderson’s conception of nation, national identity, that which identifies with something 
greater, such as a nation, is thus defined. 
The importance in Brubaker’s work to the understanding of national identity lies 
in his triadic nexus. Brubaker’s nationalism is understood through the triadic nexus, 
which is an “interlocking and interactive” triadic equilibrium of nationalisms that are all 
“distinct and mutually antagonistic,” made up of homeland nationalism, nationalizing 
nationalism, and national minorities (Brubaker 1996, 4-5). Homeland nationalism is 
nationalist support of a nation’s people who are not within the homeland, nationalizing 
nationalism is the nationalization of the institutions by the core nation of a state, and the 
national minorities are usually caught between the others, defending their own autonomy 
and identity (5-6). It is this conflict that is important to the understanding of the link 
between the state, repression, and national identity, as a minority national identity would 
be in conflict with the state, and in conflict with a group that possesses a national identity 
that is in conflict with that of the minority group. 
There exist many possible avenues for data collection and the analysis of this case 
study, but given financial and temporal constraints, are limited to a few that I have 
identified. Firstly, data collection can be done through content analysis. As stated in the 
variables subsection above, when analyzing for indicators of repression, it will come in 
the form of spoken word, rhetoric, and any type of documentation or writing. The types 
of spoken and written word that would be used to collect data would include the 2014 
Referendums, Kremlin Speeches and comments regarding both the annexation and the 
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Crimean Tatars, Mejlis speeches and comments regarding both the annexation and the 
Russians, Russian news media, Ukrainian news media, Crimean Tatar news media (at 
least, those that are still available). The content analysis of these types of documentation 
and speech will provide insight into the volume and nature of the rhetoric used. For 
example, the Russian sources would be analyzed for the usage of words that pertain to the 
categorization of citizen, as Russian media in the post-Soviet era had, according to 
Brubaker, five different terms to differentiate peoples: russkie, or Russians by 
ethnocultural nationality; rossiiane, or politically correct version of russkie, refers to the 
ethnofederalism of Russia; russkoiazychnye, or Russian speakers; sootechestvenniki, or 
compatriots; and grazhdane, or citizens (Brubaker 1996, 142-4). The same sort of 
analysis would be done with the other types of written and spoken documentation.   
A second type of data collection possible for this research is behavioral 
observation. This focuses on the actions, such as laws or promises made by the Russian 
Federation to the Crimean Tatars, and the actions made by the Crimean Tatars in 
response to the Russian rule. State action and state legislation provide areas where 
institutional repression might originate. This can be seen in the Russian Federation’s 
promise to the Crimean Tatars that they would be provided with the resources necessary 
to continue supporting the reinvigoration of the Crimean Tatar language, yet, the 
textbooks and other resources never came.  This also led to the relegation of Crimean 
Tatar to a lower level necessity language, with Russian overtaking it (Bocale 2016). 
Examples like this are types of behavior that are observable, just as law enforcement 
activity and legal issues between the Crimean Tatars and the Russians: i.e. the banning of 
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the Crimean Tatar’s highest legislative body, the Mejlis, in a move to weaken opposition 
to Russian rule. 
In conjunction with the primary source data that will be collected to support the 
hypothesis, copious amounts of secondary sources have also been collected to provide 
more academic support to the claims and analysis of the primary sources, as well as help 
develop the historical context that will prove integral to the analysis of the case study. 
The secondary source collection was completed during the months of June and July 2018 
at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign’s Summer Research Lab, hosted by the 
Russian, East European, & Eurasian Center and Slavic Reference Service. Under a Title 
VIII Grant-funded Associateship, this research was conducted over a period of weeks, 
and in addition to providing academic secondary sources for this thesis, provided a few 
primary sources as well, largely those focusing on the annexation of the Crimean 
Peninsula. These methods of data collection might not be extensive, but they will provide 
information to be analyzed on both national identity and repression, and will not only 
further demonstrate that the case selection works with the theory, but also help support 
the hypothesis. 
To provide focal points to the evaluation and search for data, eight indicators of 
repression will be used. These indicators are based off of the work from the literature 
review as well as John Coakley’s work on resolving ethnic conflicts. While he was 
working on how state’s might handle ethnic conflict, my work focuses on repression, so 
there will be differences in our indicators (Coakley 1992, 344). The indicators of 
repression that I will look for in the data collection and research are: Voluntary 
movement, forced movement, imprisonment, disappearances, removal of rights, othering, 
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punishment, and cultural destruction. Voluntary movement refers to the movement of 
minority groups out of their homes and territory as a response to occupation or 
displacement out of fear or distrust. Forced movement is any act by the state that moves 
the minority population against their will. Imprisonment can be understood as the 
imprisonment of political opponents or adversaries under false pretenses. Disappearances 
are acts of repression in which individuals of the minority community just disappear. This 
happens to activists within the minority community. Removal of rights can represent any 
action taken by the state that limits the minority groups rights to act politically, culturally, 
or in any way that represses their national identity, such as limits on language instruction. 
Othering of the minority group results in the state spreading an alternate narrative and 
depiction of the minority group, usually to discredit and ostracize the group. Punishment 
refers to actions taken against the minority group for not participating in state functions, 
such as elections, or for resisting state authorities. And finally, cultural destruction, this 
is understood as the destruction of cultural infrastructures. These indicators are not meant 
to be wholly comprehensive of the severity and judgement of the state evaluated. Rather, 
the indicators provide a way to categorize and refine the bigger picture of the evaluated 
state’s repressiveness. It is the differences between cases of repression categorized 
through the identifiers that allow for more nuanced evaluations beyond simply stating one 
state is more repressive than another. With these indicators, the types of repression the 
Crimean Tatars faced under various forms of Russian rule, from the Russian Empire’s 
annexation under Catherine the Great to the Russian Federation’s current occupation of 
the peninsula, will be evaluated to demonstrate how the Russian-Crimean Tatar relations 
in the present day represent an answer to my research question. 
 
 23 
It should be noted as well, that the data gathered is by no means exhaustive and 
fully complete. Given the time and monetary constraints of this project, the information, 
and the subsequent evaluation of it, may not offer the most accurate conclusions. 




Through the understanding of national identity as an “imagined community” and 
minority groups as a target of repression from a state which possesses an agenda 
challenged by the group’s national identity and/or supports another group whose national 
identity is perceived to be threatened by the minority group, my hypothesis manifests as: 
States are likely to immediately repress ethnic or minority groups that they have just 
acquired (whether through territorial expansion, land acquisition, border restructuring, 
emigration, etc.) if the state’s goals and ambitions are in direct conflict with the national 
identity of a minority group, and that minority group acts in solidarity to oppose or cry 
foul the actions of the state. This hypothesis will be tested through the qualitative 
analysis, as well as a content analysis, of the 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula 
and its aftermath, where two actors, the Crimean Tatars and the Russian Federation, 
maintain a tension of state action and national identities stemming directly from the 
peninsula itself. Given their long history of repression and target, both the Russians and 
the Crimean Tatars maintain that Crimea is theirs. Only in this case, the Russians, being 
the stronger force and supported through the state structures, is prevailing, thus leading to 
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the Crimean Tatars, who are actively attempting to resist Russian rule, becoming targets 
of insidious, semi-violent and nonviolent repression. 
 
Chapter Outline: 
  Following the prospectus, which acts as both introduction and first chapter of the 
thesis, establishing the theory and methodologies to be used, the next chapter will be a 
historical breakdown of Russian-Crimean Tatar relations under the Russian Empire and 
the Soviet Union. Using the indicators of repression, the status of the Crimean Tatars and 
levels of repression they faced will be analyzed. As well, this chapter will also help map 
the development of Crimean Tatar national identity from the Russian Empire through the 
Soviet period.  
 The third chapter will analyze the Crimean Tatars status under Ukrainian rule 
during the brief period between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 2014 
annexation. By looking at this period more in depth than the Imperial and Soviet periods, 
the analysis of the relations between the Crimean Tatars, the Ukrainian government, and 
the Russian population of the peninsula will reveal a stark distinction between the levels 
of conflict the Crimean Tatars and the two groups. While the Crimean Tatars were able to 
return to Crimea during the 1990s and 2000s, they faced different relations with the state 
and the Russian population of Crimea, the latter of which will become increasingly 
important in the next chapter. 
 The fourth chapter will study the Crimean annexation of 2014 and the impact it 
had on the Crimean Tatars. It is in this chapter that the content analysis of the data 
searching for the indicators of repression will aim to reflect my hypothesis. The Russian 
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factors for annexation and the Crimean Tatar factors for resistance and protest reveals a 
scenario that fits the hypothesis, as the indicators and the actions taken by the state and 
the minority group demonstrate that the result of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula 
on the Crimean Tatar population is repressive action by the Russian state. The national 
identity of the Crimean Tatars was perceived as under threat by Russian occupation, and 
so the Crimean Tatars resisted, and those actions by the Crimean Tatars were perceived 
by the Kremlin and Russian authorities as threatening to their stake in Crimea. 
 The final chapter will continue the analysis of the 2014 annexation, relating it 
back into the wider context of the research question, as well as its place in the whole of 
Crimean Tatar history. Here the 2014 annexation and the repression of the Crimean 
Tatars under Russian occupation will be compared to the previous iterations of repression 
under types of Russian rule. In this comparison, it will become clear that the hypothesis, 
that states are likely to immediately repress ethnic or minority groups that they have just 
acquired if the state’s goals and ambitions are in direct conflict with the national identity 
of a minority group, and that minority group acts in solidarity to oppose or cry foul the 
actions of the state, works in this era of Crimean Tatar-Russian relations in part due to the 
history between the two groups, the development of a national identity over periods of 







Chapter 2: The Origins of Crimean Tatar Removal: Imperial Russia and the Soviet 
Union 
Before beginning the analysis of Crimean Tatar national identity and state 
repression under Russian rule, it is imperative to cover the history of both Crimean Tatar 
national identity and their colorful history with Russian rule. As will be discussed shortly, 
the history between these two groups is heavily interwoven, making each other a part of 
each other’s history with varying degrees of impact on their respective histories. For the 
Crimean Tatars, the impact will prove to be much heavier than for the Russians, and this 
will play a key role in their national identity as it exists in modernity. As such, this 
chapter, while not having a direct focus on political analysis and laying more of an 
emphasis on historical development and relations, will highlight the impact of history and 
the past on the development of national identity, particularly in the case of the Crimean 
Tatars. The history of the interactions between Russian rulers, states and the Crimean 
Tatar people will prove to be necessary in moving forward in this thesis, providing 
invaluable background information for the understanding of Crimean Tatar stances and 
apprehensions towards modern Russian rule before, during, and after the annexation of 
Crimea in 2014.  
 History has importance in this case not only regarding how the Crimean Tatars 
and Russian states have interacted in the past, but also in framing the cornerstone of 
Crimean Tatar national identity. Central themes of modern Crimean Tatar national 
identity, memory and shared experiences, have incredible weight on the direction and 
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strength of their movements, as Dr. Greta Uehling discovered: “knowledge and history 
convinced them of the rightness of return but it was the recruitment of memory and 
sentiment into political practice and the performance of success that animated the 
movement for repatriation” (Uehling, 17). It is through this history, struggle for 
autonomy, and their homeland that the core of Crimean Tatar national identity must be 
understood. On one hand, history plays a large role in the development of the imagined 
community, given Anderson’s anthropological understanding of a nation. On the other, 
some Crimean Tatar scholars and leaders, such as Mustafa Dzhemilev (sometimes spelled 
as Jemilev), find that the history of Crimean Tatars as a nation aiming for national 
liberation began as early as the first few years under Russian annexation by Catherine the 
Great (Dzhemilev 2003, 3). By starting with the history between these groups so from 
Catherine the Great’s annexation of the Peninsula in 1783, and ending this chapter around 
the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the return of Crimea as Ukrainian 
territory, a clear picture emerges of their mutual relations and the growth of the national 
identity. This picture will provide the background needed to understand the impact and 
goals of Crimean Tatar national identity and nationalism from the late twentieth until the 
early twenty-first century. This history also reveals the Russian aspirations for Crimea as 
a territorial acquisition, indeed the pearl of the Russian Empire, as the territory 
maintained its importance during the Soviet period. The Peninsula, as well as the Russian 
and Soviet actions taken against the minority group, holds historical weight for both the 
Crimean Tatars and the Russians, playing a major role in the development of the Crimean 
Tatar’s national identity in the mid-twentieth century. This complex, intertwined picture 
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will be depicted in this chapter to give the analysis a solid groundwork steeped in the 
history. 
 While a vast majority of this chapter will be focused on the historical framework 
and relations under various types of Russian rule before the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
a portion of the history will be subjected to the evaluation of the indicators of repression. 
The time period in Crimean Tatar history of which this analysis will focus is the period 
post-WWII, after the 1944 deportation and the beginning of Crimean Tatar exile. It is 
during this time in their history that Crimean Tatars first began to develop their modern 
sense of national identity, tied to memory and the return. This period in their history also 
saw the physical manifestation of these sentiments and collective memory in the form of 
the Crimean Tatar National Movement, which allowed for political mobilization and 
demonstration. This is also the ideal moment to start the evaluation of the indicators of 
repression because it is one of the first concrete representations of Crimean Tatar national 
identity as a collective identity. The incarnation of national identifiers from this period 
also maintains relevancy and evolve in due time within the current forms of their national 
identity post-Soviet collapse, further indicating that this is the best starting point for the 
evaluation. Here, the Crimean Tatars become an imagined community, using Anderson’s 




In 1783, the Russian Empire under Tsarina Catherine the Great annexed the 
Crimean Peninsula after the Crimean Khanate failed to unify under Sahin Girey and 
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becoming a protectorate of the Russian Empire (Uehling 2004, 33). With the constant 
pushing for the Russian annexation of the region by Prince Potemkin, Catherine the Great 
finally agreed to take the Peninsula. She justified the annexation of the Crimean 
Peninsula “by pointing out that Russia had never received her just gains from the war of 
1768-74” (Fisher 136). Eventually, the Ottomans accepted the annexation, as the 
reaffirming of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca signaled, which reaffirmed without the 
articles that pertained Crimea and Crimean independence (138-139). After the annexation 
of the Crimean Peninsula, Crimea soon became known as a jewel, as “Crimea was 
coveted as the Pearl in the tsar’s crown” (Uehling, 26). The region was strategically well 
placed on the Black Sea, giving the Russian Empire a seaport with access to the Ottoman 
Empire and the West. The Peninsula was held as a beauty in its subtropics that remained 
unmatched in its exoticism and beauty anywhere in the empire. The expansionism of the 
era of Catherine the Great soon heavily impacted the Crimean Tatar population, as 
Uehling states, “Colonialism had a tremendous impact on the Crimean Tatars because 
Catherine took control of the land as though it were empty of inhabitants, giving away 
over one-tenth of the land to nobles and favorites” (34-35). Considered the “pearl” of the 
empire, Russian expansionism and colonialism eventually displaced the Crimean Tatar 
population in the peninsula, leaving many to voluntarily emigrate, only for historians and 
Crimean Tatars to retrospectively find that these were more like deportations than 
migrations (Uehling 2004, 34) (Pohl 2015, 16). While colonialism played a role in the 
Crimean Tatars living conditions, it did not play the only part, as the Russian-Turkic wars 
also negatively impacted the population, influencing emigration and the selling land to 
fund travel to safer places (O’Neill 211-212). This would not be the final incident of mass 
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migration/deportation from the Crimean Peninsula before the turn of the 20th century, as 
the diaspora continued over the next few centuries with larger scale migrations happening 
during the Russian-Turkic War of 1807-1811 and the Crimean War of 1859-1863 
(Uehling 2004, 35). By the beginning of the 20th century, hundreds of thousands of 
Crimean Tatars had been removed from the peninsula, voluntarily or otherwise, leaving 
the entire population of Crimea only 25 percent Crimean Tatar (Uehling 2004, 35; 
Williams 2000, 103). Even though the Crimean Tatars felt pressured under Russian rule, 
Russian rule did help develop the Crimean Tatar intelligentsia, a development that helped 
articulate further Crimean Tatar national identity and nationalism. 
The region was heavily populated however, as “the Crimea was quickly settled by 
Russian and Ukrainian peasants, as well as Jews (including native Karaites), Greeks, 
Armenians, and Bulgarians, some of whom had already established their first 
communities on the peninsula centuries earlier” (Naimark, 100). The Crimean Tatars and 
other ethnic minorities found themselves in a situation where they needed to develop 
adaptability. Problems developed, however, “With the influx of Russians and Ukrainians, 
social tensions between Tatars and non-Tatars episodically exploded in rioting and 
pogroms” (Naimark, 100). These actions would escalate through the climax of the of the 
Crimean War under Tsar Alexander II. Naimark goes further, stating, “As a consequence, 
Tsar Alexander II encouraged what he called the ‘voluntary emigration’ of some 100,000 
Tatars from the peninsula, most of whom ended up under Ottoman rule or fled 
persecution to other centers in the region” (100). Under Tsarist Russian rule, the Crimean 
Tatars suffered possibly the first of the centuries of potential repressions and forced 
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migrations that they would be forcibly subjected to under Russian and Soviet rule, what 
has come to be known as the “first exile” (Uehling, 35).  
This was not the case in the beginning, however, as the Crimean Tatar Muslim 
community was approached and incorporated into the Russian Empire in similar fashions 
as had been done with other periphery, steppe, and often Muslim populations. For 
Catherine the Great, the annexation was meant to support the idea of Russia as an 
enlightened state, one willing to accept and foster cultural difference (O’Neill 212).  The 
Russian military forces and Russian governing officials began co-opting the local elites, 
giving the Crimean Tatars positions in their governing bodies and political power within 
the system. In her research, Kelly O’Neill found that between 1785 and 1796, Crimean 
Tatar’s represented 18.9% of Provincial level offices, 45.2% of district-level, 14.5% of 
Appointed offices, 81.7% of Elected offices, leaving them with almost 30% of all 
political office positions (58). As well, in accordance with Catherine the Great, being 
“Muslim” did not mean that they could not be “loyal subjects of the Russian Empire,” 
enforcing policies supporting the cultural differences of the Muslim population in order 
to show that they had the support of the empire, while the empire opted for control for 
loyalty (O’Neill, 38-39, 61, 82). Some reasoning behind the eventual periodic removal of 
the Crimean Tatar population is that the Russian authorities over time did not know 
exactly how to incorporate and deal with, what was dubbed by historian Alan Fisher, an 
early Western academic writer on the history of the Crimean Tatars as, “the Tatar 
Problem.” This can be summed up as referring to “the unique challenges of administering 
a predominantly Muslim population with a strong steppe tradition,” and the first decades 
of governance by the Russian empire seem to reflect this issue (O’Neill, 59). And the 
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Russian authorities did grow to realize that along with their identifying with a religious 
community, the umma, which included the Ottoman Muslims. As such, the Tatars were 
potentially a ticking time-bomb, a security threat for the Russian Empire’s Black sea 
borders; hence, that they needed to enforce more control over the Muslim community 
(O’Neill, 60-61; Williams 2000, 82). “The Tatar Problem,” a fear of religious loyalty 
over imperial loyalty, and attempts towards “slavicisation” played into the increasing 
antagonism between the Russian colonials and other settlers of Crimea and the Crimean 
Tatar population (Aydıngün and Yıldırım 2010, 54). As the Crimean Tatars emigrated, 
the Russian Empire seemed un-phased, instead finding the true calling of the empire at 
large to be filling “the empty lands, tame the unkempt forests, and produce the kin of 
deep knowledge that would render the southern empire legible, accessible, and close to 
the heart of Russia” (O’Neill, 218). Over time, and with the concern spreading about the 
questionable loyalties of the Crimean Tatars during times of war with the Ottomans, the 
Crimean population was left with little choice but to migrate out of the Peninsula, with 
many leaving for the Ottoman Empire, displaced by Russian and German settlers. It is 
here that the geo-political location of the Peninsula as a Black sea port and a source 
fertile land drove Russian imperial desires to colonize and settle the space at the expense 
of the large Muslim population.  
These migrations that occurred throughout the late 18th and 19th centuries, while a 
topic of some debate amongst historians as to the primary cause, became the last resort of 
the Crimean Tatar population because of their deteriorating relations with the Russians, 
questioned loyalties, and the populations’ continued identification with Ottoman 
Muslims. The collective fears of military leaders and the unease around the Muslim 
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population’s identifying with Ottoman Muslims were exacerbated during war, of which 
there were numerous throughout the 19th century between the Ottomans and the Russians 
(Williams, 2000, 82). At the same time, the Tatar population was finding itself left with 
the decision on whether or not to leave the Peninsula. Groups of Crimean Tatars and 
other ethnic groups had been leaving the Peninsula since the 1783 annexation, possibly 
due to the annexation, and possibly because of the threats of war between their new state 
and the Ottoman Empire, with which they had more in common than the Russians. 
Combining some Crimean Tatars’ desire to resettle in the Ottoman Empire and the 
insecurity and potential unease felt by the populations relational proximity with the Turks 
and questioning their loyalty to their new leaders led to Potemkin and Catherine the Great 
declaring emigration to be acts of treason by 1787 (O’Neill 87). This led to possibly the 
first real example of what will become a trend in Russian historical dealings with the 
Crimean Peninsula and the Crimean Tatars, and a disregard for the indigenous 
population, as every Tatar that petitioned to emigrate was to be exiled (87-88). While the 
Empire was trying to be culturally aware and supportive, when it came to the actions of 
the Muslim population, their actions needed to align with those of a loyal subject of the 
empire, thus pitting Russian law against Muslim law, and Islam against Russian 
Orthodoxy.  
These emigrations, even after having been declared treason and resulted in the 
exile of some, still occurred, in no small part due to the numerous wars between the 
Turks and the Russians. During the Russian-Ottoman War of 1806-1812, roughly three 
thousand Crimean Tatars emigrated to Anatolia or Rumelia (O’Neill 211). The conditions 
of the population around this war and others prior were far from ideal. There was disease, 
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horrid weather and wartime economic downturns that led many to emigrate (146-147). 
However, on top of these worsening conditions, their loyalty would come into question, 
as seen during the cautionary resettlement of the coastal villagers by Russian military 
personnel during the short war in 1828-1829, even though there was no need to question 
their loyalty (Williams 2000, 84). While there was no emigration during this war, it was 
just a sign of things to come. Following the start of the Crimean War in 1853, the 
Crimean Tatars and other Muslim populations in Crimea found that this war, more so 
than the others, brought disease, accusations of treason and questioned loyalties, hunger, 
and Cossack depredations, leading to a mass migration from their lands between 1859 
and 1861 with around a quarter million leaving (O’Neill 152). Following Russia’s defeat 
in the Crimean War, accusations of treason were getting levelled at the Crimean Tatars 
by “powerful landowners” opting to use them to try and profit off of the land by having 
them removed, and further sowing the seeds of distrust towards the population (Williams 
2000, 90). For not the last time in their history, this narrative is the one that stuck. While 
this narrative is heavily over-exaggerated and falsifies the Crimean Tatar’s role in the 
war, for those with governing and military power, the questionable loyalty of the 
Crimean Tatars and this false narrative were enough to cause Crimean Tatars to emigrate 
(Williams 2000, 90-92). This “treachery” against the empire would be the subject of 
discussion throughout the Crimean Tatar and Russian histories, especially during the 
Soviet period post-World War II. As a result of these accusations and worsening relations 
between the Russians and Crimean Tatars, the Crimean Tatars feared rumored forced 
conversion to Orthodoxy or expulsion to Siberia, thus leading to the largest of the 
emigrations out of Crimea and the Russian Empire into the Ottoman Empire (94). The 
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emigration was perilous for the population, with many dying in transit (Williams 1997, 
229). Further migrations would occur in 1874 and between 1891-1902, but they were 
never on the same scale as the emigration following the aftermath of the Crimean War 
(230). Interestingly enough, the emigrations following the Crimean War were halted by 
Russian authorities and pomeshchiks (noble landowners), as the emigrations were 
harming the economy of the region, and would be a potential loss of valuable labor, 
continuing the theme of Russian interests resting in the land the economic aspirations of 
the region (230). Ultimately, these emigrations during the first century of Russian rule 
demonstrate the fragile nature of the relations between the Russians and the Crimean 
Tatar, where war, economic prosperity, and religious convictions only seemed to 
exacerbate mistrust and undermine the enlightened origins of the relationship, or, as 
Kelly O’Neill so eloquently puts it: “This was an empire in which the line between 
integration and isolation could be maddeningly thin… This was an empire in which 
difference—defined in ethnic and cultural terms—could be at once a source of 
empowerment and grounds for suppression (123).” 
As stated earlier, with Russian colonialism came the right conditions for the 
emergence of a Crimean Tatar intelligentsia. While it is the case that the Crimean Tatar 
community and the Russian authorities’ relations had deteriorated, this was only a side 
effect of the annexation and the attempts at the integration of the Tatar society into the 
Russian Empire. The Crimean Tatars educated in Russian and European institutions 
helped lead the way for an intelligentsia, with the first signs coming around the 1870’s 
(Williams 1997, 230).  The growth of an intelligentsia allowed for the development of 
Crimean Tatar nationalism, as well as for the rise of Crimean Tatar national leaders. 
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Leaders such as Shihabeddin Merjani and Ismail Bey Gasprinski (some use Gaspirali) 
helped form Crimean Tatar nationalism in the early 20th century, especially the latter. 
This nationalism was centered around the recovery of the culture, and religion that was 
ransacked during the centuries of colonialism, exile, and war (Uehling 2004, 35). It is 
important to note that those several reasons for nationalism forming amongst the Crimean 
Tatar intelligentsia will prove to be archetypes for the national identity that will follow 
the 1944 deportation by Stalin and Beria. 
Their ideas, especially those of Gasprinski, included cooperation with Russians 
for the revival of traditions, gender equality, and the modernization of Russian Islam. 
These ideas and the actions of Crimean Tatar nationalists were designed to be taken in 
congruence with the Russian Government by participating in the legislature and 
governmental congresses (35). The efforts of nationalists like Gasprinski helped to 
reform the education of Crimean Tatars, secularizing the education, and encouraging 
progressive ideals to replace the stilted conservatism of Tatar elites (231). In addition, 
they attempted to establish a Pan-Turkic movement, claiming that all Turks ought to unite 
under a common culture and language. Mladotatary, or Young Tatars, a group of 
Crimean Tatars that were followers of Gasprinski, developed the nationalist idea of 
vatan, which birthed the idea of the Crimean Peninsula as a “Homeland,” and the bound-
ness of the Crimean Tatar national identity to the land (Williams 1997, 232). The national 
leaders, along with a large youth population of Crimean Tatars, decided to try and work 
with the Russian government to get their reforms and desires met, however, this 
ultimately failed due to the Tsar’s crackdown on social revolutionaries during the 1905 
attempted revolution (Kirimli 1996, 278) (Skocpol 1976, 182). There seemed to be a 
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suspicion amongst police in Russia over the fear of growing nationalist sentiments among 
the Crimean Tatar intelligentsia and youth, especially the potential ties to the Turks, even 
if the full picture was never known (Kirimli 1996, 287-288). Again, the question of 
loyalties comes into play for the Crimean Tatars in Russian eyes, and again their actions 
are cautious and mistrusting. These ideas of national identity did not disappear with the 
failure of the revolution, as there was a resurgence during the 1917 October Revolution 
(Dzhemilev 2003, 9). During the instability of the Russian Empire during WWI and the 
October Revolution, the Crimean Tatar revolutionaries, formed from a group established 
in Istanbul known as Vatan, were able to reclaim Crimea through political power and 
revolution. Again, this was short lived, as they were conquered by, a mostly Russian, Red 
Army (Williams 1997, 233).  It wouldn’t be until shortly thereafter Lenin’s Nationalities 
Policy that the Soviet Union would allow the Crimean Tatars their claim to Crimea in the 
form of the Crimean ASSR (Uehling 2004, 36). In what can be described as a second 
wave of co-optation by Russians, at this point Soviets’ governing bodies, Crimean Tatars 
and the Milli Firka, the Crimean Tatar National Party, were given governing positions of 
power in the region (233-234). This would be the “golden age” of the Crimean Tatars, at 
least until Stalinism and World War II.  
 
Lenin’s Nationalities Policy and the Crimean ASSR 
In 1921, the Crimean Peninsula and the Crimean Tatars were granted their own 
Socialist republic, the Crimean Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic (ASSR), thanks to 
the Bolshevik Revolution in October of 1917 and Lenin’s Nationalities’ Policy. This 
policy enabled the national minority groups under the Soviet Constitution to aim towards 
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self-determination. This clause on self-determination was clung to by the Crimean Tatars 
and their efforts in the Crimean ASSR (Uehling 39). The Crimean ASSR allowed the 
Crimean Tatar’s to, albeit briefly, exist in the Peninsula under a national autonomy, not a 
territorial one. As was in vogue for early Marxism-Leninism and Bolshevism, the 
creation of this ASSR, while partly to correct the mistakes of the Russian Empire, mainly 
aimed to serve as a hub for the spread of Communism and the world revolution to 
Muslim and Turkic spheres (Chubarov, 1997, 43).  The creation of the Crimean 
Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic presented the Crimean Tatars the possibility of 
strength and movement as a people.  
However, this soon became a fleeting belief under Stalinism, just like under 
Tsarist rule. The Crimean Tatars found themselves under strict Bolshevik control, truly 
emphasizing the policy of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. The Crimean Tatars 
believed that under the Soviet rule they would have power and autonomy but as Naimark 
observes, “…this distribution of power was fictitious; the Crimea was completely at the 
mercy of Moscow’s whims” (Naimark, 101). Famine eventually hit the Soviet Union, 
particularly Ukraine and by extension, the Crimean Peninsula, killing millions, believed 
by many to be an act of ethnic cleansing to squelch the Ukrainian Independence 
Movement. It became known as the Holodomor, a man-made famine. This famine was 
exacerbated by the Soviet Union’s selling of Crimean grain (Uehling, 37). This claim was 
heavily denied by the Soviet Government; however, it is impossible to truly deny the fact 
that millions were killed in this famine. The famine represents the staple failures of the 
Five-Year Plans and the terror of Stalinism, and demonstrates the continued repression of 
the Crimean Tatars under Russian rule.  
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The Crimean Tatars also suffered cultural repression under early Stalinism. It 
seemed that as the Soviet Union strengthened as a State, the freedoms, self-
determination, and autonomy of the Crimean Tatars began to vanish. Linguistically, the 
Crimean language during early Stalinism was changed from Arabic script to Latin script, 
and then later to Cyrillic script. These linguistic changes had a perceived adverse impact 
on the culture and traditions of the Crimean Tatars, making it hard for them to keep their 
language relevant to their education, as well as their history (Uehling 37). Because 
Lenin’s Nationalities policy was more than likely implemented to support the spread of 
the world revolution with the side effect of national self-determination for the national 
minority groups, the policy became less relevant in view of Stalin’s shift towards 
Communism in one state. Now it would no longer be a priority to allow the national 
minority groups full self-determination. Instead, the new policy aimed at the integration 
of these groups into Soviet society in addition to maintaining State security, especially on 
the periphery (40). As Refat Chubarov claimed, “by the end of the 1930’s, Moscow’s 
policy towards the Crimean Tatars was the same as the Russian Empire’s colonial 
policies aimed at forcing the Tatars out of Crimea” (43). By the advent of the Second 
World War, it was clear that the Crimean Tatars and other national minority groups on 
the peripheries of the Soviet Union were facing steeper and steeper repressions, a far cry 
from the self-determination and autonomy that they were given during the early years of 
the Soviet Union. It is also by the Second World War, as well as this shift away from the 
Soviet Government supporting the national minority groups and focusing on territorial 
and ideological security, where those old fears of the Turkic connection to the Crimean 




World War II and the 1944 Mass Deportation 
During World War II, the Crimean Tatars, along with a number of other national 
minority groups on the peripheries of the Soviet Union, faced a dilemma: welcome the 
German invaders, or fight for the Soviet Union. Of course, this was not a case of siding 
with the Nazis and their ideology, or anything like being anti-Slav, this was a question of 
which group offers the better treatment of the minority group, in this case the Crimean 
Tatars. Because of the increasing repressions and loss of autonomy under Stalin’s Soviet 
Union, some Crimean Tatars felt that they could welcome German rule, as it could 
provide them more freedom and less repression than they were currently experiencing. 
However, the ideal of German rule was not to exist, as while they would be given more 
religious freedom than under Stalin, the repressions were often just as severe, if not more 
so, than Soviet repression. Hitler aimed to remove the peoples of the Peninsula, including 
the Crimean Tatars, in order to fill the empty space with Germans (Uehling, 37). From 
the West came German repression and oppression, and from the East came Stalinist 
repressions and mistreatment. Caught between the two evils, the number of Crimean 
Tatars who actually sided with the Nazis were very few and far between, while the 
majority of the population remained loyal to the Soviet Union, including the many 
Crimean Tatars that fought in the Red Army, some even becoming war heroes (Williams 
1997, 236-237; Open Society Institute, Forced Migration Projects 1996, 14-15; Naimark, 
101). Estimates are that around 8 thousand to 20 thousand Crimean Tatars joined the 
enemy, which is only a fraction of the estimated 1.4 million Soviet citizens that joined the 
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Nazis during World War II, and a small fraction of the Crimean Tatar population at the 
time, over 200 thousand at the time of the 1939 census (236; Demoscope Weekly).  
However, in May of 1944, with little warning, the Crimean Tatars were forcibly 
deported by Stalin and the NKVD under charges of mass Nazi collaboration (Stalin 1944, 
1-3). This claim was ludicrous, as only a small percentage of the population actually 
collaborated, and the movements of entire populations was not happening to other 
populations who had few collaborators, so there was no precedent for it. As this did not 
occur in other regions, such as the rest of Ukraine and Poland, where Nazi collaboration 
also existed, it was a blatant attempt to remove the Crimean Tatars from their homeland 
on the claim of Nazi collaboration, while only exiling those who collaborated in the other 
regions (Applebaum, 94). This suggests that there was something more sinister and 
targeted for the Crimean Tatars. While the reasons for the deportations outside of the 
false claim of mass collaboration by the entire population have been of some debate 
amongst historians, more recent historical research and work have had some potential 
reasons that follow themes that occurred from the very beginning of the Russian-Crimean 
Tatar relationship, namely colonialism and a fear of Turkic and Muslim influence. 
Historians like J. Otto Pohl claim that the deportation was an act of “settler colonialism” 
at the hands of the Soviet Union. “Settler Colonialism” occurs when settlers from 
imperialist nations “displaced the indigenous populations from much of their land in 
addition to depriving them of political control over the colonized territory” (Pohl 2015, 
48-49). His argument is that the deportation itself, which occurred over a three-day 
period in May of 1944, was forced by the NKVD, and “entailed a traumatic disruption of 
their collective existence” (Pohl 2014, 49-50). Other works have gone to claim that the 
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deportations were due to Stalin’s fear of Turkic influences, which lines up in the 
timeframe of the war, as Fisher reveals that the Turko-Russian Treaty of Neutrality 
signed in 1925 would not be renewed by the Soviet Union around the time of the 
deportation, lending to the idea that if Turkey was to enter the war on the side of the Axis 
Powers, then the presence of Turkic peoples, like the Crimean Tatars, would be a danger, 
and thus should be dealt with (Fisher, 168-169). Researchers today have come to the 
conclusion that collaboration was just an excuse; in reality “The Stalinist attempt to 
neutralize diaspora groups as potential supporters of foreign intelligence services and 
militaries led to their wholesale ethnic cleansing from 1937 to 1949” (Pohl 2012, 211). 
This means that fearing foreign conflict, Stalin removed national minorities, as they could 
lead to more conflict that they could not afford to get involved with during World War II, 
such as the Crimean Tatar’s links and proximity to Turkey. Some have even found that it 
is possible that the deportation was planned as early as the 1930’s, but the Second World 
War delayed its implementation, although no direct citation is given (Chubarov, 43). 
Nonetheless, Stalin and Beria’s plan to remove the Crimean Tatars from Crimea was 
swift and quiet, with the world only finding out about the deportation and the fate of the 
Crimean Tatars in 1946 due to a Soviet announcement about their fate and “treachery.”  
In the small hours of the morning of the eighteenth of May 1944, the NKVD, 
under the orders of Stalin and Beria, surrounded the homes of all of the Crimean Tatars 
and swiftly deported the entire population out of the peninsula. Hundreds of thousands of 
Crimean Tatars were tightly loaded into cattle trains, with a vast majority of the 
population sent to Central Asia, largely to Tashkent, while others were sent to Siberia to 
work in the forests. The process of deportation led to the deaths of tens of thousands of 
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Crimean Tatars, and many more over the first few years of exile. Soviet government data 
estimates indicate that around 20% of the population died between 1944 and 1945 on 
route to Tashkent and within the first six months of exile, whereas estimates from data 
collected by Crimean Tatar activists in the 1960s indicate that around 46% percent of the 
population died during the deportation (Lupu and Peisakhin, 839; Open Society Institute, 
Forced Migration Projects 1996, 14). While these numbers indicate some discrepancies 
between the two sets of data from the two sources, it nonetheless demonstrates the toll the 
deportation had on the Crimean Tatars. The whole of the Crimean Tatar population was 
forcibly exiled under the belief that the Crimean Tatars had engaged in Nazi 
collaboration. In the deportation of the entire Crimean Tatar population from Crimea to 
Central Asia and the Urals, one can see similarities between the reasoning of the Russian 
Empire’s perceptions of the Crimean Tatars as people of questionable loyalties and these 
collaboration accusations, as the Russian Empire’s view of Crimea as a strategic territory 
that it must maintain control over for its own security, even if it is at the expense of those 
current residents. 
 
Exile, Special Settlements, and Regrouping around a Tragedy 
Once the Crimean Tatars were deported en masse from their homeland, both the 
Crimean Peninsula and the history of the Crimean Tatars were altered by Stalin and his 
subordinates. In the Peninsula, Crimean Tatar homes were destroyed, along with mosques 
and other buildings of importance to the Crimean Tatar people, with some religious 
buildings getting converted into theaters and storage houses. Location and street names 
that were in the Crimean Tatar language or were related to the Crimean Tatars were 
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renamed and displayed in Russian. “The Crimean Tatars were told they were exiled ‘in 
perpetuity’ and ‘without the right to return to their previous place of residence,” thus 
making the move permanent (Naimark, 103). The Soviet Government even took steps 
under Stalin to censor the history of the Crimean Tatars, as “Tatar monuments were 
destroyed, books and manuscripts were burned, and history was rewritten to suggest that 
Tatars had engaged in little else but banditry and thievery throughout modern Russian 
history and had made no contribution to the development of their homeland” (104). The 
Crimean Tatars that arrived in Uzbekistan were treated with contempt, as the narrative of 
their betrayal had already been spread to the people in Tashkent. Crimean Tatars were 
defined in exile as existing in “special settlements,” a term that denoted them as enemies 
of the people, keeping them under high surveillance and strict boundaries. Those in the 
“special settlements” were at that moment bound to the land to which they were deported. 
The Soviet Union, having placed the Crimean Tatars in “special settlements” in 
Uzbekistan and the Urals, began to reshape the Crimean Tatar history and narrative. In 
the bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, the Crimean Tatars entry was removed and did 
not exist after the deportation until the death of Stalin. The Crimean Tatars had been 
labelled as traitors, with stories spreading that they were in fact also barbarians, 
cannibals, and demons, with reports of Crimean Tatar schoolchildren in exile getting their 
heads checked for horns when they arrived at school (Uehling, 28-29). It was within these 
depictions that the Crimean Tatars found themselves alone and seemingly stranded in 
Central Asia without a Government to back or protect them, as they were now an enemy 
of the people. 
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On top of the demonization, the Crimean Tatars faced starvation, disease, and 
maltreatment, as the provisions that were supposed to be provided to them as a “special 
settlement” by the Soviet government did not arrive. While the status as a “special 
settlement” would be removed in 1956 under Khrushchev, the Crimean Tatars would not 
be absolved of their label of treason until the issuing of a Soviet decree in 1967. Under 
Stalin, the Soviet Union and the secret police, both as the OGPU and then the NKVD, 
carried out the collection and the deportation of peoples it found to be enemies of the 
state and actors that went against the state, Lenin, Stalin, and the communist ideology of 
the Soviet Union. These special settlers, or spetspereselentsy, originally were kulaks, the 
wealthy peasantry labelled as rural capitalists (Viola 2007, 2). Special settlements were 
likened to forced labor camps, places where populations were forcibly deported, often to 
the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia (2). The special settlements “were not to replicate the 
peasant village; on the contrary, they were intended to break down and replace traditional 
peasant structures, social patterns, and sources of authority” (Viola 2007, 93). Placing the 
Crimean Tatar population in these highly restrictive and monitored settlements asserts the 
strict control of the group by the Soviet State, and the destruction of their culture and 
history from the land and textbooks act to strip the Crimean Tatars of their history and 
ties to the Crimean Peninsula, effectively reestablishing them as the enemy of the people 
that was portrayed post-WWII under Stalin’s regime. The Soviet Union was acting to the 
“other”- the Crimean Tatars, separating themselves from this group that had been labelled 
enemies of the people, efficiently isolating them. Some historians, such as Karina 
Korostelina, have argued that even the delayed official statement of the alleged crimes of 
the Crimean Tatars, two years after their exile, supports the idea that the Soviet Union 
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was isolating and separating the Crimean Tatars. The false narrative and changes made 
by the State would have been fully in effect, and the Crimean Tatars’ situation would not 
be questioned (Korostelina 2015, 34).  
Through these desperate times of need, the Crimean Tatars turned to each other 
and spoke about their history and the travesty of the deportation. In their exile, without 
books and a written history and culture to explore and perpetuate, the Crimean Tatars had 
conversations with each other, as well as the younger generations, including those born in 
the 14 years of internment in the special settlement system (Kirimli 1989, 71-72; Uehling 
114-117). In these conversations and stories told between those who had experienced it 
first hand, and those of newer generations, common subjects included the injustice of the 
deportation, the false narrative of Soviet concoction, and the beauty of the homeland 
Crimea. Crimea seemingly became almost fairytale-esque. Not in its nonexistence, but in 
the memories of the exiled, and the narratives they passed down, along with the 
imagining of this place that they were barred from returning to. The recounting of stories 
and the 1944 deportation allowed for the development of a shared memory based around 
the trauma. It is from this memory that the sense of national identity developed into a 
focus on the return to Crimea, a return to the homeland. As Uehling puts it:  
The micropolitical circulation of images and recollections within the family is 
related to macropolitics: Crimean Tatars like Fuat who experienced themselves as 
a minority in Uzbekistan were motivated to remember Crimea in a positive light, 
and when possible to move there. Thus, the sentiments Crimean Tatars 
experienced with regard to homeland had to do with relations of subordination 
and domination both within the Soviet (and post-Soviet) system as a ‘minority,’ 
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and within their own community in relation to the nationally inclined (Uehling, 
134). 
The endless recollection by the exiled population allowed for this community to unite 
through these shared memories and this shared trauma of the deportation of 1944 and the 
exile. The Crimean Tatar national identity has morphed since the deportation, but it has 
remained steadfast and strong, even in the face of cultural and linguistic destruction. 
Even if Crimean Tatars were not born in Crimea, or had more connections to the Soviet 
Union and Russia, the power of the myth of the homeland and the shared memory 
“means that a Crimean Tatar who speaks Russian and not his/her mother tongue and who 
has lost some of his/her cultural characteristics may still have a strong ethnic and national 
consciousness. The power of this consciousness comes from the feeling of exclusion and 
discrimination by the Soviet system” (Aydingün and Aydingün 2007, 127). This 
community became the essence of Anderson’s imagined community, as while they had 
an identity before the deportation, the scenario at hand and their shared trauma and 
memories of their abandonment by the Soviet state allowed for the creation of a more 
concrete national identity. An identity where they become a displaced nation, one 
wanting to return to Crimea at all costs, even if it is against the State’s interests. 
In a Soviet decree in 1967, the Crimean Tatar’s were exonerated, yet they were 
referred to as “citizens of Tatar nationality formerly resident in the Crimea” (Podgorny 
and Georgadze). Even though they had been exonerated, the Crimean Tatars were 
referred to as former residents, showing that while they had been wrongly removed, they 
would not be allowed back. The Soviet Union had now figuratively and literally 
displaced the Crimean Tatars from the Crimean Peninsula. It wouldn’t be until the end of 
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the Gorbachev era when the Crimean Tatars would be allowed to finally make their way 
back to the Crimean Peninsula, which they did in large numbers. 
 
Growing Nationalist Movement and Calls to Return 
Following Podgorny and Georgadze’s Soviet decree exonerating the Crimean 
Tatars of their supposed crimes against the Soviet Union during World War II, the 
Crimean Tatars thought they might finally be allowed to return to Crimea. This of course 
was not the case, and while they were allowed to move throughout the Soviet Union, no 
longer stuck in the special settlement system, which was abolished after the death of 
Stalin, they could not go back to Crimea. But as Uehling’s research points out: through 
collective memory, achieved through recounting the trauma of the deportation and the 
homeland over and over again for the new generations of Crimean Tatars, allowed for the 
culture to stay alive, and the eventual push to return to Crimea, their homeland (133). The 
development of a national movement to push through the idea of return seemed based 
around certain evidence throughout history that they did indeed belong in Crimea as a 
nation. This included the existence of the Crimean Khanate, the Crimean ASSR, which 
was argued to have legitimized the Crimean Tatar’s claim that the Crimean Peninsula 
was theirs, as Lenin and the Soviet Union were the ones who created the ASSR for their 
nationality, and then the events of World War II and the loss of property and culture 
though the 1944 deportation and the 1783 annexation, which was a grave injustice done 
to the Crimean Tatars (137).  With the slogan “Homeland or Death,” the Crimean Tatars 
mounted a campaign for returning. The nationalist movement began with small acts like 
letter writing, hoping that loyalty would be enough, but found it necessary to move onto 
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more active acts, such mass social movements and demonstrations under glasnost’ and 
perestroika (138).  
The national movement of the Crimean Tatars became focused on the idea of 
returning to the homeland. While their existence within the Soviet Union post-
exoneration was at least better than what it was in the special settlement, they still faced 
hardships and a lack of support from the government. That suggested to the Crimean 
Tatar leaders that they still wanted, to some extent, to prevent the resurgence of the 
Crimean Tatars as a nation and as the people of Crimea (Kirimli 1989, 85). Education, for 
instance, which would have been an important factor in the revival and survival of the 
Crimean Tatar language and culture, was severely lacking post-exoneration. There were 
very few trained instructors in the language, very little financial support, few courses per 
week, and poor and insufficient textbooks, which were also limited in quantity, leaving 
the people to be educated without sufficient resources (Aydingün and Aydingün 2007, 
123; Kirimli 1989, 82-85). It had appeared that the Soviet Union was not prepared, nor 
truly willing, to help the Crimean Tatars rehabilitate and repatriate. Thus, the Crimean 
Tatar leaders and the exiled people took their desire to return home into their own hands 
with the development of a national movement.  
As stated earlier, the national movement efforts started with letter writing to prove 
Crimean Tatar loyalties to the Soviet Union, but this did not work. By the 1960’s 
Crimean Tatar activism was growing, and developed contacts with dissident movements 
in the Soviet Union. The movement tried to get the Crimean Tatars reinstated in Crimea 
and the resurrection of the Crimean ASSR, moves which failed to garner support by the 
Twenty-Third Party Congress of the Soviet Union, to which they petitioned. This 
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ultimately caused some fractures within the movement over organization and how to 
proceed, so the movement to split into three factions: The Central Initiative Group, 
Ferghana, and Samarkand, each with different political leanings, but with essentially the 
same goal of return (Uehling 141). Even though the letters failed, the movement was to 
continue, and even impacted the youth, as they too found themselves rallying for a return 
to Crimea on the back of a growing historical literacy amongst those wanting more 
knowledge about Crimean Tatar history (142). History was important on two fronts: one, 
it allowed for the Crimean Tatars to find legitimate claims to Crimea and that as a people 
they belong there, and two, history played a key role in the establishment of the national 
identity that supported the Crimean Tatars and their desire to return. The movement used 
its knowledge of the past and its knowledge of the Soviet political system, the power of 
the Communist Party and image to frame its case for the ability to return. As the 1960’s 
and the next two decades came along, the movement held demonstrations that would 
grow in number year after year. To counter the movements and demonstrations of the 
Crimean Tatars, the Soviet authorities enacted a number of repressions aimed at derailing 
their grievances and claims to the right for a return to Crimea. There were arrests of 
activists, perhaps the most famous and most influential of the arrests was Mustafa 
Dzhemilev, who was a prominent leader in the Central Initiative Group. During one of 
his multiple arrests, he staged a hunger strike that lasted around 300 days, with him 
surviving only due to forced feeding by the prison personnel (Ideologs.). Other prominent 
activists, including Ayse Seytmuratova, also had been arrested multiple times by the 
Soviets under charges of “anti-Soviet” behavior. In addition to the arrests, there was 
propaganda from the Soviet government and Soviet news agencies, such as TASS. This 
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propaganda aimed at reinvigorating the “anti-Tatar” views held post-exile, hoping to 
relabel the Crimean Tatars as traitors, while still claiming that the deportation was unjust, 
thus delegitimizing their calls for a return. While these propagandistic efforts did have 
some results, they also drew more Crimean Tatars to join the national movement, which 
was able to counter the claims of the TASS announcement using their knowledge of the 
history (Uehling 163). There were also attempts to silence and dissuade the Crimean 
Tatars through surveillance and fear using the KGB. All while this was occurring, the 
movement kept building up steam.   
However, it would not be until Gorbachev’s glasnost’ and perestroika that the 
Crimean Tatars would be fully allowed to protest. This and the Gorbachev reforms 
presented the Crimean Tatars with the best opportunities to present their case for return to 
the world. By the late 1980’s, the groups making up the national movement had 
coalesced into two: The Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement (OKND), 
and the National Movement of the Crimean Tatars (NDKT), whose differences were in 
their political ideologies. With the creation of the Gromkyo Commission, which was 
headed by Andrei Gromkyo, the Soviet Union attempted to deal with the “Crimean Tatar 
Problem.” The Gromkyo Commission was not too kind to the demands of the Crimean 
Tatars, and the Crimean Tatars requests to return would not be heard until the 
appointment of Yanaev. It was under the Yanaev Commission in 1989 that allowed the 
Crimean Tatars the right to go back to Crimea. By May of 1990, somewhere around 120 
thousand Crimean Tatars had returned to Crimea, where they still ran into hardship and 
resistance to their presence by Soviet and Crimean officials (Uehling, 164-165; Williams 
1997, 243). The preparations for the return were not really thought out beyond the aims 
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to return, so there was little preparation for the resistance in the form of land grabbing for 
dacha construction and the endless paradoxical loop of acquiring a propiska, or residence 
permit, which was needed to get a job, and in order to get a propiska, one needed a job 
(Uehling, 164). Ultimately, this led to the Crimean Tatars resorting to squatting on land 
in order to claim it, as well as threatening self-immolation, a threat that had proven 
impactful on the Crimean Tatar activist community. One of the most impactful cases of 
self-immolation was of Musa Mahmut, who self-immolated himself in 1978 before he 
could be arrested and removed from Crimea, personifying the slogan “Homeland or 
Death.” While there was still the issue of getting land, the Crimean Tatars were allowed 
to return, with no small effort of their own, and, as Brian Glyn Williams calls it, the end 
of this “circle of migration,” where the second Kurultai, the Congress of Crimean Tatars, 
was held in 1991 (Williams 1997, 244). Having come from the depths of exile and the 
brink of cultural disintegration, the Crimean Tatars fought their way back through the 
shared memory of trauma and their history, perpetuated through oral narrative and 
community discussions, bringing the Crimean Peninsula to the forefront of the minds of 
the community, and a desire to return to the homeland. Ultimately, this desire and 
enthusiasm for oral history helped shape Crimean Tatar national identity into one that is 
both ethnic and cultural, but distinctly tied to Crimea, above all else.  
 
Evaluation 
 Taking into account the conditions necessary for evaluation depicted in the 
hypothesis, namely that the State will repress those ethnic or minority groups that they 
have just acquired if the state’s goals and ambitions are in direct conflict with the national 
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identity of a minority group, and that minority group acts in solidarity to oppose or cry 
foul the actions of the state, it is not immediately obvious how this first analysis will fit 
into that model. The problem with this evaluation is that it lacks some of the situational 
necessities of the hypothetical models, those being the new acquisition by the State of the 
minority group and the national identity of the minority group being the reason for the 
repression. While the latter is more complicated and will be discussed shortly, the former 
could be argued to fit here. The Crimean Tatars were forcibly exiled to Central Asia, 
especially Uzbekistan, so they, while still within the Soviet Union, were within the 
Central Asian Soviet Socialist Republic. This is not only a particularly different scenery 
for the Crimean Tatars, as they were moved from the periphery into the deep interior of 
the Soviet Union, but it is also a move that places the Crimean Tatars in a territory to 
which they have little ties and have had little interaction with, if any at all. And because 
of the multinational existence of the Soviet Union and the vast differences of its 
territories in certain places, this change of territory, on top of the special settlement 
status, might fit within the model. Similarly, the problem with national identity as the 
reason for repression could be understood in a slightly similar way. When exiled, the 
Soviet Union attempted to destroy Crimean Tatar culture and history, replacing it with 
their own retelling, depicting them as greedy barbarians who actively collaborated with 
the Nazis, as well as with the Ottomans and Anglo-French forces in their early history, as 
seen in the works of P. N. Nadinskii, an anti-Crimean Tatar Propagandist (Williams, 
2000, 91). Depicted as traitors of the Motherland, both during the Second World War and 
the Crimean War, this new narrative serves as a false identifier for the Crimean Tatars, 
making it understandable why they were met with fear and distrust at first in Uzbekistan 
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(Uehling 104). Here, the initial treatment and repression of the Crimean Tatars within the 
Soviet Union post-exile was based off of this false narrative which stood to define the 
Crimean Tatars as a treacherous people and the continued theme of fear of their loyalties. 
However, after the collapse of the special settlement system in the 1950’s and the 
Crimean Tatar’s exoneration in 1967 did not stop the repressions, only perhaps lessening 
them. The growth of the Crimean Tatar National Movement post-exile also provides a 
new source of Crimean Tatar identity, focused on the shared trauma of the 1944 
deportation and the desire for Vatan, the desire to return to the homeland. While the 
repressions did not start because of the national identity claimed by the Crimean Tatars 
themselves, the repressions did start more severely because of the false history provided 
by the Soviets. The national identity that would finally form because of the exile and the 
shared desire to return to the Peninsula, while partly an effect of the repressions, would 
soon become the national identity that would feel the impact of the repressions. What this 
analysis will show by analyzing the types of repression through the eight identifiers is 
how the repressions changed between Stalinism and the false narrative, and the 
manifested national identity of the Crimean Tatars post-special settler status and 
exoneration, and how the State reacted to each identity.   
 
- Voluntary Movement 
While there were probably some cases of voluntary movement during the Second 
World War, the evidence I was able to gather spoke not of this. Thus, it is difficult to 
definitively claim its existence during this period. As well, because of the special 
settlement moniker, the idea of voluntary movement was next to impossible. Thus, as an 
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identifier of repression pre-exoneration, it does not carry any weight, given the limits of 
the research. However, it is important to note that this was not due to the willful decisions 
of the Crimean Tatars not to leave, but because of their forced and monitored living 
conditions. 
 There was not much voluntary movement as defined in the first chapter post-
exoneration. Most voluntary movement would have been from Crimean Tatars who had 
decided to return to Crimea before the Yanaev Commission, such as Musa Mahmut had, 
and then decided to leave without being dragged out by the KGB. Potential other 
instances of voluntary migration may have occurred during the initial return, as some 
may have been overwhelmed by the hardships and struggle to obtain land in Crimea due 
to the actions of the Crimean officials. However, in my research, I found little evidence 
or little written about this actually occurring.  
 
- Forced Movement 
The Crimean Tatars, outside of the forced deportation of 1944, faced forced 
movement in the form of the special settlements. The special settlements were overseen 
by the OGPU and later the NKVD, which meant that the special settlements were 
anything but free, as “checking-in was imperative and it was forbidden to travel outside a 
small radius” (Uehling, 100). This form of forced movement existed as containment, 
where instead of being forced to move to another location, they were forced to stay put, 
denied the right to return and the right to move to another location within the Soviet 
Union. So, in the case of forced movement pre-exoneration, the Crimean Tatars were the 
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recipients of this form of repression placed upon them by the state and enforced by the 
secret police.  
Post-exoneration, forced movement held similar connotations to the forced 
movement experienced in exile, namely that it was movement that was limited. While not 
nearly as limiting as the forced movement in exile, the Crimean Tatars were not allowed 
to return to the Crimean Peninsula. Since this is the exact place to which they wanted to 
return, this seemed like an act of state repression, as it kept them from returning to their 
homeland. This would be further emphasized during their eventual return to Crimea, 
where they faced legal and spatial issues in claiming land, given the efforts taken by 
Crimean authorities to deny their return. Both in lacking available lands as well as 
propiska, the Crimean Tatars were forced to resort to drastic measures, which included 
squatting and threatening self-immolation, with the former still causing issues for the 
Crimean Tatars more than a decade later (Uehling, 212; 227). 
 
- Imprisonment 
The entire exile of the Crimean Tatars ought to count as an embodiment of 
imprisonment. Their status as a special settlement not only forced them into a small 
radius that was heavily surveilled, but their movement was restricted to within it. The 
Crimean Tatars were made to work “in exhausting works in the industrial sites that the 
Soviet authorities relocated industry, from the western borders to Central Asia during the 
war” without pay, while the Uzbek workers got normal salaries (Kisly 2015, 74). Some 
also worked in labor camps, such as Volgostroy, with a majority of Crimean Tatars 
working in agriculture, and the rest in industry (73-74). These special settlements, which 
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were originally meant to repress kulaks, were now being used to control and repress the 
Crimean Tatars, and represent the result of collective punishment for the groups who 
became encased in these pseudo-GULAGs. 
 During the national movement, Crimean Tatar activists, like Dzhemilev and 
Seytmuratova, were arrested multiple times, with Dzhemilev’s hunger strike being the 
most well-known. The arrest of these activists came with charges of anti-Soviet activities, 
with later arrests occurring in Crimea under the claim that they were Islamic 
fundamentalists. By adding in the propaganda and questions of loyalty again into the 
picture for the Crimean Tatars, it is also then the case that in conjunction with the arrests, 
it seems normal to arrest and imprison those types of people, regardless of how true or 
false their claims are (Uehling 167). These acts were acts of repression by officials of the 
state made to disenchant and dissuade the activists from pursuing their demands and their 
goals of return, as they were not in the interest of the Soviet Union or the interests of the 
officials of Crimea.  
 
- Disappearances 
Based on my definition of disappearances from the first chapter as acts of 
repression in which individuals of the minority community just disappear, I have found 
little evidence both before and after exoneration in the case of the Crimean Tatars. There 
has been a lot regarding death, especially surrounding the exile, but, unaccounted for 
disappearances have not come up in my research. It is entirely possible, and probably 
highly probable that the Soviet Union disappeared Crimean Tatars, but the limits of my 
research failed to provide the necessary evidence for the thesis to make that judgement. 
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The closest there was is the two-year period between 1944 and 1946 when the world did 
not know the whereabouts of the Crimean Tatars. However, the Soviet government did 
release a statement in 1946 declaring what had happened to them and their alleged crimes 
against the Soviet Union. 
 
- Removal of Rights 
During the exile, the Crimean Tatars were essentially imprisoned in Uzbekistan, 
with limited movement, heavy surveillance, forced labor with no pay, few supplies from 
the State, and that which they got was poor, and had no access to education and culture 
bar the rare book getting released. In essence, in their exile, most of their rights were 
removed, as they were no longer true Soviet citizens, but were now labelled enemies of 
the people. Clearly, this was a heavy repression of the Crimean Tatars by the Soviet state. 
Given that most, if not all of their rights were removed during exile, post-
exoneration saw a return of some of their rights, but the improvement was not massive. 
While they could move out of Central Asia, they could not return to Crimea. Regarding 
education and resources for it, while they were allowed to begin educating on their 
language and history again, the resources and personnel were still very poor and 
unsatisfactory. The Soviet Union, while reinstating some of the rights of the Crimean 
Tatars, were still limiting in those rights and the level of governmental support would be 







While more detail will be given under Cultural Destruction, the Soviet Union 
actively attempted to other the Crimean Tatars. They falsely claimed that the entire 
population were traitors to the Soviet Union and enemies of the people, and they removed 
their history and replaced it with their own false narrative, demonizing the Crimean 
Tatars, depicting them as savage barbarians and traitors. Even the delay between the 
deportation and the official statement regarding the status of the Crimean Tatars reflects 
the separation of the Crimean Tatars from the rest of the Soviet Union, making it an act 
of saving the Soviet Union from harmful forces. 
Post-exoneration, the history taught regarding the Crimean Tatars to the rest of 
the Soviet Union still caused people to believe the false narrative of the Stalin era. Anti-
Crimean Tatar propaganda during the national movement’s attempts to legitimately 
return to Crimea attempted to reignite, with some success, similar depictions of Crimean 
Tatars during World War II that had occurred during exile, this time claiming that they 
burned people in ovens and engaged in anti-Soviet actions (Uehling 163). These claims 
were meant to derail the movement and dissuade from allowing the Crimean Tatars their 
return, and was perpetrated by TASS, which at the time of the propaganda, was part of 
the Government of the Soviet Union. Thus, this act of othering was attempted by part of 








These settlements were meticulously planned and surveilled, made to do labor, 
anything from industrial labor to textile labor. The deported peoples were placed in 
difficult conditions that had a high chance of death, either from work or from the neglect 
and mistreatment under the special settlement moniker. In these special settlements, often 
the peoples were denied their identities, culture, language, and traditions, with the Soviet 
Union actively aiming to destroy their culture and history while these groups were in 
these guarded special settlements (Szporluk 1973, 32; Uehling 2004, 106). The crime for 
which they had been given this punishment was false and extremely exaggerated as well, 
so this marks a clear act of repression by the governing and policing forces of the state. 
Punishment post-exoneration relates directly to how imprisonment was handled. 
As for the arrested activists, the punishment was typically the imprisonment itself. Just as 
with imprisonment again, the addition of the TASS and KGB propaganda attempts to 
legitimize the arrests and punishments, as it is easier to justify punishment to someone 
who has committed foul acts against the people rather than someone who has just 
engaged in dissent. Other types of punishment that occurred post-exoneration include the 
removal of Crimean Tatars who had illegally returned to Crimea, such as Musa Mahmut. 
Those who had returned were given time to voluntarily leave before they would be 
forcibly removed and shipped out of the Peninsula in trucks. Punishment as an act of state 






- Cultural Destruction 
Much like the repressions of othering, the Soviet Union actively participated in 
the destruction of Crimean Tatar culture and history: they were removed from textbooks 
and reference books, their history and identity was replaced by a Soviet-made one that 
depicted them as devils and traitors to the people, and any trace of their civilization in 
Crimea was systematically either destroyed or repurposed. Clearly this is a violent act of 
state repression against the Crimean Tatars aimed at erasing their identity and relations to 
the Crimean Peninsula. 
Post-exoneration, and free from exile, the Crimean Tatars, while not exactly fully 
supported by the Soviet Union, no longer experienced the cultural destruction 
experienced under Stalin. As cultural destruction was not part of the Crimean Tatar’s 
struggle after they were released from the special settlement system, this does not work 
as an identifier for state repression during this part of the analysis. 
At this point, it is difficult to really gauge the impact of the evaluation above on 
the hypothesis because it cannot be compared to the evaluations of the other examples of 
the repressive relations between state rule and the Crimean Tatars as of this chapter. As 
well, the caveats surrounding the inclusion of this analysis may not warrant the inclusion 
of the time period as a fit into the model set in place by the hypothesis because of the 
relation between the repressions and the creation of Crimean Tatar national identity 
instead of the repressions occurring because of the national identity of the minority 
group. However, it is arguable that the repressions post-exoneration do fall under the 
umbrella of the hypothesis, as the repressive acts perpetrated by the Soviet officials are in 
reaction to the growing national movements and the national identity of the activists 
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demanding to return to Crimea. Regardless, this analysis is meant to establish how the 
Crimean Tatar’s national identity formed, how the Soviet authorities reacted to its 
formation, and how the repressions against the Crimean Tatars might measure using the 
eight identifiers. To that point, it is clear that the levels of repressions against the 
Crimean Tatars decreased after the 1967 decree, as seven identifiers were absolutely 
present and total during exile, whereas post-exile, the repressions were lessened, and only 
six of the identifiers were present. Thus, it can be understood that the repressive acts by 
the State against the Crimean Tatars were more repressive under Stalinism that those 
after Stalin’s death, even though their national identity was getting stronger and more 
active in ways that go against the state’s desires. While it could be argued that this 
indicates that the period of analysis proves my hypothesis false, it is important to 
remember that Stalinism was not only inherently more brutal than the regimes that 
followed, but also that the repressions during exile were based on a false narrative and 
identity given to the Crimean Tatars by the state, not a national identity that resonated 
with the Crimean Tatars themselves. 
 
History Steeped in Fear and Desire 
The population of Crimean Tatars in the Crimean Peninsula has fluctuated 
throughout its history under the Russian and Soviet rule. As reported by the Forced 
Migration Projects of the Open Society Institute, in 1783, the population of Crimea 
amounted to 83 percent Crimean Tatar, 5.7 percent Russian, and 2.9 percent Ukrainian. 
In comparison, the 1937 census data shows that Crimean Tatars were only 20.7 percent, 
while Russians had population percentages around 47.4 percent, and Ukrainians at 12.8 
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percent. The percentage of Tatars plummeted as a result of the forced migration to the 
Uzbek SSR under Stalin, where Crimean Tatars were only 1.5 percent of the population, 
and Russians were 67 percent, followed by 25.8 percent Ukrainian in the Crimean 
Peninsula. With the fall of Communism and the reforms of glasnost’ and perestroika 
under Mikhail Gorbachev, the numbers were growing, and by 1993, 9.6 percent of the 
population of the Crimean Peninsula was Crimean Tatar, 61.6 percent was Russian, and 
23.6 percent was Ukrainian (Open Society Institute, Forced Migration Projects 1996, 21). 
It is clear that the reason for the rise in population percentage of Crimean Tatars in 
Crimea was because of the links between Crimean Tatar identity, the Crimean Peninsula 
as their homeland, the knowledge of their history, and their shared trauma and memory of 
the 1944 deportation. Demonstrating the importance of the 1944 deportation even in the 
21st century, the first Crimean Tatar feature length film, Haytarma, which portrays the 
story of Crimean Tatar Hero of the Soviet Union Amet-Khan Sultan against the backdrop 
of the 1944 deportation, includes a scene depicting the placing of the entire population on 
cattle cars. In this scene, the people being loaded on the cars include a large number of 
people who lived through the real deportation, as they wanted to be part of this historical 
film that could allow for their history and trauma to be known to the world (Seitablayev, 
2013). The deportation has just as much importance then as it does in the 21st century, 
and will continue to be the catalyst for Crimean Tatar identity. As all of these links 
became politicized, the national movements began to grow and the Crimean Tatar 




Keeping the Crimean Tatar national identity in mind, this chapter establishes: a 
brief overview of the history of the Crimean Tatars and their relations with Russian rule 
in both Imperial and Soviet forms, the importance of the Crimean Peninsula as territory 
and land, demonstrates the repetition of themes of loyalty, fear, and migration throughout 
the historical interactions between the two groups, and offers the first evaluation of 
repression using the eight identifiers. From the Russian Empire’s questions regarding 
their loyalties to the Ottomans and Islam over the Russian crown to the questioned 
loyalties during the Soviet era during World War II, and the fear that left the states the 
decision to repress the Crimean Tatars, the Crimean Tatars were always the victim. In the 
history, and in the political, economic, and geographical contexts, the Crimean Peninsula 
carries most of the burden of these conflicts, with both groups claiming Crimea in one 
way or another. The Crimean Tatar ethnic, political, and cultural identities have been 
interwoven with Crimea. Whereas Russia, both the Empire and the Soviet Union, 
understood the importance of the Peninsula as an economic and geographic port on the 
Black Sea and as a strategic territory that should be secure. It is in their fears, insecurities, 
and claims for Crimea that these repressions took place. And it is in the evaluation that 
demonstrates that while the repressions before the exoneration were worse than after they 
were saved from the special settlement system, they still, in most cases, persisted, even if 
their state of living was marginally better than under Stalinist exile. By looking through 
the history, the formation of the national identity into what it was at the end of the Soviet 
Union can be traced through time. In doing so, this chapter allows for the continued 
evaluation of repression against the Crimean Tatars in more recent decades, as the 
context behind the national identity and the relations between the State apparatuses and 
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the Crimean Tatars is in full light, starting with their relations with the Ukrainian 
Government in chapter 3.
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Chapter 3: The Return, Lackluster Assistance, and the Crimea 
 
 In 1954, the Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev transferred the Crimean 
Oblast, formerly the Crimean ASSR, from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The reasoning behind the transfer 
was economic and territorial in nature, as the decree stated that by “Taking into account 
the integral character of the economy, the territorial proximity and the close economic 
and cultural ties between the Crimea Province and the Ukrainian SSR” they reached the 
decision to gift the Crimean Oblast to the Ukrainian SSR (Khrushchev 1954). Now, while 
there are certainly those who may question the legitimacy of this logic for the land 
transfer, there have been numerous alternative reasons that have been given by scholars, 
such as military consolidation (ICCrimea 2005). There were of course simpler reasons as 
well, including his fondness for Ukraine revealed by his great-granddaughter, Dr. Nina 
Khrushcheva (Calamur 2014). Regardless of the reasons, the impact of the gift was 
enhanced with the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the Crimean Peninsula was now no 
longer within the grasp of Russia. Crimea was now a part of Ukraine, leaving the area 
outside of Russian control, directly and indirectly, for the first time since the 1783 
annexation. As with the rest of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, people found 
themselves displaced or in countries that were no longer those in which they self-
identified. In Crimea, this was particularly the case for the large Russian majority, which 
now found themselves under Ukrainian law. For the Crimean Tatars, repatriation was 
now their main priority, returning to Crimea and reclaiming their lost heritage. 
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However, the road towards the rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatars in Crimea was not 
smooth, as they faced issues with overcrowding, denials for land acquisition, 
maltreatment by pro-Russian Crimean authorities, slow rebuilding of culture and 
representation, and a seemingly unresponsive Ukrainian government.  
 The case involved within this chapter’s evaluation behaves a little differently 
from the others. The situation between the Crimean Tatars and Ukraine qualifies under 
the hypothesis, as Ukraine acquired the Crimean Tatars through their return to Crimea, 
and the Crimean Tatars possess a strong national identity that was formulated during their 
exile and attempts to return during post-Stalin times. While the Crimean Tatar national 
identity may not represent a direct threat to the sovereignty and power of the Ukrainian 
government, the desires of the Crimean Tatar elites and Mejlis may have caused some 
concern for Ukrainian authorities in a system transitioning towards democracy. It should 
be noted that there are some caveats that ought to be pointed out and that may serve to 
better represent the analysis of the Crimean Tatar-Ukraine relationship. The most 
important of these include the large Russian majority in Crimea compared to the rest of 
Ukraine, the staying power of the Soviet education and culture on the Crimean Tatars 
even in the post-collapse era, and the differentiation between the actions of the Crimean 
authorities versus the Ukrainian authorities. All of these factor into the treatment and 
interactions with the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian government. This analysis will 
focus on the time period following the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991 to right before 
the Crimean Referendum of 2014, which eventually paved the way for Russian 
annexation once again later in 2014.  
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 In addition to the analysis of the Ukraine relations, this chapter also outlines the 
development of Crimean Tatar national identity following their return. If the main aim of 
the Crimean Tatars during the Soviet Union was for the return of the Crimean Tatar 
people to the Crimean Peninsula, then once they achieved that ability, the national 
identity would need to evolve in some ways to survive. What was waiting for the 
Crimean Tatars gave them reasons to maintain the national identity, as the return was not 
simple or supported by the authorities and current residents of Crimea. On top of the 
struggle for land, the leadership of the Crimean Tatars, including Refat Chubarov and 
Mustafa Dzhemilev to name a few, fought for the rights of Crimean Tatars for more 
accurate education and language rehabilitation as well as stronger political representation 
in all facets and levels of Crimean governance, and aiming to undo Soviet-era 
misconceptions of the Crimean Tatars. While in the long run these goals were indeed 
realized to some degree, these goals were not without their share of hardship and 
resistance from Crimean authorities and some nationalistic portions of the Crimean 
Russian population.  
 Throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s, the Crimean Tatar’s witnessed not only the 
gradual rehabilitation of their culture and language and the growth of the unity of their 
political leaders, but also the indifference of the Ukrainian government to their calls for 
greater political representation, the recognition of the Crimean Tatars’ place in Crimea, 
and for the funding to help rebuild their heritage. It was in these two decades that the 
Crimean Tatars found themselves both alienated and supported by the state apparatus. 
Serving as the counterexample to the hypothesis, the relations between the Ukrainian 
state and the Crimean Tatars will demonstrate that while the Crimean Tatars hold a strong 
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national identity that may threaten the Ukrainian government, acts of state repression 
were not only lesser than those during the Soviet period, but were also virtually 
nonexistent, with most acts of repression coming from the Crimean authorities of the 
Autonomous Republic and Pro-Russian groups. However, it is Ukraine’s relative inability 
to take a role in helping the Crimean Tatars obtain land, preventing and protecting the 
Crimean Tatars against discrimination and repression, increasing aid and funding for 
Crimean Tatar education and language instruction, and providing platforms for political 
legitimacy in the Crimean and Ukrainian political system that makes this case an 
intriguing counterexample, as well as a necessary political and historical period that helps 
to frame the eventual “reunion” with Russian governance in 2014.  
 
Land Acquisition, Squatting, and Statelessness 
 
 As stated at the end of the previous chapter, while the Crimean Tatars were given 
permission to return to Crimea and revitalize the previously defunct Crimean ASSR by 
the Soviet leadership, the nature and reality of the return provided its own challenges. 
The Crimean Tatar population started their movement back to Crimea from Central Asia 
and other areas of exile and emigration over the decades under the Soviet Union only to 
find issues with overcrowding, land acquisition and government support due to the 
requirements of propiska, and the subsequent statelessness that would result from the 
inability to become citizens, either from missing the deadline placed in the original 
Citizenship law, or because of the problems with housing and work.  
 When the Crimean Tatars were deported in 1944, not only did the Soviet Union 
take action to remove their cultural heritage from the land they once inhabited, but they 
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also let Soviet citizens migrate to the peninsula, replacing the Crimean Tatars. By the end 
of the Soviet Union, a generation or two of Soviet citizens had fully filled the gaps left by 
the deported peoples of Crimea, leaving little room for the returning population, 250,000 
of which had returned by 1991 (Uehling, 164; Žídková and Melichar 2015, 97-98). 
Because of the current population settling the most productive and habitable land in 
Crimea, most of the Crimean Tatar population had to settle in the steppe region, a region 
of lower quality than the other areas in Crimea that struggled with overcrowding 
(Minorities at Risk Report 2003). The settlement situation for this population would 
persist through much of the 1990’s, and the government of Ukraine did relatively little to 
alleviate or deal with the Crimean Tatar’s residency issues. One potential reason for this, 
a theme that will persist throughout the relationship between the Crimean Tatars and the 
Ukrainian state, is that the Ukrainian Government had more urgent matters to attend to, 
specifically the large Russian population in Crimea and Ukraine. At the same time the 
Crimean Tatars were pushing for greater autonomy, as seen with the 1991 Declaration of 
National Sovereignty for the Crimean Tatar People, the Russian population, which was a 
majority in Crimea, was doing the same. Representing only around twelve percent of the 
population at the time, on top of the Ukrainian Government’s insufficient financial and 
economic stability, the Crimean Tatar’s desires took a back seat to the desires of the 
Russian population (Žídková and Melichar 2015, 97-98). Facing pressures from the 
Crimean authorities and receiving no help from the Ukrainian state, the Crimean Tatars 
resorted to squatting on unclaimed and uninhabited land. 
 Squatter settlements became the result of the Crimean Tatar policies of squatting 
on unoccupied land and threatening self-immolation towards attempts of eviction, the 
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Crimean authorities’ animosity towards the population, and the Ukrainian government’s 
lack of aid (Human Rights Watch 1992; Uehling 212). The Crimean Tatar’s were 
rebuilding their society and communities from the ground up, attempting to support 
themselves in their return by building Mosques, schools, housing, and other infrastructure 
necessities in the late 20th century (Doroszewska 1997, 46-47; Guboglo and Chervonnaia 
1995, 34-35). Across the almost 300 settlements of Crimean Tatars, many were left 
without running water and electricity. One of the negative impacts that came along with 
the squatter settlements was the issues with citizenship and becoming a resident. While 
the Citizenship law before the early 2000’s gave automatic citizenship to those who were 
in Crimea before November 13, 1991, of the 250 thousand returning Crimean Tatars, 
around 108 thousand returned after the cut off (Žídková and Melichar 2015, 98). While 
the law initially only would provide citizenship to those arriving after November 1991 
with the intent of permanent residence if they belonged to no other country, had lived in 
Ukraine for five years, and had a command of the Ukrainian language, the 1997 
amendments to the law allowed for deported peoples, like the Crimean Tatars, to bypass 
the five-year limit and language proficiency (Žídková and Melichar 2015, 98; United 
States Department of State 1998). By 1998, there had even been contacts between 
Ukrainian and Uzbek leaders to make it so it would be easier for the deported peoples to 
abandon their Uzbek citizenship in order to pursue a Ukrainian one (United States 
Department of State 1999). The law was changed further in 1999, removing the necessity 
of stripping one’s own current citizenship to become a Ukrainian citizen (United States 
Department of State 2000).  
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While the citizenship requirements were eased by the changes to the law, the 
Crimean Tatars still would face issues obtaining land and legal residency. This left the 
squatting strategy a necessary practice going into the 2000’s and disregarded the 
stateless, even though Ukraine had implemented funding programs to aid in the 
resettlement and rehabilitation of Crimean Tatars and other deported peoples (CESCR 
2006, 8; 2012, 4). In 2009, Crimean Tatar activists protested in Kyiv wanting a new, 
fairer system of privatization of state-owned land that would allow the Crimean Tatars 
easier access to security and land ownership, while at the same time, Crimean Tatars 
protested in Simferopol demanding land restitution for the land taken from them in after 
the deportation (RFE/RL 2009; RFE/RL 2009). These protests were not isolated 
incidences, but occurrences that were all too familiar to the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine. It 
took these types of demonstrations and international pressure to really get the Ukrainian 
authorities to work on supporting the returning groups.  
 The Crimean Tatar population still faced periods of statelessness in its time within 
the territorial borders of Ukraine. As reported in their yearly Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices on Ukraine, the United States Department of State indicates that of the 
Crimean Tatar population has been exposed to some risk of statelessness throughout the 
1990’s and 2000’s, with at least 60 thousand Crimean Tatars without citizenship in 2009 
(2010; 2014). People were still returning to Crimea into the 2010’s, so the risk of 
stateless had always been present. Those most vulnerable to it were émigrés who did not 
apply for citizenship, or those who could not surpass the legal and bureaucratic woes that 
came with obtaining citizenship, much like those faced by the bulk of the population in 
the 1990s and early 2000s.  
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 The Ukrainian government’s involvement in the struggles of the Crimean Tatar’s 
has been hard to point out, as they have not directly taken actions to hinder the rights of 
citizenship to the Crimean Tatars. However, it took them a long time to revamp the 
citizenship laws and facilitate paths towards citizenship for those stateless persons, as 
seen with the drop from just 60 thousand stateless Crimean Tatars alone to just 35 
thousand, UNHCR estimated, stateless persons in Ukraine, a marked improvement 
(United States Department of State 2014). Ukraine also demonstrated a willingness to 
adhere and listen to International and UN organizations and attempt to work with them 
to, among other things, better integrate the Crimean Tatars into Crimean and Ukrainian 
society (CESCR 2001). However, Ukraine also failed to support the Crimean Tatar’s 
economic and territorial situation, as the squatter settlements still remained and went 
insufficiently funded by the Ukrainian government. To the questions of citizenship and 
land ownership, the Ukrainian legislature and leaders were highly responsive towards the 
needs regarding access to citizenship, but struggled to provide anything else beyond the 
amendments to make the citizenship of deported peoples easier. Chubarov summarizes 
the issue with Ukraine rather simply, signifying the basic problem as: “the Ukrainian elite 
as a whole, although recognizing the rights of the Crimean Tatars, do not consider how 
these rights can be realized within the framework of the Ukrainian state and in a way 
serving both Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar interests” (Chubarov 1997, 48). Throughout 
the over two decades under Ukrainian law, the Crimean Tatars and Ukrainian authorities 







Crimean Tatar-Russian Relations in Crimea 
 
 One of the potential reasons for the lack of repressions against the Crimean Tatars 
by the Ukrainian state is due to the cultural and historical connections to the Crimean 
Peninsula itself. While the Ukrainians try to connect the Crimean Tatars to themselves, in 
reality, Ukraine has a much weaker connection to Crimea compared to the importance it 
holds for the Crimean Tatars and the Russians. Ukraine, as it only received Crimea in 
1954, had no historical ties to Crimea, and it never saw it as a military outpost on the 
Black Sea, nor as an outlet to the West. For the Crimean Tatars and Russians, however, 
the connection was much more ingrained into their identities. Crimean Tatar national 
identity is forever linked with the peninsula as the homeland and the place where their 
history and culture begins and ends. Comparatively, Russia has held a long-standing 
interest in Crimea since the annexation in 1783, both as a cultural and territorial hub of 
the empire/state and as an important military port on the Black Sea. Additionally, Crimea, 
due in large part to the 1944 deportations, was settled by Russians, and to this day has a 
majority Russian population compared to the rest of Ukraine. Because the connection to 
Crimea is stronger to the Crimean Tatars and Russians than it is for the Ukrainians, the 
relations between those two groups and the Crimean authorities, which had ties to Pro-
Russian political groups, hold a lot of weight towards the treatment of the Crimean Tatars 
in Ukraine. In the analysis of the relations between the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian 
state, it is necessary to address the relations with the Russian majority population, their 
actions, and the response of the Ukrainian government. 
 One of the key factors in the treatment and discrimination against the Crimean 
Tatars in Crimea was the result of Soviet education and the rewritten history. The impact 
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the Soviets had on the perceptions of the Crimean Tatars cannot be understated. Much of 
the issues of land acquisition, integration, cultural revival, and political power can all be 
linked back to the discrimination against the Crimean Tatars that persisted in Crimea 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s (United States Department of State 2007; 2010; 2014). If 
the Crimean Tatars were perceived to be as the Soviet Union had depicted them, then 
surely discrimination against them would be commonplace. The Human Rights Practice 
reports on Ukraine demonstrate that the Crimean Tatars were credibly claiming acts of 
discrimination against them by the Russian majority and the Crimean authorities, a 
majority of which were Russian. Discrimination made it difficult for Crimean Tatars to 
obtain fair employment, land allotments, find places of worship, and increase the 
proficiency of the language (Council of Europe: ECRI 2012, 8-9; Human Rights Watch 
2010, 2). Pro-Russian groups in the Crimean government have repeatedly called for the 
banning of the Kurultai, the Crimean Tatar congress, and the Mejlis on the grounds of 
claims that they were criminal groups who acted unconstitutionally, as Oleg Rodivilov, a 
member of the Crimean Parliament and the leader of Crimea’s Russian bloc in 2010, 
claims. He was not alone in these calls, as other pro-Russian groups joined in as well 
(RFE/RL 2010). The issue here is that Crimean Tatar leaders have prided themselves on 
their non-violent stance and approach, which is contrary to the pro-Russian claims 
(Chubarov 1997, 45). If violence or force was ever used, it would be in self-defense, and 
as protection against powers threatening them, such as the destruction of squatter 
settlements or threats of military force from the Crimean authorities (45). While 
nonviolence was the stance, the same cannot be said for some pro-Russian groups and 
nationalists, as sometimes this discrimination even invoked acts of violence. 
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 Crimean Tatars, their elites, activists, and members of their political bodies, like 
the Mejlis, were often the targets of violent acts. These smaller acts were usually the 
actions of Russian nationalists and neo-fascists, and were usually isolated. Protests by 
Crimean Tatars for various reasons were met with violence occasionally, and not just in 
Crimea, but in more Western leaning areas of mainland Ukraine like Kyiv (RFE/RL 
2009). Violence against the Crimean Tatars stems not only from the false narrative 
enacted by the Soviets, but also though the concerns about the population gaining special 
living privileges and political representation (Minorities at Risk Project 2003, 2).  
However, perhaps the most dangerous actions were propagandistic calls to violence 
against the Crimean Tatars. Russian Cossacks have supported acts of violence against the 
Tatar community, and have been supported by groups who have aimed to legitimize the 
violence, such as priests of the UOC-MP (Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow 
Patriarchate), who in 2005 supported violence against “Muslim Tatars” for the protection 
of Orthodoxy (United States Department of State 2007). On countless occasions Crimean 
Tatar landmarks, symbols, and even the squatter settlements faced destruction and 
vandalism in clashes with the Russian majority in Crimea. Acts and threats of violence 
were not rarities for the Crimean Tatars, and they more often than not came from Russian 
nationalists and pro-Russian forces in Crimea.  
 When looking at the discrimination against the Crimean Tatars and the poor 
relations with the more nationalistic forces of the Russian majority population and the 
Crimean government, it is revealed that a vast majority of these issues and potential 
repressions originated from the Crimean government and forces that were against the 
return on principle, rather than the Ukrainian government. And while the Crimean Tatars 
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side with the Ukrainians and the state, as they did when they supported the Ukrainian 
claim to Crimea over the Russian majority’s demands for autonomy in the late 1990s, the 
Crimean Tatars felt as if nothing was accomplished for them (The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies 1999, 2). Even though the Ukrainian government has supported the 
end of discrimination, and has no tolerance for it, demonstrated through its 
implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the Ukrainian government is unable to help lessen the discriminations of the Crimean 
Tatars (CESCR 2012, 8-9). On one hand, the Ukrainian government supports the 
Crimean Tatars and their rights as a minority group; and on the other hand, pro-Russian 
forces in the Crimean government and Russian nationalists do not support the Crimean 
Tatar return and their revival in the Crimean Peninsula, subjecting them to discrimination 
stemming from old Soviet stereotypes, and at worst leading to acts of violence and even 
death in certain cases. Investigations into 1995 riots that started as the result of the 
killings of two Tatar market vendors, and led to the deaths of four more Crimean Tatars 
ended inconclusively, demonstrating the levels of incompetence from the Ukrainian 
government to sufficiently support the Crimean Tatars, and the Crimean government’s 
reluctance to support the population (United States Department of State 1997). The 
source of Crimean Tatar repression and acts of discrimination does not come from the 
state, but from within Crimea itself, which the State fails to sufficiently address.   
 
 
Education and Language 
 
 Education and language usage are the answers to two large problems that the 
Crimean Tatars faced on their return and struggles under Crimean and Ukrainian rule: 
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discrimination linked to former Soviet misconceptions and the revival of Crimean Tatar 
culture and heritage. For most of the time within Ukrainian borders, the Crimean Tatar 
elites and leaders have fought for equal language status with Russian and more education 
and language resources to educate the Crimean Tatar population, always finding the 
recent results inadequate (United States Department of State 1995… 2014). However, 
while the Ukrainian government has enacted laws and taken efforts to help the Crimean 
Tatars in spreading the education and access to materials in their language, much like 
with the issues with land and discrimination, the Ukrainian legislation and aid that ought 
to help, either does not actually help alleviate the situation, or in at least one case, fails to 
be implemented in Crimea by the Crimean government.  
 The Crimean Tatars’ demand for changing the textbooks is one great example. 
The Crimean Tatars urged the Ukrainian government to change the textbooks so as to 
correct the mistakes of Soviet misconceptions on Crimean Tatars and other Muslim 
groups that were still present in primary school textbooks, such as Viktor Misan's Stories 
on the History of Ukraine and A.K. Shchvidko's History of Ukraine, 16th-18th Centuries 
(United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 
2008; United States Department of State 2006). These and similarly incorrect textbooks 
were found being used even later, with some still in use in 2013 (Wilson 2013, 429). The 
use of such textbooks and textbooks with stereotyped understandings of history and 
religions remained commonplace during the first two decades, and the slow 
implementation of changes to the curriculum would not help facilitate this. 
 When discussing the importance of language for the Crimean Tatars in the 
decades after their return, it is critical to mention language not only in terms of 
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educational and cultural revival, but also in terms of legal and political strength in the 
region. Crimean Tatar language instruction has seen an increase in support as more and 
more of the youth population have been exposed to language courses. From Crimean 
authorities resisting Crimean Tatar requests for language support and schooling in the 
early 1990s to having 15 schools with Crimean Tatar as the primary language of 
instruction, over 17 thousand children studying Crimean Tatar as a separate subject in 
secondary, and over 5 thousand secondary schoolchildren studying it as an extracurricular 
by 2009, it is clear that the Crimean Tatars have seen advances in language study (United 
States Department of State 1996; 2010). However, when looking at the bigger picture and 
what language instruction means for the national identity, these numbers, while still 
improvements, are nowhere near good enough. According to estimates before the 2014 
annexation, 20 percent of the schoolchildren in Crimea were Crimean Tatar, of which 
only about 3 percent were taught in Crimean Tatar, and only 6 percent were taking it as 
an elective (Bocale 2016, 4-5; Wilson 2013, 428). In comparison to Hungarian language 
instruction, Crimean Tatar instruction was three times lower in numbers of children 
learning the language, indicating that there was something wrong regarding the 
instruction of Crimean Tatar in comparison to the number of actual Crimean Tatar 
schoolchildren (Kulyk 2013, 633). Some estimates indicate that while there are 15 
schools that taught in Crimean Tatar, to fit the necessities of the population and to ensure 
the survival of the language, around 75 to 80 schools are needed (Wilson 2013, 429). 
Looking at the demographics of Crimea helps to determine the reasons for the 
insufficient schooling, beyond the discrimination that was present at the time and the 
insufficiencies of the Ukrainian government. With a majority Russian population and a 
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common language of Russian in the region, most schools in Crimea were taught in 
Russian. Russian language also had a heavy presence in all aspects of life, while Crimean 
Tatar only finding its guaranteed usage in the homes of Crimean Tatars. Ukrainian, the 
state language of Ukraine, severely suffers in Crimea as well. It is not mentioned in 
Article 4 or 10 of the Crimean Constitution, only assumed to be referred to as the 
“official language,” although it is mentioned in Article 18 as the “official language” 
(Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea 1998; Bocale 2016, 4). While 
Crimean Tatars have 15 schools delivering instruction in their mother tongue, Ukrainian 
only has 7 “Ukrainian-track” schools compared to Russian’s 368 (4). Including the 175 
Russian-Ukrainian bilingual schools and Russian-Ukrainian-Crimean Tatar trilingual 
schools, it is clear that Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian language are not viewed as holding 
the same level of cultural and everyday necessity as the Russian language. Crimean Tatar 
language instruction is also facing problems from within. Struggling with lesser quality 
assurance compared to some of the Russian, bilingual and trilingual schools, both 
infrastructural and in terms of academic instruction, Crimean Tatar parents became 
increasingly reluctant to actually send their children to schools with an emphasis on 
Crimean Tatar language instruction. The parents began holding the language in 
ambivalence, often opting to not have their children learn or know of Crimean Tatar 
because it would be disadvantageous for advancement in society and higher education, 
with some deeming it less important than other subjects (Kulyk 2013, 638). As Crimean 
Tatar leaders see the new challenge to Crimean Tatar language, the indifference of its 
people, it is not difficult to imagine how this might have changed if not for the inadequate 
resources and support for the language in the first place, both by Crimea and Ukraine. 
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These realities are why Crimean Tatar leaders and activists still have concerns about the 
quality of language education, because without solid support from the government, 
language instruction will remain below par. 
Another avenue of language that was important for the Crimean Tatars was the 
status and use of the language in cultural, legal and bureaucratic instances. While 
linguistic and political rights usually go hand in hand, linguistic demands are going to be 
discussed here instead of the next section. While the Crimean Constitution does 
recognize and offers protection for the Crimean Tatar language (Article 10) as well as 
allowing for documentation to be published in Crimean Tatar (Article 11), the status of 
the language in Crimea never reflected the constitution (Verkhovna Rada of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea 1998). Other legislation was approved and passed by 
both the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, but with little 
impact on the Crimean Tatar language. In 2006, Crimea’s “Concept for the Development 
of Education in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea for the Period until 2012” failed to 
provide any improvement in Crimean Tatar instruction, even though it was meant to 
create “conditions for the in-depth study of Ukrainian, Russian, and Crimean Tatar” 
(Bocale 2016, 5). Additionally, Ukraine’s “On the principles of the state language 
policy,” reestablished Ukrainian as the state language, thus setting it as the official 
language to be used in all sectors of the public and society, including academia, unless 
the regional language or minority language reaches that 10 percent usage in the 
population. Then that language, at the 10 percent threshold, is allowed to be used if the 
parties involved want to use the regional or minority language versus the state language: 
“To each language determined regarding the second this Article, the measures directed on 
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use of regional languages or languages of minority, provided in this Law are applied, 
under the condition if the number of persons - the carriers of regional language living in 
the territory on which this language is widespread, constitutes 10 percent and more 
number of its population” (OPSLP, Art. VII). While some tried to raise the threshold to 
30 percent, which would have denied status to Crimean Tatar in Crimea and Russian in 
Ukraine, the threshold remained at 10 percent (Wilson 2013, 428). While the law, which 
would have had the support of the Crimean Tatars, did see the expansion of national 
minority languages in Ukraine such as Russian and Hungarian in regions where their 
percentage of the population was over 10 percent, the law was not enforced in Crimea, as 
it would have given definite status and expanded support of the Crimean Tatar language 
(Bocale 2016, 5; United States Department of State 2013, 28). Here again, the failure of 
the Ukrainian government to act on their legislation and claims of support for the 
Crimean Tatars compliments the Crimean authorities’ decisions against supporting the 
Crimean Tatars, this time regarding status and support of official language usage.  
There are other indications that the Crimean Tatars were able within Ukraine to 
expand the use of their language, as some newspapers and multimedia programs were 
translated into Crimean Tatar. New media and news sources were even created and 
presented entirely for Crimean Tatars and spoken and written in their language to at least 
some extent with a prime example being ATR, which was a Ukrainian TV channel whose 
broadcasts were 60 percent Russian, 35 percent in Crimean Tatar, and the remaining 5 
percent in Ukrainian (gazeta.ua 2015). Crimean Tatar language and education 
undoubtedly saw positive advancements under Ukrainian law and support. Yet, the 
necessary levels of education and linguistic support were not available due to: a 
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combination of the linguistic and demographic landscape of Crimea at the turn of the 
century, the insufficient support from the Ukrainian government for higher quality 
instruction and schooling, and the Crimean government failing to enforce Ukrainian law 




 Perhaps just as imperative for the Mejlis and the Crimean Tatar national identity 
as language rights and revival, political representation and participation was held in high 
respects among the main figures of the national movement from the Soviet era and fellow 
Crimean Tatars. Holding the second Kurultai in Crimea in the heat of the return, the 
Mejlis as it exists today was founded in 1991, marking the beginning of Crimean Tatar 
political activism and participation both officially and unofficially within the governing 
systems of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Ukraine. Unofficially is a necessary 
term because of Ukrainian law not allowing for regional political parties, as “The 
Government enacted a regulation imposing limitations on the establishment of regional 
political parties through restrictive registration requirements,” meaning that “the 
requirement to have representatives in at least half the oblasts of the country as a 
prerequisite for registration as a political party negatively affects primarily Russian and 
Tatar organizations in Crimea,” the Mejlis and Kurultai of the Crimean Tatar People 
cannot be official governing or legislative bodies within Crimea (United States 
Department of State 1997; 2014). Instead, the members of these groups joined national 
political parties and blocs throughout the decades within the Ukrainian presidential 
parliamentary system. The Mejlis and the Kurultai are organs of Crimean Tatar politics 
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and ones that Ukraine cannot utilize because of the law, and as such this group that is 
clearly in agreement with the government of Ukraine, must act rather indirectly and with 
reliance on the same government: 
“That the Mejlis, the leadership of which was reared in the humane and 
democratic traditions of the human rights (dissident) movement in the former 
USSR, orients its compatriots toward constitutional, nonviolent methods of 
struggle for their rights, relies on the support of democratic forces and movements 
both within Ukraine and far beyond Ukraine’s borders, and, unlike a number of 
other immature national movements in various regions and republics of the 
former USSR which have allowed their peoples to be drawn into separatist 
provocations, has shown the world a unique example of consistent loyalty toward 
a republic (Ukraine) that has embarked upon the path of state independence and 
has been averse to playing the card of anti-Ukrainian Crimean separatism, which 
would be fatal to the cause of peace in southern Europe, is crucial” (Guboglo and 
Chervonnaia 1995, 35). 
 
Even with the Mejlis representing a nongovernmental body of politically active and 
willing people who want to enrich their own livelihoods as well as of those around them, 
the Ukrainian state, to return to a theme throughout this chapter to this point, offers them 
little impactful progress and adequate representation.  
For Crimean Tatars, the situation surrounding political representation and 
participation reflects the reality of Crimean Tatar language, where they have members of 
the Mejlis and regular Crimean Tatars in all levels of local, regional, and national 
government, yet those numbers don’t actively reflect the Crimean Tatar population as a 
whole. In a press release in 2014 a few months after the Russian annexation of Crimea, 
the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed a number of measures and efforts that 
the Ukrainian government had “efficiently” undertaken to facilitate the repatriation and 
integration of the Crimean Tatars, one of which reported on political representation.  
The claim reads: “according to the results of elections to local councils in 
2010, the share of representatives of Crimean Tatars in local self-
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government amounted to 16%, while Crimean Tatars represented 13.7% of Crimea’s 
population,” while a second claimed that “Over 1,800 representatives of deported 
nationalities worked in government service and local self-government, which amounted 
to 6.4% of the total number of officials” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). The picture 
painted is not necessarily accurate, at least not to the Crimean Tatars. While the share of 
representatives in local self-government may have indeed amounted to 16 percent, this 
was referring to numbers in local governments, so mostly referring to lower level 
positions, not positions in the Crimean regional government or the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine. While representation did increase in local and regional governments, with 
Crimean Tatars the third most represented in the Supreme Council of Crimea by 2003, 
the numbers in the highest positions in politics, those with the most power and sway, 
remained unequally represented. When reviewing the numbers of Crimean Tatars in the 
upper echelons of Ukrainian politics, the representation they received was weaker than 
their population percentages should have allowed. By 2013, the Crimean Tatars only held 
three percent of senior positions in local government offices, and only had seven seats in 
the Crimean Rada, which seats 100. Crimean Tatar leadership find that these numbers do 
not fully represent the total Crimean Tatar population (United States Department of State 
2013). These numbers have hardly changed over the years, as the Crimean Tatars had 
eight seats in the Crimean Rada and occupied four of 25 positions in the Crimean 
government in 2006, and seven seats and eight of 25 senior positions in 2008 (United 
States Department of State 2007; 2009).  
To combat these low numbers in all levels of government, the Crimean Tatars 
would call for changes to be made to the electoral laws in Ukraine and Crimea to increase 
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the eligibility of Crimean Tatars to run and be appointed to offices and positions. These 
calls also hoped to give the non-government political bodies of the Crimean Tatars more 
strength in political affairs, allowing them political power and duties to help the 
revitalization of the Crimean Tatar language and culture. Even though their status as the 
largest ethnic minority group in Crimea and their tightly organized political structures 
and self-governance would have granted them some unique opportunities to negotiate 
with the governments of Ukraine and Crimea for more political representation and 
opportunities for political participation, electoral changes never really happened. Beyond 
some support from the Ukrainian government, their representation seemed to have 
plateaued (Malyarenko and Galbreath 2013, 921). These calls even came about in the 
form of peaceful protests, including one, 15 thousand strong, during the 65th anniversary 
of the 1944 deportation in Simferopol, where they protested for greater political and 
linguistic rights (RFE/RL 2009).  
Initial actions taken by the Ukrainian government did help the Crimean Tatars 
achieve greater political representation and participation, as seen with the changes to the 
citizenship laws that allowed for the Crimean Tatar returnees greater and easier access to 
citizenship. These changes allowed more Crimean Tatars the privilege to vote with 
Article 36 of the Ukrainian Constitution, the results of which were seen in 2003 at its 
peak, where citizenship laws allowed for more Crimean Tatar political participation, 
allowing for their increased representation in the Supreme Council of Crimea 
(Constitution of Ukraine, Art. XXXVI; United States Department of State 2004). Further 
actions by state officials signaled a greater desire to trust and work with Crimean Tatars, 
such as the “Council of Representatives of the Crimean Tatar People attached to the 
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President of Ukraine” formed under President Kuchma in 1999, which contained all 33 
members of the Milli Mejlis, the national level of the Mejlis, even when other groups in 
Ukraine believed them to be an unconstitutional parallel governmental body (Uehling, 
165; Wilson 2013, 424). Unfortunately, not only did the support of the Crimean Tatars on 
the state level never really push further than these actions and the election of a few 
members of the Mejlis to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, such as Refat Chubarov and 
Mustafa Dzhemilev, but the changes in presidents and administrations would not fare 
well for the Crimean Tatars either. By the time Yanukovych’s presidency, the Crimean 
Tatars faced more resistance and hostility from the Ukrainian government, which at some 
point began to manifest under a moniker that was first used by pro-Russian forces in 
Crimea during the 1990s and the 2000s: the dangers of Islam and Islamic fundamentalism 
(Wilson 2013, 420). There would be a number of plausible reasons for the Yanukovych 
administration, representing the Party of Regions, a pro-Russian party in Ukraine, to 
resist and try to repress the Crimean Tatars, including the minority group voting for his 
opponent in the 2010 election, which Yanukovych admits told Dzhemilev in private. 
Additionally there was a fear of the Mejlis as an independent political actor that could not 
be controlled (421-422). Additionally, opposition groups to the Mejlis, like the Milli 
Firka, which supported Russian intervention in Crimea and the Yanukovych regime, and 
İnkişaf, which was charged as a pro-Mohyliov front aimed at undermining the Mejlis, 
were given some power both by the Ukrainian government and the Crimean government 
(427). The levels of support or hostility from the Ukrainian government would vary based 
on the leaders and their relations to the Crimean Tatars. Each proved rather ineffective in 
the long run, as Crimean Tatar political growth was still slow and plateauing without 
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changes to the laws. However, once the Yanukovych presidency stepped in, their 
representation began shrinking. Again, as was seen in the dissection of 
language/education, land acquisition and citizenship, and population relations, the 
Ukrainian government was typically on the side of the Crimean Tatars and would 
eventually help them under Ukrainian and international law, yet their support would often 




 Even though the support of the Crimean Tatars by the Ukrainian government 
waned under the Yanukovych and was replaced with a growing hostility both politically 
and culturally fueled, it is impossible to deny that the Ukrainian state supported the 
repatriation and integration of the Crimean Tatars into Ukrainian society and politics. 
Thus, as the evaluation of the eight indicators of state repression will demonstrate, the 
case of the Crimean Tatars under Ukrainian law and rule acts as a counterexample to the 
hypothesis, as the Ukrainian government has not actively repressed the Crimean Tatars. 
One criticism of this counterexample that holds weight is the fact that Crimean Tatar 
national identity, which, as displayed through the analysis of the relationship, was still 
strong and maintains its center on the homeland, the return, and the rebuilding of 
Crimean Tatar heritage, and was not in opposition to the Ukrainian government. Instead, 
the Crimean Tatars wished to be more politically active and wished to change the 
attitudes and perceptions of the Crimean Tatars and other minority groups in Crimea and 
Ukraine, to which the Ukrainian government reacted positively, updating laws and 
providing legislative and monetary support to solve the problem of Crimean Tatar 
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repatriation and integration. Between the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian government, 
there was not a lot of hostility and the goals of each group did not threaten the other’s 
agendas and desires for legitimacy, and so this criticism stands for the most part. 
However, the problem with this criticism is that it ignores that the fact that the Ukrainian 
government during Yanukovych’s presidency did enact some politically motivated 
repressions against the Mejlis and supporters of the group that was in opposition to him 
and the Party of Regions. It also ignores the existence of the Milli Firka, a small Crimean 
Tatar group that formed in 2007 in opposition to the Mejlis and their policies of working 
with the Ukrainian government. Milli Firka instead wanted a more independent Crimea 
for Crimean Tatars, and one whose namesake represents the minority (Wilson 2013, 
424). These opposition groups to the Mejlis, whom were against working with Ukraine, 
could have been recipients of repression by the Ukrainian government, but they never 
found themselves repressed. The evaluation of the repression indicators in this case will 
demonstrate that the Crimean Tatars, while suffering very little repression from the 
Ukrainian government bar some targeted repression under Yanukovych, still suffered 
from discrimination and repression from the some of the Russian population of Crimea 
and the Crimean government, with the Ukrainian government failing to alleviate the 
situation always.   
 
- Voluntary Movement 
Voluntary movement as an identifier of repression is a slightly complicated issue 
when observing the actions of the state of Ukraine versus the actions of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea. While the latter is within Ukrainian boundaries and part of its 
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political system, within that system, it is allowed certain levels of self-governance as any 
autonomous region would possess, which the Ukrainian government respects. Distinct in 
their actions and policies towards the returning Crimean Tatars, it is the case that the 
Crimean government was much more repressive than the Ukrainian government. The 
voluntary movement here, represented as the development of squatter settlements and 
camps on steppe lands and other uninhabited areas of the peninsula, was a result of the 
propiska and the resistance of the Crimean government towards the Crimean Tatars, 
leaving them little choice but to voluntarily migrate to these areas and set up settlements 
themselves. Most of this started before the establishment of the modern Ukrainian and 
Crimean Constitutions, both of which respect the rights of the Crimean Tatars and 
returning deported peoples. When evaluating Ukrainian actions towards the return and 
the settlements of the Crimean Tatars, there is little evidence of repressive activities in 
the form of voluntary movement. The Ukrainian state did not act in ways that caused the 
Crimean Tatars to feel that they needed to move either from Crimea or directly linked the 
necessity of the squatter settlements. Instead, their actions not only demonstrated that the 
Crimean Tatars had at least some political power in their organization and demands, as 
“the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine – thanks in part to pressure exercised by Crimean 
Tatar organizations at the time of its adoption – makes several references to indigenous 
peoples,” but also that they were more than willing to help the repatriation and 
integration of the Crimean Tatars through changes to the citizenship law and funding 
through programs such as Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1952, No. 
626, and No. 514, the latter of which extended the program on resettling to 2015 (Council 
of Europe: ECRI 2012, 27; Council of Europe: Secretariat of the Framework Convention 
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for the Protection of National Minorities 2013, 5). Ukraine offered more to the Crimean 
Tatars, granted after demonstrations and protests by the Mejlis and Crimean Tatar 
political activists, leaving the possibility of voluntary movement as an act of state 
repression almost an impossibility.  
 
- Forced Movement 
 
Under the definition of forced movement in the first chapter and the guidelines of 
the hypothesis, it must be stated that forced movement was not a repression used by the 
Ukrainian state against the Crimean Tatars. My research shows no evidence that this 
occurred, as it would contradict the actions of the Ukrainian government towards the 
support of Crimean Tatar repatriation and integration through monetary funding and 
collaboration with international organizations such as the U.N. Development Program 
(UNDP), OSCE, and the International Organization for Migration. If there was any 
forced migration, it would only exist in the forms of evictions of Crimean Tatars off of 
land in which they were squatting during the first decade or so of their return, actions that 
were perpetrated by the Crimean authorities, not the central government of Ukraine. As 
has been depicted throughout the analysis, the Crimean government was more hostile and 
resistant towards the Crimean Tatars, while the Ukrainian government was much more 




There was little to no evidence of the type of imprisonment that would qualify as 
state repression based on the definition from the first chapter. While it was happening 
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under the Crimean government, imprisonment of political or ethnic peoples on arbitrary 
grounds did not occur in the case of the Crimean Tatars. In one such instance, Crimean 
authorities acted to imprison Crimean Tatars in 2000, as “the Dzhankoy city court's 8th-
December ruling, which fined and sentenced to two years in jail, with postponed 
implementation, four Tatars who blocked railway traffic between Dzhankoy and 
Simferopol in a protest last summer against the violation of their rights was a political 
reprisal” (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2001, 2). Instances of arrests that 
came from clashes between the Crimean Tatar and local police forces, which 
occasionally turned deadly, were not investigated by the Ukrainian state (United States 
Department of State 2009). Among the data obtained regarding protests and human rights 
records of Ukraine throughout the two decades Crimean Tatars were under Ukrainian 
law, there was no mention of wrongful imprisonment of Crimean Tatars, even though 
there were still cases of arbitrary imprisonment within Ukraine during those years.  
 
- Disappearances 
As far as my research is concerned, there was no evidence of disappearances of 
Crimean Tatar Mejlis, Kurultai, or community members under Ukrainian rule. Much like 
with forced movement, disappearances would have contradicted the actions of the 
Ukrainian government, even under the Yanukovych regime. In terms of an act of 
repression, disappearances were not among the acts of repression by the Ukrainian state 





- Removal of Rights 
With the two decades under Ukrainian law working towards gaining rights and 
improved rights, the Crimean Tatars were not the subjects of rights removals in the sense 
of explicit rights outright being removed. However, while they did receive usually 
positive, if not hesitant support from the Ukrainian government, their rights improvement 
saw negligible results, and by the time of the Yanukovych presidency, saw some of their 
rights limited indirectly. During Yanukovych’s administration, the council set up by 
Kuchma was restricted from 33 members to 19, with only eight members being from the 
Mejlis (Wilson 2013, 424). Crimean Tatar supporters of the Kurultai were also removed 
from bodies like the Crimean Assembly and the Cabinet of Ministers between 2012-
2013, replaced with loyalists to Anatoli Mohyliov, the Crimean Prime Minister with pro-
Russian ties and having praised the Stalinist deportations during WWII, and the State 
Committee for Nationalities and Religion was dissolved in 2010, which would have 
supported the Crimean Tatars (425; Gorchinskaya 2011). By the end of 2012, there was 
only one Crimean Tatar national MP out of 450, in Kyiv, and held only 10 percent and 5 
percent of positions of local councils and local administration official respectively (425). 
While the political rights of the Crimean Tatars were not removed under Yanukovych, 
they were certainly decreased purposely, partly as punishment for siding with his 
opposition.   
 
- Othering 
Acts of othering the Crimean Tatars were present in Ukraine and Crimea, both as 
holdovers from the former Soviet Union, and as new accusations of criminality and 
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terrorism against the Mejlis and Kurultai. Not only did the fears manufactured by the 
Soviet Union about the Crimean Tatars survive the collapse in 1991 in the minds of 
Ukrainians and Russians in Crimea, but so did the narratives against Crimean Tatars and 
Muslim minorities in educational textbooks. Even though there were petitions to have 
these references and false depictions removed from the textbooks, they were still present 
in widely used textbooks as late as 2013. Other acts of othering that occurred include 
calls to violence against the Crimean Tatars by pro-Russian and Cossack groups, 
believing that their actions are justified. These were acts undertaken by mostly non-
governmental groups, however pro-Russian leaders in the Crimean government have 
demanded the banning of the Mejlis as an extremist group and one that acts through 
criminal means. In Kyiv in 2006, Progressive Socialist leader Natalya Vitrenko invoked 
words of hatred and racism against the Crimean Tatars in public testimony, in an attempt 
to spark conflict between Crimean Tatars and ethnic Russians (United States Department 
of State 2007). While for the most part these acts of othering are limited to the Crimean 
government and pro-Russian politicians, Ukraine under Yanukovych saw the return of 
these claims of extremism, exaggerating the threat the Crimean Tatars could pose, trying 
to incite local elites to side with his party, the Party of Regions, by alienating the Crimean 
Tatars (Wilson 2013, 422-423). Acts under Yanukovych’s Ukraine ought to be followed 
by an asterisk, as his actions were repressive of the Mejlis specifically, those pro-Western 
Crimean Tatars. Yanukovych did not repress all Crimean Tatars, as pro-Russian Crimean 
Tatars and the Milli Firka, a small Crimean Tatar opposition to the Mejlis, were allowed 
in positions of power from which some Mejlis members were removed (424). Ultimately, 
on the subject of othering, there was little active actions of othering enacted by the 
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Ukrainian government, with most of the othering coming during Yanukovych’s 
presidency and targeted against those vocal Crimean Tatars and the Mejlis that would not 
join his party and agenda. While these were passive inactive acts of othering, such as the 
failure to address the perception of the Crimean Tatars by correcting Soviet era 
information in textbooks, they highlight the failures of the Ukrainian government to 
support the Crimean Tatars.  
 
- Punishment 
Punishment was only an act of repression taken against the Crimean Tatars by the 
Ukrainian state during the Yanukovych years. Just as stated when discussing repression 
in the form of othering, Yanukovych’s repressions were politically motivated against the 
Crimean Tatar groups that would not side with him or join the Party of Regions, instead 
opting to support his opponent during the 2010 Presidential election, Yulia Tymoshenko. 
He punished the members of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis for this act of indiscretion by 
shrinking the Council of Representatives put in place by former President Leonid 
Kuchma, removing all but eight of Mejlis members from the Council replacing them with 
members of the opposition Tatar organization supporting Yanukovych, the Milli Firka, 
and also saw the decrease in political representation in Crimean political positions and 
offices by filling decision making positions with those loyal to Yanukovych and Crimean 






- Cultural Destruction 
Cultural destruction was not an act used by the Ukrainian government against the 
Crimean Tatars, however, it was an act used by vandals and on occasion, even political 
leaders in the Crimean government. Russian relations with the Crimean Tatars remained 
poor throughout the 1990s, 2000s, and early 2010s, leading to acts of discrimination and 
cultural destruction. These actions ranged from the destruction of Crimean Tatar squatter 
settlements to the vandalism of Crimean Tatar symbols, such as the tearing down of a 
Tamga in the Crimean Village of Krasnogvardejskoye, the national emblem of the 
Crimean Tatars, from a memorial to the victims of the 1944 genocide (Paschyn 2016; 
United States Department of State 2009). Even some Crimean officials participated in 
acts of cultural destruction, as witnessed with then Prime Minister Mohyliov, appointed 
by then President Viktor Yanukovych, as he was in charge of the bulldozers that levelled 
Crimean Tatar businesses at the site of Ai-Petri, a disputed holy site, in 2007 during an 
infamous confrontation (Wilson 2013, 420). These instances of cultural destruction were 
not endorsed, ordered, or carried out by the Ukrainian government, but their responses to 
these sorts of actions existed only in the creation of laws to offer protections to the 
Crimean Tatars, and laws that would not be successfully followed in Crimea. 
It is clear that the repressions under Ukraine were far lower in level and present 
indicators than the repression at the hands of the Soviet Union. In the case of the Soviet 
Union, seven of the eight identifiers were present before the exile, and six of the eight 
were active during and post-exoneration. Comparing it to the Ukrainian case, it is clear 
that only two of the eight identifiers, othering and punishment, were present. A third, 
removal of rights, refers to a decrease in the power of their political rights rather than an 
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outright removal, indicating that its presence in this case does not entirely match up with 
the identifier. Thus, based on numbers of identifiers present and employed by the 
different states, the Soviet Union was far more repressive. In both cases, however, the 
strength of the national identity of the Crimean Tatars was equal, with the strength of the 
national identity perhaps being stronger during the Ukrainian case. The Crimean Tatars 
faced opposition and constant struggles in their return, and so they had to find solidarity 
in their return and fight for land. This, alongside the organization and structure of 
Crimean Tatar political and national mechanisms, allowed for the national identity to 
maintain its strength in Ukrainian Crimea. Yet, the Crimean Tatars, even with a more 
refined sense of national identity and the ability to realize their national dreams, were less 
repressed by the state government than under the Soviet Union. Thus, the Crimean Tatars 
under Ukraine, did not suffer from state repression on the same scale as under the Soviet 
Union, even though their national identity and desires as a nation were in full force. 
However, ultimately this counterexample, which does fit the guidelines of the 
hypothesis of a state having just acquired a minority group with a strong national identity, 
falls short because it does not have the historical connections to the land of Crimea, nor 
does the goals of the Ukrainian government and the Crimean Tatars directly oppose one 
another, and works to help explain why the Crimean Tatars were not the recipients of 
state repression mostly. By observing the repressions faced at the hands of some of the 
Russian majority in Crimea and the Crimean government, it becomes clear that the acts 
of repression are much more prevalent than from the Ukrainian government, with the 
repressions covering five of the eight indicators, demonstrating that the Crimean 
government and pro-Russian groups and individuals were much more repressive of the 
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Crimean Tatars than the state. It also indicates that although the Crimean Tatars and other 
minority groups in Ukraine are protected and supported under various Ukrainian 
legislation, the authorities of Crimea do not seem to follow the decrees of the Ukrainian 
government, to which the Ukrainian government has had no impetus to correct or 
reprimand for the violations.   
 
Too Little, Too Late and the Role of Homeland: Ukraine and the Crimean Tatars 
 
“On one hand, Ukraine is the only country willing to finance the Crimean Tatars, 
albeit at a reduced level, and it also began to work actively on getting the world 
community to help the Crimean Tatars’ return, an effort we support. On the other 
hand, the government first ignored and now is delaying a decision on the political 
and legal aspects of the problem” (Chubarov 1997, 45).  
 
One of the side effects of Ukraine’s insufficient support of the Crimean Tatars 
was the development of the Milli Firka. The chairman of Milli Firka, Vasvi Abduraimov, 
even supported the Russian annexation, claiming the Ukrainians did nothing to help the 
Crimean Tatars, and that the Russians recognize the Crimean Tatars and support them 
with more efficiency and openness than Ukraine ever did over two decades (Winning 
2014). While Abduraimov has made some questionable claims, including one claim that 
Crimean Tatars were in danger from the “nationalist-leaning official authorities of 
Ukraine,” urging the Russian Federation and its leaders to save the minority groups in 
Ukraine, he is correct in believing that Ukraine has done little to help the Crimean Tatars 
(Wilson 2013, 425). Ukraine never fully recognized the Crimean Tatars as belonging to 
Crimea until after the 2014 referendum on Russian annexation, finally issuing a decree 
that they were the indigenous people of Crimea (Makarenko 2017). Also present in the 
decree was the recognition of the Mejlis and the Kurultai as “a plenipotentiary body of 
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the Crimean Tatar people,” and Ukraine’s adoption of the “UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous People” (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine No. 4475). The bill, “On the Status 
of the Crimean Tatar People in Ukraine,” passed in 2017, and made the decree from three 
years prior law. As well, Ukraine officially recognized the 1944 deportation of the 
Crimean Tatars an act of genocide (Makarenko 2017). These actions by the Ukrainian 
government for the Crimean Tatars come off as “too little, too late,” even the bill to make 
the decree from 2014 law took too long to pass. It could be easy to speculate that the 
responses regarding the Crimean Tatars came about not fully out of solidarity with the 
Crimean Tatars, but possibly out of defiance against Russia, who had annexed Crimea 
from Ukraine illegally, and had supported separatists waging war in the Donbas region of 
mainland Ukraine. While this cannot definitively be proven, what can be proven is that 
while Ukraine did not repress the Crimean Tatars and instead offered them funding and 
political support towards their repatriation and integration, the actions of Ukraine were 
insufficient on all fronts. The Crimean Tatars still faced repressions in Crimea, in which 
the Ukrainian laws protecting and aiding them were not enforced, the ethnic conflicts 
with the Russian majority continued to simmer, never quite reaching a boiling point 
thankfully, and the Crimean Tatars desires for more political representation and 
participation, better access to adequate schools, language, and cultural education, and a 
more stable quality of life in the squatter settlements and land restitution were seemingly 
ignored by the Ukrainian government (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2001, 
2).  
The Crimean Tatar return to the Crimean Peninsula was ultimately successful, and 
the desire for the homeland was made reality. But, even though they returned, the idea of 
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homeland would not dissipate. “Homeland is some place where the community emerges 
as a separate and distinct entity,” and as such, the Crimean Tatars, all drawn together 
through the desire to reach the homeland, would find themselves an imagined community 
in reality, where their national identity and togetherness as a nation are bound to Crimea, 
and Crimea is where they are fully actualized (Aydıngün and Yıldırım 2010, 37). The 
homeland for the Crimean Tatars is a place where identity can flourish, the final 
destination of the people can be realized, and become a place of peace and security (37-
38). Even though the return was far from perfect, and the struggles of the return are still 
experienced decades after the initial return in 1991, Crimean Tatar national identity has 
stayed strong. They were allowed to start rebuilding, although in this case it was not just 
their heritage and language, but also new living areas and villages as well in squatter 
settlements. The support of the Ukrainian government, Turkey, and various international 
organizations had mixed results for the Crimean Tatars in Crimea, leaving a lot to be 
desired. Their struggle for homeland would prove to be far from over though, as in early 
2014, Crimea would become a struggle between Ukraine, Russia, the Russian majority in 
the Peninsula, and the Crimean Tatars, the national minority stuck in the middle of 












Chapter 4: Annexation and the Return to Russia 
 
 The Winter of 2014 was an unusually busy time of the year for the former Soviet 
Union. On top of the 2014 Winter Olympics held in Sochi, there was civil unrest and 
revolution in Ukraine, regime change, Separatist violence and war in Eastern Ukraine, 
and the 2014 referendum in Crimea and the subsequent annexation of the Crimean 
Peninsula by the Russian Federation. As some former Soviet states, especially the Baltics 
like Latvia and Lithuania, began wondering if they were next in line for what may have 
been perceived as a modern wave of Russian expansionism, the minority groups in 
Crimea, including the Crimean Tatars, found themselves locked in a position in which 
their actions could do very little to alleviate the situation. They had little political power 
in Ukraine to begin with, and the Yanukovych administration had further limited the 
power of the largest political nongovernmental organizations of the Crimean Tatars, the 
Mejlis and the Kurultai, not to mention the disregard for the Crimean Tatars politically by 
the Crimean government. Without the political clout and sway to directly impact the 
outcome of the referendum, which had been touted as illegal by the West and a number 
of the successor states of the former Soviet Union, the Crimean Tatars found themselves 
at the mercy of the incoming Russian “invaders,” the pro-Russian Crimean government 
and Russian majority population in Crimea, and the ineffective replacement government 
that took over once Yanukovych was ousted as President and fled to Russia (Chubarov 
2015). Here, the Crimean Tatars would find themselves unable to do anything but protest, 
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rally, and watch as they were forcibly reunited with Russia once again after over two 
decades of being under the Ukrainian state.  
 Unlike the previous chapters, this chapter will not include an evaluation. Instead, 
this chapter will act as a prelude to the final chapter chronicling the events and decisions 
that led to the reunification of the Crimean Peninsula with Russia, the reasons for the 
referendum, Russian interference, and Russia’s decision to annex Crimea. The chapter 
also will include the actions and reactions of the Crimean Tatars and the Mejlis during 
and after the referendum and the annexation of Crimea. Media played a large role in 
Russian professions of legitimizing the annexation on moral, historical and national 
grounds, pitching a narrative that carefully crafts a perception of the annexation as 
liberation and reunification, all the while ignoring the territorial, economic, and military 
gains from the annexation. On the other hand, the Ukrainian provisional government, 
which was also busy with separatism in Donetsk and Luhansk - the historic region of 
Donbass - found themselves powerless to stop the referendum in Crimea. The referendum 
initially started as one for greater autonomy within Ukraine and morphed into one for 
joining Russia. Analyzing these factors in addition to the depiction of the decisions and 
events will provide the context for the final chapter, demonstrating how the situation in 
Crimea represented something akin to Brubaker’s triadic nexus, and how the Crimean 
Tatars and their growing imagined community provided foresight into their treatment 







 The events leading to the Euromaidan and precipitating the ousting of President 
Viktor Yanukovych and the infamous referendum began in November of 2013 when 
Yanukovych failed to sign a deal with the European Union that would further associate 
Ukraine with the West, as well as start a free trade agreement between the political units. 
Instead, further connections with the Russian Federation were chosen. With Kyiv’s 
suspension of talks on the 21st of November and Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the EU 
agreement on November 29th, pro-agreement protests that had started following the 21st 
only grew stronger (Baczynska, Polityuk, and Kasolowsky, Reuters 2014). As these 
protests and riots rang out in Kyiv, the Yanukovych administration was having meeting 
with Russian officials about re-securing full economic ties with Russia instead. The 
economic package offered by Russia appeared much more substantial. The EU only 
offered Ukraine 610 million euros of loans and aid, whereas Russia had offered 15 billion 
US dollars’ worth in aid as well as cheaper petroleum prices, an amount much closer to 
Ukraine’s much desired estimate of $27 billion (Baker, Reuters 2013). Yanukovych, who 
has proven to have desired closer relations with Russia through his actions and his 
election in 2010, opted thus to look towards Russian aid and ties over those with the EU. 
This was the primary cause of the protests that began around the end of November of 
2013. Throughout the rest of 2013 and into 2014, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians 
protested, held rallies, and created tent cities in Kyiv, while smaller protests were held 
elsewhere in the country. On top of these protests in Kyiv and elsewhere in the country, 
opposition leaders, such as Yulia Tymoshenko, were calling for either the resignation of 
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Yanukovych, or the resumption of EU talks, neither of which happened in light of these 
demonstrations.  
Instead, the Ukrainian courts banned protests in central Kyiv, and Yanukovych 
and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine passed laws against anti-government protests on 
what has become known as “Black Thursday;” ten different laws limited rights of speech 
and assembly (Information Department of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Secretariat, 
Verkhovna Rada 2014). Dubbed “dictatorship laws (zakoni pro diktaturu)” by 
Yanukovych’s opposition and the Ukrainian media, this action further distanced 
Yanukovych from the protesting masses and the opposition, leading to violence in Kyiv, 
as the bans were ignored by the protesters. After a few protester deaths through the 
violence perpetrated by riot police in Kyiv, Yanukovych and lawmakers begin to 
overturn some of the anti-protest laws as the Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov 
resigned on January 28th of 2014. Regardless, after a brief sick leave during which 
Yanukovych granted amnesty to those arrested during the riots and protests, the 
demonstrations did not simmer as Russia and Yanukovych grew closer, with Russia 
granting Yanukovych and Ukraine $2 billion to help Ukraine. With growing violence and 
an increasing death toll within the warzone-lite Kyiv, the Verkhovna Rada voted to 
remove Yanukovych as president, with the latter then fleeing to Russia for asylum. 
Yanukovych was essentially a fugitive at this point, having been indicted for “mass 
murder” over the deaths of the protesters. This was followed by the formation of a new 
government in Ukraine. Russia reacted forcefully as Putin put 150,000 troops on high 
alert, and orchestrated the seizure of Ukrainian airports and the Crimean Parliament in 
Crimea by armed individuals who were in support of Russia.  
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On the 1st of March, the State Duma gave Putin permission to have Russian troops 
invade Ukraine in reaction to the violence in Ukraine, the ousting of Yanukovych, and 
the formation of a new government through what Russia believed to be a coup by anti-
Russian, fascist forces. As well, pro-Russian protests were held in Crimea, Eastern and 
Southern Ukraine. On the 4th and 5th of March, Putin recalled armed forces in Eastern 
Ukraine and Crimea, yet some armed conflicts and forces still remained, so called “self-
defense” forces, who were not under his command. Ukraine had been divided politically, 
linguistically and ethnically for most of its independence along pro-Russian and pro-
Western lines. A peek at voting and ethno-linguistic maps of Ukraine around the time of 
the 2010 election and the Euromaidan display this phenomenon: 
 
(Fisher, Washington Post, 2013). 
This map shows that there is a distinctive language and ethnic break between the 
Western-leaning, Ukrainian majority language population and the Eastern, Russian-
leaning, Russian majority language population. This divide also reflects politically as 





The divides virtually matches the ethnic and linguistic divides of Ukraine in the early 
2010’s, reflecting not only the places in which Russia had the most active troops and 
where the “self-defense” volunteers remained, Crimea and Donbass, but also the 
locations of pro-Russian protests in Ukraine after the removal of Yanukovych.  It is this 
division and the failure of the “self-defense” units to leave Crimea that help to understand 
the issues surrounding the legitimacy and illegitimacy of the Crimean referendum.  
 As a reaction to the irregular changes in the Ukrainian government by the 
Euromaidan leaders and the pressures from the pro-Russian armed individuals who had 
seized the Crimean Parliament on the 27th of February, the Crimean Parliament elected to 
hold a referendum on the 25th of May to determine the status of Crimea within Ukraine 
and dismiss the current regional government of Crimea (Interfax-Ukraine, 2014). 
According to reports from the inside, of the 100 deputies, 64 were present, and passed 
both of the resolutions, with the referendum passing with 61 out of 64, and the dismissal 
of the government passing with 55 out of 64. It is questionable whether all of deputies 
recorded present were actually there, and no one could know whether the vote was 
legitimate or falsified by the armed forces holding the parliament, as they had taken away 
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all forms of communication and no one from the secretariat was present during the vote. 
As mentioned before, the referendum that was to happen on the 25th of May was 
supposed to be regarding the levels of autonomy Crimea had within Ukraine.  However, 
the referendum was later moved to the March 30th by former deputy and appointed 
Crimean Prime Minister Sergei Aksyonov, a leading member of the Russian Unity party 
(Ukrayinskaya Pravda, 2014). To counteract the referendum and the dismissal of the 
executive branch of Crimea’s government, the Council of Ministers, SovMin, and the 
appointment of Aksyonov, the Central Election Commission and Kyiv nullified the 
dismissal and found the referendum and the creation of it illegal on March 4th 
(Ukrayinskaya Pravda, 2014). The Crimean Verkhovna Rada responded by moving the 
referendum from the 30th of March to the 16th, and changed the queries on the 
referendum. Instead of asking about greater autonomy, now the referendum covered 
possible secession to Russia, asking “Do you support the idea of Crimea becoming part 
of Russian Federation?” (Verkhovna Rada of Crimea, CG Press, 5). Regardless of 
Ukrainian President Turchynov and the interim government’s warnings and claims of 
illegality, the vote passed, again under the watch of pro-Russian armed self-defense 
forces, this time passing 78 in favor and eight abstentions. Prior to the referendum, on 
March 11th, the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea and the Sevastopol City Council declared 
independence from Ukraine, claiming that with a “yes” result from the referendum, they 
would join Russia.  
 Even though the goal of the referendum was to join the Russian Federation, there 
were two choices on the referendum. The first was to secede from Ukraine and reunite 
with Russia. The second choice was to reinstate the 1992 constitution of Crimea and 
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reestablish the status of Crimea under Ukraine (Podolian 2015, 119; Verkhovna Rada of 
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea 2014). The second choice, which would reinstate 
the Crimean constitution that the Ukrainian government had struck down in the early 
1990s, granted Crimea a stronger status as independent, and would have allowed Crimea 
to have relations with whomever it pleased. It follows that Crimea, with a government 
that was now in stronger favor of Russian relations and annexation, would have strong 
relations with Russia if the second option was the result of the referendum, meaning that 
whichever choice was made, relations with Russia and Russian presence in Crimea was 
not going away. Regardless, the referendum resulted in the vote to join with Russia, with 
83 percent turnout, and 96.77 percent of votes in support of the first choice, as reported 
by Russia (Podolian, 119). Before and as a result of the referendum, waves of people 
decided to flee Crimea, including some hundreds Crimean Tatars before the referendum, 
fearing Russian rule again (State Border Guard Service of Ukraine 2014).  
The results of the referendum have been scrutinized and believed to have been 
trumped up and fallacious. With the voter registries made inaccessible to the Crimean and 
Sevastopol governments by the Central Elections Commission, the Crimean authorities 
had to make their own lists, allowing for distinct choices to be made in an attempt to keep 
those who would not vote for the first choice to be passed by and left off of the list. In 
addition, minority groups and their leaders, such as the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, called for 
the boycott of the referendum, a decision that the Mejlis took. While it is more than likely 
not the case that all Crimean Tatars abstained from voting, it is possible that a large 
number of them did. Cases of multiple voting and Russian citizens voting were also 
reported post-referendum, further delegitimizing the vote, as Sevastopol polling 
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percentages show that 124 percent of their electorate voted (Podolian 2015, 120-121; 
KyivPost 2014). Several leaks from Russian state sources have also pointed to the 
falsification of the results in favor of Russian annexation. The website of the President of 
Russia’s Council on Civil Society and Human Rights leaked, and was swiftly taken 
down. One of the leaked report claimed that the turnout was only around 30 percent and 
just above half had voted for annexation; other reports by the council show that 50-80 
percent of Sevastopol residents voted to join Russia, 50-60 percent of Crimean residents 
voted to join Russia, all with a total turnout of 30-50 percent, meaning that only about 
22.5 percent of the total population voted in favor of annexation (Bobrov, president-
sovet.ru 2014; Gregory, Forbes 2014). This number also seems in line with polling 
numbers taken between 2009 and May 2013 on the status of Crimea, with 33 percent 
supporting Russian reunification in 2011, and 23 percent in 2013, less than a year before 
the referendum (Podolian 2015, 115). Given these results, it makes more sense logically 
that the result of the leaked report is correct. Thus the official reported results of the 2014 
Referendum are false, supporting Kyiv, Crimean Tatar, and Western claims that the 
referendum was illegal outside of its conception. 
 
2014 Annexation by the Russian Federation 
 Regardless of the legitimacy of the vote, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula, 
an act which was only recognized by a few countries, including some former Soviet 
states of Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Much like the referendum that allowed 
for the annexation to take place, the annexation was deemed illegal by Ukraine and much 
of the West, resulting in sanctions taken against Russia by the Obama Administration in 
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America and from the European Union. Debates raged between Western leaders and the 
Russians about dealing with the Ukrainian crisis, with the former pressuring Russia to 
withdraw all of its troops that had been sent into Ukraine in response to the ousting of 
Yanukovych and the appointment of Turchynov’s interim government. As already stated, 
Putin did fall to these pressures, but still pro-Russian forces remained in Ukraine and 
Crimea, with Putin deeming them self-defense forces that were not under his command. 
The question of legality and legitimacy of the referendum and the annexation that swiftly 
followed, while important questions that ought to be addressed, do not need to be 
addressed in this thesis. On one hand, you have the Ukrainian and Western perspective, 
which finds that Russia was in violation on numerous treaties in its invasion of Crimea 
and the Donbass and the annexation of Crimea, centered around an illegal referendum 
held at gunpoint, declared illegal by the Ukrainian government and found to have been 
take illegally by international and Western organizations, such as the OSCE. The OSCE 
was not able to representatives to monitor the 2014 referendum because it was illegal, 
with members barred from entry to Crimea by armed pro-Russian forces (Podolian 2015, 
113-114, 120). On the other hand, Russia found that the Crimean referendum was legal 
because the found the interim government to be illegally in place after a coup d’état that 
overthrew Yanukovych, with Russian President Vladimir Putin claiming that the 
government in Ukraine following the Euromaidan revolution was mostly illegitimate, and 
that Yanukovych was the only legitimate President of Ukraine (Putin 2014). Putin also 
argues that the referendum followed UN treaties and was in line with their policy 
decisions, citing Kosovo as a comparison (kremlin.ru, 2014). It is because of this mindset 
around the interim government that Russia and Crimean officials found that the 
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referendum was legitimate and legal, and related to Russia’s reasons for annexation, 
which will be discussed in a little bit. Putin also used the idea that the Ukrainian 
government, as it was after the ousting of Yanukovych, was both the spawn of a coup 
d’état and revolution. This created a new government, one in which Russia had not made 
military and territorial agreements with, allowing Russia to seemingly breach the Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation, and agreements from 1997 and 2003 on the Black Sea 
Fleet and borders respectively, and use military might (Allison 2014, 1265). Both 
perspectives have weight on the hypothesis of this thesis, as the Russian perspective 
impacts their official reasons for annexation, while the Crimean Tatars hold the Western 
perspective on the legality and legitimacy of the referendum and annexation, leading to 
another point of conflict that existed prior to Crimean Tatars joining the Russian 
Federation through annexation. Thus, the debate about whether or not it was illegal does 
not find its place here.  
 The day after the contentious referendum vote, March 17th, the Verkhovna Rada 
of Crimea formally declared independence from Ukraine with the intent of requesting full 
annexation to the Russian Federation. That same day, Putin signed an executive order 
that read: “Given the declaration of will by the Crimean people in a nationwide 
referendum held on March 16, 2014, the Russian Federation is to recognize the Republic 
of Crimea as a sovereign and independent state, whose city of Sevastopol has a special 
status” (Putin, kremlin.ru, 2014). Sergei Aksyonov also found himself the Prime Minister 
of Crimea, a role which he previously held in the form of the acting Prime Minster until 
his election to the position in September of the same year, assuming office officially on 
the 9th of October. The following day, the Duma approved of the annexation, and the 
 
 112 
Treaty on Accession of the Republic of Crimea to Russia was signed by President Putin. 
The treaty was then ratified by the Russian Federal Assembly on the 21st of March, 
having been ratified by the Duma the previous day, five days after the referendum. The 
ratification retroactively made the 18th of March the first day that Crimea was officially 
part of Russia (N 6-FKZ, garant.ru, 2014). March 18th also marks the first documentation 
of bloodshed during the occupation between the Russian and pro-Russian forces and the 
Ukrainian military personnel still in Crimea and Sevastopol, as both sides suffered one 
casualty in the Simferopol Incident. In his speech to a meeting in Moscow, Putin 
celebrated the annexation, showing support and worry for the hardships Ukraine was 
facing at the time, while welcoming Crimea with open arms: “After a long, hard 
and exhausting voyage, Crimea and Sevastopol are returning to their harbour, to their 
native shores, to their home port, to Russia” (Putin 2014). Using nautical lexicon to 
describe the reunification, Putin supports the idea that not only did Crimea belong to 
Russia, but that Crimea had always belonged to Russia, with Russia as the homeland. The 
idea of Russia as the homeland of Crimea and Crimeans is shown through the residents of 
the peninsula as well, demonstrated with billboards in Sevastopol following the 
referendum that stated “Crimea—Path to the Homeland (Krym—Put’ na rodinu)” 
(Charron 2016, 246).  
 On the 19th of March, Russian military personnel began invading the Peninsula 
and occupying Ukrainian military bases and Crimean political locations in order to 
facilitate the establishment of Russian rule of law, and the removal of Ukrainian political 
and military influence in the newly obtained Russian territory. Aside from the ratification 
and signing on the incorporation of Crimea and Sevastopol into Russian territory on the 
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21st, the rest of March involved the removal of Ukrainian military personnel, with mixed 
results, some of which led to violence. By the 25th, the last Ukrainian warship in Crimea 
was disabled, and on the 26th, Russia had obtained all of Crimea’s military facilities with 
some Ukrainian service men declaring loyalties to Russia. Those who held Ukrainian 
loyalties were evacuated to Ukraine, according to General of the Army and Chief of Staff 
of the Armed Forces of Russia, Valery Gerasimov (volyns’ki novyny 2014). By the end 
of March, Crimea and Sevastopol adopted Moscow’s time zone, and Crimea had become 
part of the Russian Federation.  
 The direct aftermath of the annexation and the process of ridding Crimea and 
Sevastopol of Ukrainian military presence had negative consequences for Russia 
internationally and Ukraine’s safety in the region. The countries of the G8 voted to 
remove Russia from the summit, and the UN General Assembly’s resolution declaring 
the March 16th referendum illegal was approved. A number of key Russian political 
figures were also heavily sanctioned by the US and the West, including acting Prime 
Minister of Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov. Russia also revealed to Ukraine that following 
annexation they would be abandoning some of the agreements made regarding the Black 
Sea Fleet, including the Partition Treaty, part of the Kharkiv Pact, which gave the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet access to their military bases in Crimea while respecting the 
sovereignty and internal affairs of Ukraine (Kimball, DW, 2014). With relations between 
Russia, the West, and Ukraine breaking down because of this aggressive act of expansion 
by the Russian government, it leaves open the questions of why Russia decided to annex 
Crimea, and what their intentions were that drove the campaign for its return to Russian 
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soil. To understand the Russian reasoning, it is necessary first to establish why the 
referendum, which allowed for the annexation to occur, legally or not, in the first place.  
 
Why did the referendum happen? 
 
 The reasons for the referendum will echo some of Russia’s official and media 
fueled reasons for the actual annexation, but for the most part, the referendum occurred 
because of uncertainty within the Ukrainian government surrounding the removal of 
Yanukovych and the Euromaidan rallies. Yanukovych, who had been elected in 2010 and 
desired closer ties to Russia rather than to Europe, was the candidate of choice amongst 
the Crimean Peninsula, with over 70 percent voting for him over Tymoshenko (BBC 
2014). The region also held the highest population percentage of Russians in Ukraine, 
with Russian being the ethnic majority in the region, as well as being predominantly 
Russian-speaking (Fisher, Washington Post, 2013). Witnessing the removal of the 
President they elected, one whose political and foreign policy interests allied with the 
Russian majority, through the riots in Kyiv and pressures from the opposition in what 
they consider a coup d’état, the political leadership of Crimea voted to hold a referendum 
on the status of Crimea.  
The first iterations of the referendum were to discuss increasing the autonomy of 
Crimea in Ukraine. It was not until the Central Election Commission of Ukraine and the 
Ukrainian government found the referendum to be illegal and nullified the dismissal of 
the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea and the appointment of Aksyonov as Prime Minister that 
the referendum in question was changed from covering greater autonomy to joining 
Russia. If it was just the fear of the interim government that had overthrown the 
government they had elected and the fear of growth in fascism and Ukrainian 
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nationalism, as suggested by the Milli Firka leader, Abduraimov, then it would make 
some logical sense for holding such a referendum (Wilson 2013, 425).  
However, this was not the case with the Crimean Referendum. The Verkhovna 
Rada of Crimea did not meet to hold a referendum fully on its own accord. Instead, just 
as the Donbass region was seeing separatist fighting with pro-Russian and Russian 
“volunteer” forces, the Crimean Parliament as well as other administrative buildings were 
seized by these so-called “self-defense” forces. What resulted was a vote at gunpoint with 
no real means of communication with the outside; this left the vote and the actual results 
of the vote in question. While the level of actual impact the self-defense and pro-Russian 
forces had on the voting is unknown, it is likely that the decision to hold the referendum 
was approved not entirely through the political processes of the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine as would typically occur. Given the reports of some of the members of 
parliament not being present for the vote and not knowing whether there were actions 
taken by the armed men guarding access to the parliament building or someone else 
casting the votes using the absent members’ voting cards, the legitimacy of the 
referendum remains in contention. It is difficult to say whether or not the referendum 
vote would have taken place without the armed interference, and if the results of the 
referendum vote would have matched the results of the votes from February 27th and 
March 6th.  
The military presence also impacted the result of the referendum that eventually 
took place on the 16th of March, creating an environment that was not conducive for the 
freedom of political expression and willful expression. Instead, it created an environment 
of suffocation under the constant possibility of violent coercion by the presence of armed 
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men (Allison 2014, 1263). Hence, it would not be far-fetched to claim that the source of 
the violence would have their own agenda to force these actions. One can imagine that 
the self-defense units in Crimea did not heavily guard the parliament building out of their 
admiration for the democratic, political process, for instance. Instead, there is more than 
likely an agenda that was being pushed. The threat of violence is to ensure that the 
agenda goes through, with possibilities of violence growing stronger the farther away the 
agenda appears to be, as witnessed with the first combative deaths following the 
referendum, as well as the violence against Ukrainian military personnel who refused to 
give up their naval units, who were forcibly coerced through violence to surrender. The 
threat of violence was allowed to continue by Ukraine and the West because there was 
not surmountable evidence supporting the claims of Russian interference that would 
allow for Ukrainian military responses. Learning from Russia’s Georgian War in 2008, 
Ukraine could not risk firing upon Russian forces, which would have provoked further 
Russian intervention (1260). With the Ukrainian government unable to do anything 
beyond declaring the referendum and dismissal of the Crimean government illegal and 
null, the referendum was able to go ahead anyway, with the Crimean government under 
Aksyonov and the pro-Russian self-defense forces ignoring the decisions by the laws of 
Ukraine.  
Ultimately, while there may have been some legitimate concern about the new 
government in Kyiv, which did not reflect the one voted for by the Crimean Peninsula 
and took power in a time of crisis, and may have led to an eventual referendum like the 
first iteration of the referendum that passed, there was too much external pressure to 
claim that the referendum occurred as an independent action by the Crimean people. The 
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referendum happened because in a situation where the Ukrainian government could not 
feasibly act, pro-Russian forces and the new Crimean government were able to hold and 
support a referendum with the intent of seceding from Ukraine and joining the Russian 
Federation. 
 
Why did Russia annex Crimea? 
 The question that ought to follow is why Russia decided to annex Crimea. Surely, 
the Russians would have known that the annexation would be an international political 
nightmare and would sour the relations between not only Ukraine and Russia, but also 
Russia’s relationships with the West. Following the annexation, Russia was hit with 
sanctions against key political cadres, the members of the G8 voted to suspend Russia 
from the organization and the summits, and a majority of the members of the UN General 
Assembly do not recognize the referendum and the annexation as a legal territorial act, 
and as such find that Crimea still belongs to Ukraine. In spite of such international 
opposition with Putin expecting such negative consequences, Russia forced its way to 
annex Crimea (Rotaru and Troncotă 2017, 331). The question is why.  
There were two types of reasons for the annexation. First, there are reasons that 
were spoken of in public forum through speeches and state media, thus conveying the 
official, image-based purposes. The second type of reasons are the unspoken reasons for 
the annexation. These reasons for annexation can be found in the political measures taken 
directly after the annexation, and these helps establish Russia as an independent political 
force in the world with its own power and direction. All of these reasons combine to 
develop Russia’s links to the Crimean Peninsula, believing Russia to be the “homeland” 
of Crimea, also setting up intriguing parallels and future conflicts with the Crimean 
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Tatars, both as part of the Brubaker’s triadic nexus and regarding the importance of the 
land to the history and prosperity of both the Crimean Tatars and Russia with the prime 
word being “homeland.”  
 The public perception of the referendum and the annexation portrayed by the 
Russian media and public appearances by President Vladimir Putin betrays an intent to 
use ethnic, historical, and national ties between Crimea and Russia to legitimize the 
reasoning for annexation. From the narrative spun by the Russian media conglomerate 
and the words of Russian and pro-Russian Crimean officials, the annexation was not 
annexation, but was instead an act of self-determination. Russian media portrayed the 
actions of Crimean Russians and other residents of the peninsula as exercising their right 
to determine what future they wanted in the face of a hostile, illegal government 
(Ambrosio 2016, 471-472; Chandler 2018, 12). The Russian media emphasized the 
illegality of the interim government, and the corrosive nature of the takeover and fear it 
would stoke in the Crimean authorities and people, much of whom have been established 
as Russian and Russian-speaking. The media, politicians, and even academics found that 
the government was seized by Nazis directly supported by the European Union and the 
United States, funded by the Oligarchs behind Euromaidan (Deliagin 2015, 8-9). By 
depicting Turchynov’s government in such a stark image, it supported the idea that the 
Russian populations were in danger from these so-called Nazis and far-right nationalists 
(Putin 2014). By looking at a cluster of Channel One, one of the main news outlets run by 
the Kremlin, by Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, it is easy to see the desired impact that the 
Kremlin successfully worked towards in depicting the Ukrainian crisis and Crimean self-
determination, linking Western interference, illegitimate governance, and Ukrainian far-
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right nationalists like Stepan Bandera together in the Crimean discourse (Hansen 2015, 
148-149). Russian media’s focus on these problems in Ukraine try and exaggerate the 
threat to Crimea, and one that requires Russian assistance. With the interim government 
portrayed as something threatening, it came down to the Russians in Crimea to act in self-
determination in the form of independence. Thus, Russia swooped in to aid its fellow 
compatriots, as “Crimea became the friend that Russia claimed to protect; while Ukraine 
was perceived (inaccurately) as being lost to enemy control” (Chandler 2018, 17). The 
support of the referendum and the desire for independence in Crimea was deemed 
legitimate by the Kremlin, using the example of Kosovo as a means to claim that the 
Crimeans were acting out of a fear of Ukrainian repression from the new government 
(Rotaru and Troncotă 2017, 334). In looking at the referendum as an act of independence, 
the Kremlin and Russian state-owned media, offer their support not only in recognizing 
the independence of Crimea, but also in coming to its aid on the basis of historical and 
ethno-national grounds (Putin 2014). 
 It would not be enough to just help the Crimeans because the Russian Federation 
wanted to exercise an act of land acquisition. Russia recognized the independence of 
Crimea on the 17th of March through an executive order, allowing them to claim that they 
were allowing Crimea to join as a free act of an independent entity, not an annexation of 
a territory with legal connections to a sovereign state, i.e. Ukraine. Of course, this would 
not be enough, as it would not inspire unity within Russia for the move. The Kremlin and 
Media spun the narrative to historically connect Crimea to Russia, and ethno-nationally 
connect the Crimean people to the Russian people. The 1954 gifting of Crimea to 
Ukraine under Khrushchev was spoken about as a grave error of the past, and “in clear 
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violation of the constitutional norms that were in place” (Putin 2014). In the same 
address, Putin stated that the Crimeans had no say in whether they wanted to become 
Ukrainian, and sees that the annexation is the reversal of the grave mistake made during 
the 20th century, claiming that “in people’s hearts and minds, Crimea has always been an 
inseparable part of Russia” (Putin 2014). There is also evidence of the reinforced 
sacralization of Crimea for Russian Orthodoxy and Russia, with Putin citing the city of 
Korsun as the place of Prince Vladimir’s baptism, and by extension, the birth of 
Christianity in Russia, thus making Crimea a geo-spiritual connection to Russia 
(Pavković 2017, 506; Suslov 2014, 588-589). Putin’s language and the portrayal of the 
Crimean people by the media echoed similar beliefs: that these were Russians who had 
wanted a return ever since the end of the Soviet Union, but could not hold a legal 
referendum, and now their “20 years of struggle have finally ended in success: they have 
held a referendum in which the region's peoples expressed their unanimous will” 
(Matviyenko, CQ Press, 6). By tying Crimea to Russia historically, the Russian 
Federation could undo the errors of the Soviet past, and reunify with Crimea. It also 
reunifies Russians in Crimea with Russia. While Putin and other authorities are clear to 
point out the problems of the past with minority groups like the Crimean Tatars and 
Ukrainians in Crimea, their language chosen to speak about the Crimean people point to 
the understanding that the people of the Crimean Peninsula are Russian. Russian media 
and Kremlin speeches are flooded with the use of russkiy, so much so that “it was 
independently noted by such different personalities as the liberal but pro-Kremlin film 
director Karen Shakhnazarov and the nationalist-oriented journalist and author Sergey 
Shargunov during televised discussions” (Teper 2015, 384). Russkiy is a term that is used 
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to describe Russian people, and identifies them ethno-nationally as Russian (Brubaker 
1996, 142-4; Teper 2015, 381). Believing them to be Russians, the media and the 
Kremlin make intervention almost necessary, as they are their compatriots in need, as 
they are under threat from a hostile government. The media campaigns and propaganda 
supporting the Crimean people and the annexation of Crimea in the face of international 
regression worked effectively in Russia, as the annexation was supported by the Russian 
public, and Crimea was welcomed into Russia’s open arms.  
 For all of the linguistic and geopolitical reasons for the annexation that the 
Kremlin and the media fed to the public, there were, of course. some unspoken factors 
that carried weight in the decision to annex Crimea. These reasons were not discussed in 
the public forum, but they undoubtedly had their impact. The unspoken reasons include 
Putin’s approval ratings, the Black Sea Fleet, and resource and energy dominance in the 
region. Putin’s approval rating had fallen 18 percent between 2010 and 2013, from 79 
percent to 61 percent (Bukkvoll 2016, 277). By annexing Crimea and successfully pulling 
off a media campaign to help people support it, Putin’s approval rating shot up to 80 
percent once the Federal Assembly ratified the annexation, and 87 percent by August 
2014 (levada.ru 2014). The timing of the jump coincides with the move for Crimea. The 
other point in Putin’s presidency where he received a massive boost in approval was 
during the 2008 Georgian War, where it hit its peak at 88 percent. Both of these points 
also coincide with the largest percentages of polled individuals on whether they think the 
country is going in the right direction (levada.ru 2014). While this is not necessarily an 
important reason for Putin, or have a large impact on the decision, there is no mistaking 
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the power of aggressive foreign policy action taken by the Kremlin and Putin on his 
approval. 
 Kyiv was looking towards the West, wanting to become part of the European 
Union. It was Yanukovych’s decisions to look towards Russia instead that caused the 
Euromaidan revolution and protests in late 2013, early 2014. If Ukraine had worked with 
and joined the European Union, then Russia would have lost economic and resource 
gains and influence over the region, including supplying Ukraine with gas and oil 
(Bukkvoll 2016, 271). Not only would destabilizing Ukraine by occupying and 
controlling some of the eastern provinces, the ones that were more inclined towards 
Russia, lower the possibility of the EU welcoming a Ukraine in crisis, but it would also 
keep Ukraine within the economic sphere of influence and reliant on Russian fossil fuels. 
Now with full access to the Black Sea’s untapped resources, Russia could work on 
projects that would move its resources westward without a reliance on the three pipelines 
that run through Ukraine, such as the South Stream, which could now be shorter and 
directly from the Black Sea to Europe (Biersack and O’Lear 2014, 258; Gedmin 2014, 
10). Russia’s control over the Black Sea resources further cause Ukraine to rely on the 
Russian reserves, something that Russia was very cognizant of, as they rose the asking 
price for gas sold in Ukraine following the Crimean annexation (Biersack and O’Lear 
2014, 258, 261). 
 Access to the Black Sea without the need to consult and cooperate with Ukraine 
also allowed the Russian military to fully commit and revitalize the Black Sea Fleet in 
Crimea. The Fleet was split between Russia and Ukraine following Soviet collapse, and 
Russia has been wanting to return it to its original strength (256). Before the annexation, 
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Russia and Ukraine had been sharing military space on the Black Sea, with Russia paying 
rent to Sevastopol for allowing the Black Sea Fleet to have its base in Ukrainian territory 
(Deliagin 2015, 18). With the crisis in Ukraine and Euromaidan, Russia felt their fleet 
was insecure and the strategic significance of Crimea under threat by talks of Europe and 
the Turchynov government, leading former chief of the Russian general staff Yuri 
Baluyevsky to insist “that Russia ‘should urgently reinforce western strategic areas and 
the Black Sea Fleet’ since events in Ukraine had created new threats to Russian security” 
(Allison 2014, 1278). Russian security and military reestablishment in the Black Sea 
became goals of the Russian government, even though they never surfaced as talking 
points in the public forum of the media. The military had ambitions to enhance its 
presence abroad, as well as its strength on its borders, to which the maritime locations on 
the Black Sea provide a strong front and protection from both the West and Turkey, 
reflecting Crimea’s historical placement as a point of question being a peripheral territory 
(1281). The importance of the Black Sea Fleet and a revitalized maritime military 
presence in the Black Sea is also reflected in the nullification of key agreements between 
Ukraine and Russia in the Kharkiv Pact and the 1997 Friendship Treaty because they no 
longer apply to Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet, which is now fully under Russian control 
(Biersack and O’Lear 2014, 257). Regardless of whether or not Russia’s portion of the 
Black Sea Fleet was in danger from the Ukrainian government or not, it was a useful tool 
to not only protect the Russians in Crimea during the crisis, protecting those nationals 
abroad, but also proves to be of benefit to the Russian military strategic goals and the 
Russian image. Crimean annexation gave the Russian Federation the ability to ignore 
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protocols and agreements with Ukraine, legally empowering Russian military expansion 
in the region. 
 Through both the publicly supported reasons for annexation and the unspoken 
ones, power and might worked together to create a certain relationship between the 
Russian state and the Crimean Peninsula. This relationship places the moniker of 
“homeland” on the Russian state for the Crimean people and the peninsula, with the 
annexation serving as the fulfillment of Crimean self-determination and a willingness to 
return to the “homeland.” The narrative of Russia coming to the rescue of Russians in 
Ukrainian Crimea reflects the triadic nexus, where Russia acts as the homeland that is in 
support of its nationals abroad, in this case in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, who feel 
threatened by the nationalizing nation with power, in this case the interim government 
birthing from the Euromaidan. Russia’s actions in Crimea publically follow suit as the 
actions of a country trying to protect its nationals abroad, with the annexation not the goal 
of the Russians, but the goal of the nationals in Crimea, as an act of self-determination.  
While the Russian government has material and political interest in reestablishing Crimea 
and the Black Sea as Russian territory, it is the return of the russkiy abroad in Crimea to 
the “homeland” through territorial assimilation that echoes the self-determination of the 
Crimean Tatars national identity with the “homeland” of Crimea. The difference here is 
that for the Crimean Tatars, that homeland is very much not Russian or part of Russia.  
  
Crimean Tatar Reactions 




On the 26th of February, the Mejlis led a pro-Ukrainian demonstration outside of 
the Verkhovna Rada building in Simferopol attended by several thousand. The purpose of 
the demonstration was to protest the irregular convening of the Crimean parliament, one 
that would vote on whether to hold a referendum or not on Crimea’s status. As a pro-
Russian rally led by Aksyonov was held simultaneously, both rally leaders, with Refat 
Chubarov leading the pro-Ukrainian side, made different claims about the nature of the 
referendum. Chubarov claimed that the session would lead to the secession of Crimea 
from Ukraine and into the arms of Russia. Aksyonov claimed that there were no 
separatist motives in holding the odd session, and they were not planning on discussing 
secession. In the end, Aksyonov was only correct for a few days, while Chubarov was 
correct in the long run, as the referendum’s purpose morphed into secession and 
unification with Russia. Under Ukrainian rule and law, the Crimean Tatars were still 
working towards the rebuilding of their homeland and heritage. So, with the threat of 
Russian reunification, not only is the past histories of Russian state-Crimean Tatar 
relations brought back to the forefront, but the Mejlis and supporting Crimean Tatars see 
a direct threat to the “homeland” and in turn their national identity. Crimean Tatar 
responses to the annexation follow their typical actions that they have employed over the 
years in Ukraine in the forms on protests and non-violent political activism and 
participation, clearly demonstrating a disdain for the referendum, the armed takeover of 
Crimean political buildings, and for the annexation itself.  
One of the first actions that separated the Crimean Tatars from the self-defense 
forces and the pro-Russian politicians and activists in Crimea is the stance on the interim 
government and the ousting of Yanukovych. During the All-Crimean Rally in Memory of 
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Noman Chelebigihan, who among other things was the Chairman of the Crimean 
People’s Republic from 1917-1918, the participants of the rally offered support of the 
decisions in Kyiv: “We declare our unconditional support for the decisions taken by the 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on February 21 and 22, 2014 in order to dismantle the 
criminal regime of Yanukovych, who was responsible for the murder of dozens of 
Ukrainian citizens who defended democracy and human rights in Ukraine” (qtmm.org 
2014). This stance is in opposition to the leaders of Crimea and the pro-Russian allies that 
found the takeover in Kyiv to be a coup d’état and illegal. The Crimean Tatars at the rally 
also asked Ukraine to deal with these same forces, which included the Party of Regions 
and Aksyonov’s Russian Unity party, and the separatist appeals that had been made by 
the pro-Russian politicians. There were also claims from Mejlis leaders that key Crimean 
politicians, specifically Crimean Verkhovna Rada chairman V. Konstantinov, had openly 
invited Russian security agencies to intervene in Crimea (Chubarov, qtmm.org 2014). 
The relationship between the Crimean parliament and the Crimean Tatars had diminished 
since Yanukovych’s restrictions and repressions on their political participation, and the 
increased strength of pro-Russian officials in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. As of 
Yanukovych’s ousting and increased militarized takeover of Crimean political 
establishments, the Mejlis and pro-Russian forces raison d'etre completely veered in 
different political directions.  
Between the end of February and the 21st of March, the day Russia ratified the 
annexation of Crimea, the Mejlis and Crimean Tatars were largely opposed to Russia 
interference and found the self-defense units to be unlawful, thus making the referendum 
and sessions voting on it unlawful and illegitimate as well. Crimean Tatar leaders noted 
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that Crimea had been invaded by Russian and pro-Russian forces, with both Dzhemilev 
and Chubarov claiming that the source of the seizure of the Verkhovna Rada and other 
administrative establishments was from the Black Sea Fleet of Russia, with the latter 
citing two recorded sightings of Black Sea Fleet armored personnel carriers being used 
by these self-defense forces (Dzhemilev, qtmm.org 2014; Chubarov, qtmm.org 2014). 
The referendum was seen as a threat to the sovereignty of Crimea and Ukraine, and an 
action carried out by a few individual Crimean Politicians, flanked by Russian “self-
defense” forces, who supported reunification with Russia who completely disregarded the 
laws of Ukraine and Crimea. The Mejlis called on the Crimean Tatar people to boycott all 
stages of preparation for the referendum, including voting, which most Crimean Tatars 
did boycott, showing support for Ukrainian integrity (Chubarov, qtmm.org 2014; 
Korostelina 2015, 42). The Crimean Tatar leadership made numerous appeals to 
international bodies to de-escalate the Crimean situation, believing that if the situation 
were to go unchallenged or even stopped, that the minorities that disagreed with the 
direction Crimea was taken under the tutelage of the self-defense forces and pro-Russian 
groups would be faced with a very real threat of violence. (Chubarov 2014). However, 
with the Crimean Tatars a minority in Crimea, and without real international support, the 
referendum and annexation occurred under protest of the Crimean Tatars and the Mejlis. 
While it is not the case that all Crimean Tatars opposed the annexation, the fact is 
that a good majority of the population is dissatisfied with the direction of Crimea after the 
annexation. As a result of their polling in late December 2014, John O’Loughlin and 
Gerard Toal, academics at the University of Colorado-Boulder and Virginia Tech 
respectively, found that only roughly 30 percent thought Crimea was moving in a right 
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direction, compared to 40 percent believing it to be the wrong direction (O’Loughlin and 
Toal, openDemocracy 2015). On the question of joining Russia, a third of Crimean Tatar 
respondents thought it the wrong decision, another third thought it the generally right 
decision, and 20 percent thought it the absolutely right decision. However, it is 
unexplained what “generally right decision” refers to exactly, as it could be interpreted as 
referring to leaving Ukraine through secession or referring to joining Russia. And on the 
question “How much of a problem has been the joining of Crimea to Russia?” the 
Crimean Tatar response shows 98 percent finding it a problem to some degree. These 
numbers were the highest in the negative answers to the questions for each of the three 
nationalities surveyed, the other two being Russians and Ukrainians, and the lowest in the 
positive answers. Crimean Tatar resistance to Russian occupation is not universal, but the 
voices of the ones taking issue with the current occupied state are well supported by the 
Crimean Tatar community. 
On multiple occasions, Vladimir Putin had assured the safety and support of the 
Crimean Tatars and other formerly deported peoples. In his speech on the 18th of March, 
he spoke about supporting the deported peoples, including making “all the necessary 
political and legislative decisions to finalize the rehabilitation of Crimean Tatars, restore 
them in their rights and clear their good name” (Putin, kremlin.ru 2014). In his thirty-
minute phone conversation with Mustafa Dzhemilev on the March 12th, when discussing 
the lawlessness on the part of the self-defense forces towards the Crimean Tatars, Putin 
seemingly threatens the self-defense forces and implies protection of the Crimean Tatars 
and other discriminated groups, saying “Let them try” (Putin, qtmm.org 2014). Putin 
even went so far as to recognize Crimea as the homeland of the Crimean Tatars in his 
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address at the Kremlin. Further support for the Crimean Tatars was given in the form of 
the agreement signed between the now Republic of Crimea and the Russian Federation, 
which made Crimean Tatar a state language in the Republic of Crimea, according to 
Article 3, paragraph 2 (kremlin.ru 2014). Even though Putin declared the support of the 
Crimean Tatars, the annexation did not alleviate any fears pro-Ukrainian Crimean Tatars 
had about Russian annexation, and began to give Putin’s words a hollow feeling. 
Following the annexation, threats against the Crimean Tatars rose. Self-defense personnel 
openly discussing re-deporting the Crimean Tatars, beatings and killings of people who 
disagreed with the annexation became more commonplace in Crimea, and many feared 
that bloody, violent conflict was an imaginable future for the Crimean Tatars (Dzhemilev, 
qtmm.org 2014). Disregarding Mejlis and Crimean Tatar calls to have the self-defense 
forces de-legitimized and made illegal, the Crimean government under Russian law 
instead legalized the self-defense forces under the law “On People’s Uprising” 
(Korostelina 2015, 42). By early August 2014, nearly 10 thousand Crimean Tatars had 
fled Crimea under the pressure from official and unofficial actions in Crimea (Aydın 
2014, 89).  
 
Start of the Last Case 
 
 Up until now we bore witness to the inseparable links between Crimean Tatar 
national identity and the Crimean Peninsula, their “Homeland.” With this chapter, the 
claims made by the Russian government and media stake Russian interest in the region 
and their reasons for the annexation, both officially stated and unstated. Russia waged a 
highly successful media campaign for Crimean annexation on ethno-national grounds 
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while obtaining the Crimean territory with its resource-rich Black Sea and the revival of 
the maritime dominance of the Black Sea, without the need for Ukrainian cooperation. It 
was the vocal voices of the Mejlis and the Crimean Tatars that clashed with the self-
defense forces and the pro-Russian Crimean officials wanting secession and assimilation 
with Russia, questioning and threatening Russian narratives and purposes in annexation, 
both officially state and unstated. Even though attempts to help win over the Crimean 
Tatars were enacted, recognizing Crimea as the homeland of the Crimean Tatars while 
claiming Russia to be the homeland of Crimea, these different occurrences of 
“homeland” regarding Crimea provide the potential components of conflict between 
Crimean Tatar national identity and Russian rule and law. Russia and Crimean Russians 
had prevailed over the triadic nexus with Ukraine, but the Crimean Tatars had lost. Now 
under Russian occupation, Crimea became the battleground of another conflict, one 
between the Crimean Tatars and the Russian and Crimean authorities. Already in 
opposition regarding the referendum and annexation, the national identity of the Crimean 
Tatars, adamantly linked to Crimea and their past struggles as a people without Russia, 
the source of almost all of their strife, finds itself diametrically opposed to the Russian 
occupation of the peninsula whose purposes for annexation are tied to the Crimean 
Russian population and Crimea as Russian land, both historically and strategically. This 
being the case as of early 2014, then if this hypothesis is correct, the Russian state will 
repress the Crimean Tatar Mejlis and population in order to protect the Crimean Russian 
population and Russian claims to Crimea. Thus, the repression of the Crimean Tatars 
begins post-annexation with the banishment of central Crimean Tatar figures, Mustafa 
Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov, from entering Crimea. 
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Chapter 5: Crimean Tatars’ Crimea Versus Russia’s Crimea: The Results of the 
Annexation 
 The annexation of the Crimean Peninsula forced a situation where two different, 
opposing forces would inevitably collide, with the Crimean Peninsula and status of 
Crimea the center at the center of this conflict. As it has been stated throughout this 
thesis, the Crimean Tatar’s national identity and general unity has revolved around their 
collective memory of suffering, a desire to rebuild their language and heritage, and 
Crimea itself as the homeland. Much like Anderson’s imagined community, the Crimean 
Tatar national identity encompasses the origins and desires of all Crimean Tatars 
embodied by their political and cultural structures in a way that is imagined as a 
sovereign community, linked by suffering, rooted in the 1944 deportation and once 
realized with the return to Crimea. It is in Crimea once again that the Crimean Tatars 
would strive through more hardship still, but eventually able to begin the process of 
reinvigorating their heritage, culture, and status within their homeland. As demonstrated 
in the last chapter, however, the Russians also have claims to the peninsula. For the 
Russian Federation, Crimea holds military, economic, and geopolitical value, as well as 
historical and ethnic ties with Russian historical glory and the Crimean Russian 
population respectively. Because of Crimea’s various levels of importance to Russia, the 
annexation seemed natural. Yet, the Crimean Tatars were perhaps the loudest voice in 
Crimea against the annexation and Russian occupation. Even though Putin seemed to 
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publicly extend a welcoming hand and showed support for the rehabilitation of the 
Crimean Tatars, the population did not respond as Russia may have hoped: 
While some members of the Crimean Tatar leadership have been willing to accept 
the annexation and lend their support to the Russian authorities in Crimea – 
including a few members of the Mejlis and mufti Emirali Ablayev – the Crimean 
Tatar community at large has proven rather resilient in opposing Russia’s 
occupation of Crimea and affirming the region’s status as a part of Ukraine in 
spite of expectations that they would eventually come around (Coynash and 
Charron 2019, 16). 
 
The Russian annexation of Crimea was in general poorly received by the Crimean Tatars, 
and by understanding their national identity and its development, it is not hard to see 
why. Russian authority had played the leading role in the suffering and struggle of the 
Crimean Tatars that helped define themselves. The Crimean Tatars are not quiet or 
oppressed by their history of suffering, they do not want to forget and move on. Instead, 
the Crimean Tatars want their story to be heard, and they want to remember their 
suffering, as it helps define their purpose for rebuilding and moving forward in their 
identity (Williams 2002, 324-325). So, the Crimean Tatars opposed the annexation of the 
Crimean Peninsula. The Crimean Tatars and the Russian authorities, both with rivaling 
claims to Crimea as a territory with national and historical connections, on top of a 
history of state repression, find themselves at odds in the post-annexation Crimea.  
As hypothesized, it is this conflict between the opposing national identity of the 
minority group, the Crimean Tatars, and the State that has absorbed the said minority 
group, here the Russian Federation, that has led to state repression. Previous chapters 
have shown that the Crimean Tatar national identity is well-formed, it has a strong will 
towards self-determination and rehabilitation, and possesses well-defined and organized 
political and democratic structures of leadership. The Crimean Tatars, at least a majority 
 
 133 
of the population, do not support the annexation and Russian occupation, with some 
actively protesting against the Russian Federation’s plans for Crimea. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the Crimean Tatars, under the Russian rule once again, find themselves under 
the threat of new repressions. This time, however, the repressions would be less 
straightforward. Similar to the repressions witnessed during the Soviet and Imperial 
periods, these new repressions would not come in the form of a direct physical removal 
of the people, or even a direct destruction of their cultural identity for the purposes of 
rewriting their narrative for Russia’s own sake. This time, the repressions would be more 
insidious, as they hit at the Crimean Tatars’ developing political and cultural power of 
revival. This time the Russian state is seeking to garner submission to Russia’s reality 
and assimilate rather than a directly attempt to forcefully move the population.  
 
Rehabilitation, Promises, and Repression 
 While rehabilitation and treatment under the Russian occupation was a worry of 
Crimean Tatar leaders and activists, the Russian Federation seemingly voiced that these 
were unfounded concerns, and instead the Crimean Tatars would receive full support of 
the Kremlin. On the surface, it would appear that the Russian Federation and Putin 
regime offered support for the Crimean Tatars, along with all other Crimeans, through the 
Euromaidan, the Ukrainian crisis and into the annexation period. Multiple actions had 
been taken by President Putin to seemingly assure the Crimean Tatars that the Russians 
were not a threat, and that they would respect and help the rehabilitation process of the 
Crimean Tatars. During concerns voiced by Dzhemilev to Putin about lawlessness 
amongst the self-defense units directed towards Crimean Tatars, Putin vaguely implied 
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that they would not get away with such acts if they tried (Putin, qtmm, 2014). More 
politically, in April 2014, having recognized the ineffectiveness of Ukraine’s attempts to 
foster the rehabilitation process, Putin signed a decree that recognized the Crimean Tatars 
and other deported peoples of Crimea during the Second World War, offering cultural 
and political support, calling for measures to be taken to ensure that the “national, 
cultural, and spiritual renaissance” of the deported peoples thrives (Putin, 2014; Soldatkin 
and Gutterman, Reuters, 2014). Of course, this was not the only instance of official 
proceedings and statements by the Russian leader that worked towards improving the 
recognition of the Crimean Tatars and their relationship with Russia. Putin has repeatedly 
stated that Crimean Tatar was one of the three official languages of the Crimean 
Peninsula, and would be supported alongside Russian and Ukrainian as the other two key 
languages (Putin, 2015). Along with vows to aid linguistic, political, and cultural growth 
for the Crimean Tatars, Putin has also recognized the plight of the Crimean Tatars 
throughout their history, especially the 1944 deportation under Stalin (Putin 2014a; 
2015). He even goes to the lengths that seemingly place his views and the views of 
Russia in line with Crimean Tatar national identity, urging their rehabilitation by taking 
“steps to organise normal life and put in place the conditions for the Crimean Tatars 
to develop steadily in their own homeland” (2014). Not only did Putin demonstrate a 
willingness to enhance the quality of life amongst the Crimean Tatars, but also validated, 
to Crimean Tatar community representatives on the eve of the 70th anniversary of the 
1944 deportation, Crimean Tatar claims to Crimea as their homeland, and by proxy their 
national identity. By recognizing the Crimean Tatars as a people who belong in Crimea 
and supporting their rehabilitation process in all aspects of Crimea and Crimean Tatar 
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society, one may question the possibility of repression and see that it must not exist in 
this case. 
 However, in these same words of support, one can find tones and requirements 
that allow for the state repression of the Crimean Tatars to take place. All of the nurturing 
offered by the Russian state comes with caveats, and in this case, it was the idea that 
Crimean aspirations must be realized within Russia. In citing ideas of Catherine the 
Great’s annexation of Crimea in 1783, which resembled the similar situation of the 
annexation in 2014, Putin finds that the “Crimean Tatars will be perceived by Russia 
as its own citizens with all ensuing consequences” (Putin, 2014a). The Russian state’s 
support of the Crimean Tatars rests on the idea that they are part of Russia, and those who 
would wish to “destabilize” Crimea under Russia, such as the Mejlis and other groups 
and activists in support of Ukraine instead of Russia, are considered as not having the 
interests of the Crimean Tatar people in mind (Putin 2015). The rehabilitation effort 
cannot be done without the Crimean Tatars, Putin has conceded, but it is necessary for 
Russia and the minority group that they cooperate, as they have no choice but to act with 
Russia, with their interests now “bound to Russia” (Putin 2014). With Putin having 
ostensibly opened the channels for communication between Crimean Tatar leaders, both 
in support of Russian occupation and those against, one might assume that there would be 
dialogue between all parties, and if Russia were serious about their assistance, enough 
evidence to persuade those naysayers to their side. However, the actions during, and 
following the annexation prove that this was indeed not the case. The Crimean Tatar 
national identity that had formed out of the Soviet exile was against Russian annexation 
due to its illegitimacy, the referendum process by which Crimea was taken, and the long 
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history of suffering and repressions at the hands pro-Russian and Russian rule. The 
Crimean Tatars have proven over the past decades that while they are politically 
interested, they had not been engaged by the new Crimean authorities. Their policies 
have made political action difficult, a trend with historical record that appears to have 
continued under the Russian occupation. Instead of Russian actions to work with those 
opposed, the conflict between Russia’s equivocations for support and occupation, and the 
Crimean Tatar national identity that is firmly against Russian rule once again, has 
produced state repressions, largely against those opposed to the state’s policies. In this 
chapter, I will evaluate these policies of repressions orchestrated by the Russian state 
against the Crimean Tatars after the annexation. My analysis focuses on acts that are 
pointedly repressive and applied against those Crimean Tatars who protest the 
occupation. These acts are justified as response to extremism, while the state policies 
keep undermining the promises of cultural, linguistic, and political support of the whole 
community by repressing instead of delivering on the promises.  
 
Crimean Tatar Treatment Under the Guise of the Law 
To find evidence of Russian repression of the Crimean Tatars, one needs to look 
no further than the anti-extremism laws and the citizenship laws and their 
implementations in Crimea. Under these laws, the Crimean Tatars have found themselves 
the subjects of massive repressions under the guise of law enforcement, suspicion of 
religious extremism, and failures to garner a Russian passport. These repressions have 
manifested in the forms of disappearances, imprisonment on charges of extremism, 
search-and-seizures of Crimean Tatar homes, and physical abuse by enforcers in Russia. 
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These laws and their enforcement will demonstrate that the problems they seem to 
address on the surface are not fully representative of the actual purposes employed. 
Instead, the enforcement of anti-extremism laws is meant to target those who oppose the 
Russian occupation of Crimea, while the laws on citizenship work to keep those without 
citizenship and passports from intervening in Russia’s system. As a result, it appears that 
“indigenous Crimean Tatars are frequently suspected of this sort of broadly defined anti-
Russian activity,” leading to increased repressions against them (Bilych, 4).  
The anti-extremism laws activated in Russia seek to criminalize those who would 
support separatism or threaten the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, defining 
acts of extremism in what the Venice Commission deems terms that are “too broad” and 
could lead to “arbitrariness” in its interpretation by the judiciary and the executives 
(Open Society Justice Initiative, 37). The vagueness of the law and the vastness of its 
interpretation allow the Russian Federation to apply it to the case of pro-Ukrainian and 
anti-annexation individuals and populations in Crimea, which, as indicated in the last 
chapter, undoubtedly includes the Crimean Tatars and the Mejlis (37). Furthermore, the 
Anti-Extremism Law of the Russian Federation, Federal Law No. 114-FZ, does not hold 
that violence is necessary for an act to be labelled extremist; it criminalizes what is 
considered “preparatory acts with characteristics of extremism” (37-38). Mixed with the 
arbitrariness and opaqueness of the understanding of what constitutes an extreme act, the 
Russian Federation can seemingly determine something that it does not like or finds 
vaguely threatening to their status quo, and deem it an act of extremism. The version that 
is part of the Russian Federal Criminal Code under Article 280.1 added in July of 2014 
that “publicly acknowledging that ‘Crimea is Ukraine’ or calling the de facto authorities 
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in Crimea ‘occupying authorities’” constituted as acts of extremism and were banned, 
with utterances of such thoughts earning the perpetrator between four to five years in jail 
(39). Including laws 375-FZ (2016) and 433-FZ (2013), which tightened punishments 
and expanded investigative measures and prohibited public calls for violations of Russian 
territorial integrity, respectively, and laws 369-FZ (2013) and 139-FZ, which addressed 
internet policing and online blacklisting, the Russian Federation had the means to 
perpetrate repressive actions against those who were considered threats to Russian 
integrity, especially in Crimea (40). The Crimean Tatars and the Mejlis, amongst other 
groups, it must be said, displayed such a threat posture.  
In a recent article published in the journal, Eurasian Economy and Economics, 
authors Halya Coynash and Austin Charron put forward the idea of Russia’s intervention 
in Crimea and the actions against the Crimean Tatars and other opposition groups in 
Crimea as examples of a state of exception, with Crimea existing in this state (Coynash 
and Charron 2019, 6-7). As a state of exception, the Russian authorities can justify their 
own actions as actions taken against those who would threaten the livelihood of fellow 
Russians, just as Russia had argued in their meddling in Ukraine and the Crimean crisis, 
and would continue to maintain during Crimea’s occupation, as there were still those who 
would “do harm” to the territorial integrity of Russia and the quality of life of Russian 
citizens. The idea of Crimea as a state of exception under Russian rule works in tandem 
with the anti-extremism laws in Russia and the vagueness that plagues them. A wide net 
that is easily adjustable so that Russian state repression can catch those it desires. The 
Crimean Tatars, especially those connected to the Mejlis and their supporters, and those 
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who support Ukraine, bear the full brunt of Russian repression in Crimea through 
numerous types of repression and abuses of political and enforcement power. 
One such manifestation of the abuses is the abductions and home invasions of 
Crimean Tatars. As of March 2019, around three quarters of Ukrainian political prisoners 
in Russia are from Ukraine, while “nearly three quarters of those are Crimean Tatars” 
(14). Under claims of extremism, terrorism, or as threats to Russia’s security, claims that 
are largely unfounded, Russian authorities would perform raids of Crimean Tatar homes, 
make arrests, typically of the men in the family. Arrests usually ended in imprisonment 
and conviction. The targets tended to be those who were active in the Crimean Tatar 
community, many being Crimean Tatar activists, as well as those who were considered 
members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, “a conservative pan-Islamic organization with no history of 
terrorism,” and was legal in Ukraine, but is banned in Russia (18). In an interview Emine 
Dzheppar, a social activist on Crimean Tatar matters and the Advisor to the Minister of 
Information, describes early morning home invasions perpetrated by the Russians in 
order to scare the Crimean Tatars and keep them aware of where they are, and who is in 
charge (Gromads’kye Telebachennya 2014). In an interview with Human Rights Watch, 
Abdureshit Dzhepparov recalls the events of one such raid: “Dozens of people in masks 
with automatic weapons come at the break of dawn, sometimes tell the whole family to 
lie down facing the floor and turn their houses upside down. It happened to some of my 
neighbors. I don’t know what their motives are. All I know is that today in Crimea it is 
dangerous to be a Crimean Tatar” (Human Rights Watch 2014). In September of 2014, 
his son, Islyam Dzhepparov and his cousin Dzhevdet Islyamov were taken off the side of 
the road and forced into a van. These types of disappearances and kidnappings are not 
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uncommon in the post-annexation Crimea. Another story of disappearance, this time the 
cases of Leonid Korzh, Timur Shaimardanov and Seiran Zinedinov, corroborates this. 
When interviewed, Zinedinov’s mother, who had hired investigators to help find her son 
and the others, stated: “the investigators asked a lot of questions about my son’s activism 
and how he felt about Russia but did not present a single piece of information about how 
or why he disappeared. It’s been four months and I know nothing” (Human Rights Watch 
2014). The interview puts on display the angle in which these repressions were deployed, 
as safety and true security for the Crimean Tatars in Russian-occupied Crimea was 
entirely conditional on their loyalty to the Russian state.  
Those who opposed the Russian occupation found life very difficult, and arrests 
and harassment by the authorities became the status quo for the Crimean Tatars, as 
demonstrated by Zarema Kulametova’s case from the first chapter. People were arrested 
left and right, and two months after the annexation, Russia passed new legislation to the 
criminal code 280.1, which “provides for a penalty of imprisonment from 3 to 5 years for 
journalists and ordinary citizens for disagreeing with the fact that Crimea belongs to 
Russia or for calls for its return to Ukraine” (Klymenko, 37). The basis of these arrests 
ranged from associations with Hizb ut-Tahrir or vague accusations of extremism and 
terrorist plotting to supporting Mejlis members online to even participating in pro-
Ukrainian events before the annexation. Coynash and Charron show that by March 2019, 
at least 31 Crimean Tatars are held as political prisoners for alleged links to Hizb ut-
Tahrir (18; The Moscow Times 2019). In some of the more bizarre examples of Crimean 
Tatar arrests, Crimean Tatars were arrested for actions taken before the illegal 
annexation. Crimean Tatar leader Akhtem Chiygoz was arrested in January 2015 for 
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staging a riot in Simferopol on February 26th, 2014, which turned out to have been a non-
violent standoff between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian supporters. He was sentenced to 
eight years imprisonment in September 2017 before being released to Ukraine one month 
later (Coynash and Charron 2019, 16). In another case, Zair Akadyrov, a Crimean Tatar 
blogger and journalist, was arrested and detained on extremism charges and for 
connections to pro-Ukrainian demonstrations in February 2014, again, prior to the illegal 
annexation (UNPO 2018). Crimean Tatars have also been arrested for online activity as 
well. According to Open Society Justice initiative, “several individuals have been 
convicted and sentenced to prison terms for statements made, and articles posted or 
reposted, on their social media accounts, referring to such things as the oppression of the 
Tatars’ or stating that Crimea being ‘occupied’ or ‘annexed,’” including Rafis Kashapov, 
for “inciting ethnic hatred” by vocalizing online frustrations about Russian occupation, 
and activist Remzi Bekirov, who was jailed for five days in 2017 for a seven-year-old 
“extremist post on VKontakte about police corruption (Open Society Justice Initiative, 
40-41; UNPO 2018; Coynash and Charron 2019, 12). Over the past five years of Russian 
occupation, the Crimean Tatars have been subjected to abductions, home searches, and 
arrests, many based on planted false evidence against them, all related to claims of anti-
Russian activity and extremism (Open Society Justice Initiative 42). Of course, these 
criminal cases fall under the classic legislative abilities of the Russian government, as 
they attempt to make that which is against them against the law, with many of the 
criminal cases forged. In a prepared statement at the 2015 Briefing of the Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Yuriy Yatsenko supports this claim, stating that “the 
criminal cases against them are fabricated, most of them have been brutally tortured, 
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some of them have been deprived for over a year of their right to meet with an attorney or 
a Ukrainian consul” (Yatsenko, 40). In the interviews and the data collected from 
Crimean Tatar experiences and understandings of their own situation, it would not be 
hard to blame those who have fled out of fear, as at least 7,000 Crimean Tatars have left 
the Crimean Peninsula, with some estimates between 8,000 to 10,000 (DailySabah 2014; 
Dzhemilev).  
Repressions- arrests, raids, threats, and abductions-also occurred, as might be 
expected, under Russian anti-extremism laws and by the Crimean authorities against 
Crimean Muslims, the group the Crimean Tatars belong to. Beyond the alleged links to 
Hizb ut-Tahrir, which has already been discussed, Crimean mosques and Crimean Tatar 
religious organization have also suffered. In May of 2016, a mosque in Molodzhnie, a 
village situated near Simferopol, was subject to a raid in which over 100 worshippers 
were arrested and interrogated (Fine and Ollman 16). What makes this type of event for 
the Crimean Tatars more distressing is that religious solidarity among the Crimean Tatars 
has risen in the wake of the repressions, as prayers grew by the Crimean Muslim 
community to the point where they could no longer be contained within a building, so 
they took to the streets for collective prayer, as seen with the support of arrested activist, 
Server Karametov in 2017 (Soboleva 2017, 56). While the importance of these growing 
religious events will be discussed later in the chapter, their growth in Crimea also 
provides the Russian and Crimean authorities the ability to enact these anti-extremism 
laws and repress. In addition to raids of mosques and madrasas, the authorities, also 
began installing surveillance in places of Islamic worship and gathering (Open Society 
Justice Initiative, 42). As of April 2019, the Russian authorities have plans to erect a 
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“rehabilitation center” with the purpose, as Ruslan Balbek, a member of the State Duma’s 
Committee on Religious Affairs, said “to save those trapped by an extremist religious 
sect under the muftiate, a center will be set up to rehabilitate those who fell under the 
influence of the extremist ideology of the Hizb ut-Tahrir terrorist organization banned in 
Russia” (RIA Novosti 2019; Coynash, KHPG 2019). While it should be said that the 
creation of this center is supported by the Crimean Muftiate or Spiritual Directorate of 
Muslims of Crimea, including Mufti Emirali Ablayev, a Crimean Tatar who decided to 
collaborate with the Russian Federation, this stance is shared only by a minority of 
Crimean Tatars, and the Mufti himself has been silent on political prisoners in Crimea 
(Coynash, KHPG 2019). This center is not the first type of counter-programing that the 
Russian Federation has tried to use to repress the Crimean Tatars in the past, as a number 
of Crimean Tatars that have been arrested have been placed in psychiatric facilities, 
demonstrating that the Russian authorities view those who reject the Russian authority in 
Crimea as in need of mental rehabilitation (Open Society Justice Initiative, 41). 
Placement in psychiatric facilities and rehabilitation centers, along with the preventative 
crackdown on suspected terrorism and extremism, serve only to repress and surveil those 
who would question Russian authority in Crimea.  
Many prominent Crimean Tatars have been interviewed about the situation in 
Crimea and the problems that the Crimean Tatars will face under Russian occupation. 
One such official stated, “The current situation in Crimea is even worse than the Soviet 
regime. At least there were certain procedures in the Soviet regime. Opposition figures 
were first judged and then sent to jail; however, today they are abducted and killed” 
(DailySabah 2014). In this interview, Crimean Tatar leader Qırımoğlu shows that the 
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Crimean Tatars are in greater danger, as the operations of the current Russian government 
are much more covert and ruthless than the actions of the Soviet government in the 
twentieth century. He pointed out that the Russians are even attempting to infiltrate the 
religion of the Crimean Tatars, as “most of the pressure focuses on the religious aspect. 
Russians have appointed another mufti in addition to our current one and they are trying 
to blackmail our mufti” (DailySabah 2014).  From the interviews and statements, it 
would appear that the Crimean Tatars are being targeted by the Russian occupiers, just as 
ATV stated in their final broadcast on air (Euromaidan PR). In the same vein, an 
interview with the former head of the Mejlis shows that the Crimean Tatars will always 
support Ukraine over Russia and autonomy over all else. It is because of this that the 
Crimean Tatars find themselves in a situation that is actually worse than the situation 
under Soviet Union post-exile, as: 
“The attitude of the Ukrainian leadership and the president, Petro Poroshenko, in 
particular, is the following: to never and under no circumstances agree that 
Ukraine will become a part of Russia. This is also the point of view of the 
overwhelming majority of Crimean Tatars. Of course, there are some people who 
support the Russian action, as is usual in any country under occupation. But even 
those people who were actively running around with Russian flags now 
understand that they have fallen into a trap. There are no democratic freedoms; 
everything is just as it used to be during the time of the Soviet Union.” 
(Dzhemilev) 
 
This idea is supported by the banishment of the Mejlis from the Peninsula, an act that was 
described in one interview as “ethnic, cultural and political discrimination (on the 
grounds of banning the political freedoms of opinion and expression) towards the entire 
Crimean Tatar people” (Bakkalli). Those who fight the will of Russia in Crimea become 
the subjects of repression. 
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 Some of these actions taken against the Crimean Tatars by Russian and Crimean 
authorities even turned deadly. Less violent, but potentially just as harmful acts like 
“preventative interrogations” over long periods of time and raids of Crimean Tatar 
settlements have also been part of the practice. Violence was unfortunately also 
employed in silencing those against the annexation (Klymenko, 12). Case in point, 83-
year-old Vedzhie Kashka, a long-time Crimean Tatar activist, died from injuries and 
stress inflicted during a raid of a café in November 2017 (Coynash and Charron 2019, 
18). She was meeting three Crimean Tatar men in the café during the raid, who were all 
arrested and had their homes searched, leading to so-called “discoveries” of “firearms, 
ammunition, narcotics, and ‘extremist literature’” (18). The authorities claimed falsely 
that they were members of the Mejlis, and that their meeting with Kashka was extortion. 
According to Coynash, her death was left uninvestigated, and CCTV footage of the raid 
was removed. Again, demonstrating that the efforts of Russian authorities in Crimea 
exercise a sort of selective justice, determined by the placement of one’s loyalties (18). 
This was not an isolated case, as violent and sometimes deadly acts of repression have 
been present ever since the referendum itself. Two weeks before the referendum was held 
in Crimea, Reshat Ametov was approached by three “unidentified men in military 
fatigues” whilst he held a solitary protest in Lenin’s Square and he was abducted (19). He 
was then found on March 15th, the day before the referendum, dead “in a field about 40 
miles east of Simferopol, his head wrapped in duct tape, his legs bound, and bearing signs 
of torture” (19). While a police case was filed, no headway was made in arrests, even 
though the incident took place in broad daylight and was caught by surveillance 
(Coynash and Charron 2019, 19; Korostelina 2015, 43). Another incident, this time as a 
 
 146 
result of a Vkontakte post about Crimean Tatar treatment, Edem Asanov, was 
disappeared in Evpatoria on the 29th of September 2015, only to be found six days later 
hung in an abandoned building (Korostelina 2015, 43). At the end of May 2018, Asan 
Egiz, who is a vocal opposition to the occupation, was abducted, beaten, and left along a 
highway, representing one of the more recent examples of Russian action taken against 
those who are in opposition to the annexation (UNPO 2018). These cases of Crimean 
Tatars suffering torture, beatings, and even death in some cases ramp up the severity of 
repression against anyone willing to be even the slightest bit vocal (Asanov was 
reportedly not politically active online) about Russia’s treatment of the Crimean Tatars 
and the problems in Crimea.  
Representing only a small fraction of individual repressive actions against 
Crimean Tatars under the guise of extremism, terrorism, and for the sake of territorial 
integrity, these actions demonstrate the Russian perception of their so-called enemies in 
Crimea, and the lengths they would go to maintain their control. Even if actual terrorism 
and extremism on the part of the Crimean Tatars would do nothing but lead to either a 
full-scale deportation, à la the 1944 deportation under Stalin, or lead to swift 
repercussions harsher than the repressions they face now. Given what has been 
established by this thesis so far about the Crimean Tatar leadership in the Mejlis and the 
Kurultay, non-violence is the way in which demonstrations are undertaken. They do not 
stage riots, or validate or campaign for violence against the Russian occupiers. For the 
most part, the same can be said about Hizb ut-Tahrir, of which Crimean Muslims joined 
under Ukraine, as it is a legal organization, but is banned in Russia. Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects 
the use of violence as a method of political change, instead it professes the belief that 
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regime change can occur through peaceful measures (Karagiannis 2010, 13-15). While 
this is in line with Crimean Tatar views on non-violence, the understanding and fear that 
violence will only elicit a visceral reaction from Russian authorities is deeply understood 
(Žídková and Melichar 2018, 105). Most of the repressions are non-military in nature, 
veering more towards cultural, legal, and bureaucratic repression, so violence would not 
be the answer in most cases of repression. As well, the Crimean Tatars have no means to 
arm themselves offensively, nor do they have the necessary organizations and 
connections to protect themselves defensively against the Russian military retaliation if 
violence were indeed used (105). Crimean Tatar military protection against the Russians 
and Crimean Tatar terrorism would not occur in Crimea at this time because “it would 
threaten the survival of the society even more by providing the majority society with 
arguments for harsh repercussions” (106). The current repressions against the Crimean 
Tatars discussed above are based around the arbitrariness of extremism laws and Russian 
and Crimean enforcement of them with fabrication and preemptive action taken in most 
cases. The introduction of verifiable evidence of actual acts of terrorism and extremism 
would only lead to a massive escalation of repressions, possibly reducing the likelihood 
of survival of Crimean Tatars in Russian-occupied Crimea. Thus, the Crimean Tatars 
remain non-violent for their own safety and principles, while the Russian authorities 







Citizenship and Population Movement 
Just as the usage of anti-extremism laws and preventative law enforcement, the 
policy of pasportizatsiya, as argued by Sam Wrighton in 2018, follows the framework of 
the implementation of previous laws and authoritative administration in Crimea that has 
been discussed so far. Chiefly, the idea that through pasportizatsiya, the Russian 
government can maintain direct control over and surveillance “of a population involving 
large-scale co-optation of the politically obedient as well as the exclusion of the 
dissident” (Wrighton 2018, 284). While those who succumbed to the Russian annexation 
were co-opted by the Russian Federation, the decision to obtain a Russian passport and 
Russian citizenship, automatic upon the official date of annexation, March 18th, was not 
only to maintain actual documentation of residency in Crimea and the Russian 
Federation, but also as a direct investment in what co-opted individuals hoped for: 
financial security and a “practical” one (Open Society Justice Initiative 20; Wrighton 
2018, 289-290). For those co-opted, pensions were nearly doubled, and by having 
documentation of their citizenship, they could have access to those resources that would 
not be available to them otherwise, such as education, work, and healthcare (290). The 
faculties of possessing a Russian passport are similar to those of propiska during the 
1990s and early 2000s; by having it, the individual would be welcomed to the benefits of 
citizenship, whereas without them, they were virtually stateless.  
There was an 18-day window for Crimeans to reject their Russian citizenship and 
regain their Ukrainian citizenship that was lost on the 18th of March through Federal 
Constitutive Law No. 6 FKZ “On Admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of 
Crimea and Establishing within the Russian Federation the New Constituent Entities of 
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the Republic of Crimean and the City of Federal Importance Sevastopol”, Article 4 (Open 
Society Justice Initiative 20-21). The process and time limit were vigorous, and resulted 
in those who rejected Russian passports, and those who were unable to receive them 
receiving the status of “foreigners,” and in other cases, stateless persons (23-24). Of those 
who opted out or were denied passports, many were denied on political grounds, as those 
who voiced opinions not shared by the Kremlin, such as the legitimacy of the Russian 
annexation, were denied passports, or at the very least provided passports, but not without 
arduous periods of waiting and showing of Russian support (Wrighton 2018, 292). This 
was particularly a problem with Crimean Tatars, as in addition to the vocal aspects of 
majority leadership and activism against the annexation and referendum, the population 
did lack the necessary documentation of residency that would be necessary for a Russian 
passport, a problem that had plagued the Crimean Tatar population since the 1990s. It 
must be remembered that Putin had proclaimed that he would help solve the problems of 
the Crimean Tatars through a rehabilitation process that would be more efficient and 
lucrative than the Ukrainian attempts at rehabilitation, and surely the residency problem 
would have not only been covered by the rehabilitation, but also known to the Russian 
President as well. So, it would have made sense to either grant reprieves to those citizens 
without documentation until the rehabilitation, or recognize that they could not meet the 
criteria, so to accommodate the population instead. Neither possibility happened, and 
while the Crimean Tatars in those cases in the 1990s stayed in Crimea regardless of the 
hardships, this time, under Russian law, the prospect of living without the necessary 
services of survival, led to “some of these individuals feeling like foreigners within their 
territory of birth, consequently provoking an exodus from Crimea” (293). This exodus 
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was the voluntary movement out of Crimea by the Crimean Tatars, around 10 Thousand 
of them by July 2015 (293).  
As time went on, the process for naturalization and for obtaining passport grew 
stricter and more Russian focused. Papers had to be translated into Russian, even though 
the Kremlin and Putin had declared that Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian were official 
languages of the region alongside Russian by early 2015, making the process even harder 
(295). With Crimean Tatars unable to get the necessary documentation, they could be 
deemed by Russian law as foreigners, and as such could only remain in Crimea for 90 
days for every period of 180 days. Those who could not comply with these terms faced 
“court-ordered deportation,” as seen with the detainment and deportation of Sinaver 
Kadyrov, a Crimean Tatar activist and founder of the Committee for the Protection of 
Rights of Crimean Tatars (Open Society Justice Initiative 25, 33). Forced movement from 
the Crimean Peninsula by Russian and Crimean authorities seems to have also 
accompanied voluntary movement by thousands of Crimean Tatars, in part due to 
pasportizatsiya and the citizenship laws. In the wake of these movements of Crimean 
Tatars and other groups that could not obtain or rejected Russian passports and 
citizenship, the Russian Federation has engaged in demographic shifting in the Peninsula 
by increasing the migration flow of Russian citizens into Crimea, with new Crimean 
residents from mainland Russia counting for one-fifth of the population of Crimea by 
2018 (Goble 2018). In what Evgeniia Goryunova calls “soft (Miagkaia)” deportation, 
where the deportations are mostly voluntary in that people choose to leave because the 
conditions have been made to be uninhabitable, the natural citizens of Crimea have been 
leaving, being supplanted with Russian citizens (Goryunova 2018). An estimated 100-
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125 thousand people, including Crimean Tatars, have left due to these “soft” 
deportations, and as the population of Crimea becomes more Russian, it will only get 
worse. Mirroring the population displacement of the original annexation of 1783 and the 
migration of Russian settlers in place of the Crimean Tatar population, it appears that 
Russia, which had pledged to support the Crimean Tatars and vulnerable groups in 
Crimea, is instead acting to replace them with Russian nationals. Crimean Tatars were 
also subject to internal displacement by seizing “illegal” Crimean Tatar land, with 
“promises” to resettle them by the Deputy Prime Minster of Crimea, Rustan 
Temirgaliyev, largely unsubstantiated (Blank 2015, 26). Clearly, these movements are 
repressions against these groups in a bid to further legitimize their stake in Crimea as the 
Russian soil through the removal of populations that would potentially threaten that status 
quo. The Crimean Tatars, as a group with claims to the Crimean Peninsula and probably 
the most vocal opposition to Russian occupation, was surely impacted by these 
repressions, on top of the repressions at the hands of Crimean and Russian officials 
through anti-extremism laws and preventative policing based on trumped up suspicions.  
What followed the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian 
Federation was an increase in the risk to those who reject their Russian occupiers. “The 
situation in Crimea since annexation also gave rise to the risk that persons not wishing to 
acquire Russian nationality would be rendered effectively stateless; or, if maintaining 
Ukrainian nationality, would be forced to migrate” provides one such example of the 
problems related to those who reject Russian occupation (Grant, 34). The Crimean Tatars 




“The entire population of Crimea, ethnicity aside, has endured more human rights 
abuses as a Russian subject than it has ever had under Ukrainian rule,” as “all 
Crimean residents are forced to accept Russian passports and denounce their 
Ukrainian citizenship; failing to do so may result in dismissal from employment, 
loss of property rights, inability to travel to mainland Ukraine and elsewhere, and 
eventual deportation as foreigners.” (Gdalina 2016, 563)  
 
Demonstrated through the treatment of Crimean Tatars and the usage of various laws 
against them, the choice between Russian citizenship and being classified as a 
“foreigner” was sometimes never an option. The Russian and Crimean authorities 
seemingly chose for some, whether it be forcing them to become foreigners, due to 
political differences to that of the Russian political stability, or through forced Russian 
citizenship against the wishes of the individual. Ukraine and Russia both refused to 
recognize dual citizenship in Crimea, so no one could hold both Ukrainian and Russian 
citizenship, leaving hundreds of thousands with the decision to choose Russian 
citizenship or choose Ukrainian citizenship, and become a stranger to your home (Open 
Society Justice Initiative 31). The inability for one to obtain citizenship, which 
disproportionately impacted Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, also limits one’s access to 
justice, thus expounding the repressions in the guise of law enforcement and security, and 
making justice almost impossible (53). What this sort of repression of the Crimean 
Tatars, and the people of Crimea in general, does is that it turns the Crimean Peninsula 
into a sort of prison, where the Russians have taken over the job of the regulators and the 
guards. Because of this prison, the result that generally follows from this is the massive 
repression of the inmates, in this case the Crimean Tatars, as “activists or citizens disloyal 
to Russia. They are subjected to many-hours-long interrogations, ’preventive 
interrogations’; searches are carried out in their homes, raids are carried out in the areas 
of compact settlement of the Crimean Tatars, the troops block certain localities or 
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settlements, the authorities organize deportation from Crimea, exclusions, criminal 
prosecution based on fabricated evidence and false accusations, kidnapping, murders” 
(Klymenko, 36; Uehling 2015, 12).  
 
Culture and Education 
 Just like the other promise for rehabilitation and revival that the Russian 
government had given the Crimean Tatars, language rights, education, and cultural and 
heritage have all fallen victim to the Russian state repressions. Days before the 
referendum was to take place, the Crimean Parliament adopted a decree “On Guarantees 
of the Restoration of the Rights of the Crimean Tatars” on March 11th, 2014. In this 
decree, language rights were to be given to the Crimean Tatars and the security of their 
culture and language was to be fulfilled through better educational access to Crimean 
Tatar language instruction at all levels, and the promotion of its use and the development 
of print and electronic media in the Crimean Tatar language (Novosti Kryma 2014). Once 
illegally annexed by the Russian Federation, Putin signed a number of decrees that also 
supported similar promise that the Crimean Parliament’s declaration had done, also 
supported by the government of the Republic of Crimea. Language-wise, the Russian 
Federation and the Republic of Crimea recognized that Crimean Tatar was one of the 
three official languages, alongside Russian and Ukrainian (Aksyonov 2017). While 
Russian language policy in Crimea has been to support the languages of Ukrainians, 
Russians, and Crimean Tatars, there were some early signs that the Crimean Tatar 
language, and the status of the Crimean Tatars as a whole, in Russian-occupied Crimea 
was to be determined based on Russian agendas. In Article 3 of the “Treaty between the 
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Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on Acceptance of the Republic of Crimea 
to the RF and the Formation of New Subjects of the RF,” the Crimean Tatar language is 
given official status in Crimea, as well as supporting the right to preserve and develop 
their native language (Babin 2014, 104-105). However, the usage of the term “Crimean 
Tatar” in referring to the language was written as “krymsko-tatarskii” rather than 
“krymskotatarskii.” The importance of this distinction is that the former connects the 
Crimean Tatar language to the ethnonym “Tatar,” making their language one that is 
classified as belonging to Tatars, and that Crimean only refers to where they live (105). 
This seems to undermine the Crimean Tatars as a separate, unique ethnic group that is 
tied to the Peninsula by connecting them to the greater Tatar identity, much like the 
Russian Empire and the Soviet Union attempted to do in their classifications of the 
Crimean Tatars. The use of “krymsko-tatarskii” is also found in the Republic of Crimea’s 
“On the State Languages of the Republic of Crimea and Other Languages in the Republic 
of Crimea,” signed in May of 2017 by Sergei Aksyonov, head of the Republic of Crimea 
(Aksyonov 2017). Since the annexation, the support of the Crimean Tatar language has 
been reflective of the other repressions of the Crimean Tatars, and has revealed the false 
promises of the Russian and Crimean authorities.  
It has already been stated that the Russian language was necessary for all 
documents when trying to obtain a Russian passport, but other instances of disrespect of 
the Crimean Tatar language and a refusal to support it have occurred in Crimea since 
2014. Weeks after the annexation, a Crimean Tatar boy was beaten for speaking Crimean 
Tatar on the phone by two strangers, with the boy’s mother, Asiye Muzhdabayeva, 
recounted her son’s encounter: “They said that Crimea is Russia and that Crimean Tatars 
 
 155 
don’t belong here. ‘You should all be thrown out,'.” His response led to his beating 
(Euromaidan Press 2014). A police report was filed, but it is unknown as of this research 
whether or not the Crimean authorities actually investigated the incident, although the 
fact that the incident was made publicly known nine days after the incident (the article 
was published on the 10th of April, whereas the source from BBC was published on the 
9th) occurred may speak to the level of interest the Crimean police had towards solving 
this case. More recently, Crimean Tatar activists had planned to hold an education 
campaign “Bigli Kervani,” which translates to “Knowledge Caravan,” on May 10th, 2019, 
but they were denied after the owner of the establishment in the village of Zuya of the 
Bilohirsk region, where their meeting was to take place, received multiple threats (QHA 
2019). The owner denied their request out of fear for his safety, but the fact that someone 
had called and spoke of threats demonstrates the harassment and repression of the 
Crimean Tatar language rights and rights to promote its usage amongst its people. This is 
further supported by Nariman Dzhelyal, the First Deputy Head of the Mejlis of the 
Crimean Tatar People, as he told reporters that the activist group have encountered many 
situations like this before, showing that “Such an attitude towards the activity of citizens 
living in the Crimea demonstrates the whole foul situation in which we have been living 
here for a number of years trying to defend our rights in absolutely legal ways” 
(Dzhelyal, QHA 2019). These incidents are not isolated, and the Crimean Tatars have 
found that exercising their right to use and practice the Crimean Tatar language under 
Russian rule has been far from ideal, and threats and abuses towards them have gone 
unchecked by the authorities. 
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Crimean Tatar language education and instruction has also been hit by Russian 
repressions. After returning to the Crimean Peninsula, the Crimean Tatars have attempted 
to revitalize the use and knowledge of the Crimean language among the Crimean Tatar 
population. Before the annexation, Crimean Tatar language instruction rose, and there 
were at least fifteen Crimean Tatar schools that taught Crimean Tatar, accounting for 
12.5 percent of the student population of Crimean Tatars learning the Crimean Tatar 
language (Emirova 2007). This number has not changed since the annexation, and the 
availability of Crimean Tatar versus Russian has gone down. While the Republic of 
Crimea passed a law on education in 2015 that “instruction is to be provided in the state 
language (i.e. Russian) in Crimean educational institutions, but also guarantees Crimean 
citizens the right to study and receive preschool, primary, and basic education in their 
native language, including Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean Tatar, within the 
possibilities offered by the educational system” (Bocale 2016, 6). This allows for 
Crimean Tatar to be taught, albeit in a fashion that is non-compulsory. Campaigns to 
have the other official languages of Crimea become mandatory failed, leading to criticism 
from Crimean Tatar leaders and other groups represented by languages other than the 
state language. This law has roots back to Soviet era language laws, which maintained 
“principles of voluntary choice for the study of national languages and of the right of 
parents to choose their children’s language of instruction,” however these laws may 
reflect Soviet legislation’s intent to “Russify” the Soviet Union by making Russian 
language compulsory, and letting native tongues become matters of choice (6). The 
problem here is that the requirement of Russian instruction allows for the potential 
overshadowing of the less used, chosen languages. Perhaps fulfilling the role of the 2015 
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law, Russia approved a new law in 2018 that restricted the rights to receive pre-school, 
primary and basic secondary education in an individual’s native language (UNPO 2018). 
While the Russian linguistic laws before this amendment made it necessary to allocate 
some hours of the school week to offer courses on other official languages of federations 
that possess more than one official language, this new law made these courses optional. 
These schools do not have to offer these languages at all. Given the necessity of Russian 
language throughout Russia and Crimea, as well as requiring written permission from 
parents to take courses in their native language, attention is drawn to those that would 
learn their mother tongue, as “with the new law, learning one’s native language at school 
can be done only to the detriment of a better command of Russian, which, in effect, 
discourages speakers of minority languages from learning their native languages at 
school” (UNPO 2018). The discouragement from learning one’s mother tongue due to the 
stigma and disadvantages society has built-in through bureaucracy and government has 
been a problem in the past for Crimean Tatars, as was seen during the early 2000s, but 
this law directly limits their language rights and opportunities for language revival by 
creating a system that makes it disadvantageous to pursue a language other than Russian.  
The school system itself has also been hit. The Russians claimed to be providing 
Crimean Tatar schools with language textbooks to allow for the teaching of Crimean 
Tatar, as textbooks for language instruction became a needed commodity for Crimean 
Tatar schools. The Russian publishing company, Prosveshchenie, had reportedly 
produced over 600,000 textbooks for the region in 2014. Included in those are supposedly 
Crimean Tatar language textbooks. Textbooks were sent to the region between at least six 
different publishing companies (Don TR 2015). Images of these books exist, and the 
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trucks can be seen, yet according to many, these textbooks never actually arrived (Goble, 
2015).  On top of this, the instruction of the Crimean Tatar language has diminished in 
favor of Russian. The number of schools in Crimea that teach Crimean Tatar has not 
changed from the fifteen that existed before the annexation. According to various reports, 
the academic years after the Russian occupation began contained no schools that strictly 
instructed in Crimean Tatar, all the schools are now dual-language with Russian. Russian 
has dominated, as 96% of students are learning Russian instead of Crimean Tatar, and 
Crimean Tatar children are taught in Russian in schools where Crimean Tatar is the main 
language (Coynash 2015; 112 UA 2016; Goble 2015).  The hours of instruction and the 
importance of Crimean Tatar language instruction have fallen since the Russian 
occupation began in 2014, and seemingly have become completely optional as of June 
2018. Crimean Tatar has lost the necessity in instruction in some schools, including the 
Crimean New School for Kids and Youths, where Crimean Tatar is only used outside 
formal lessons (Network of Schools).  Only three hours a week of instruction of the 
language is in place currently amongst schools that offer the language (RISA, 2014). 
Here, one can see the repression of the Crimean Tatar language, even though the 
Russians told the Crimean Tatars that textbooks and education materials would be 
provided (Goble, 2015; Goble, 2015). The results of these limitations on language 
education in Crimean Tatar are best viewed by looking at recent Crimean Tatar 
graduation numbers in the language. In June 2019, there were only 533 people scheduled 
to take the final exams, GIA, in Crimean Tatar, a right that Russian citizens have to 
choose, and only 147 in Ukrainian (Ministerstvo obrazovaniia, nauki i molodezhi 
Respubliki Krym 2019). To put that number into some perspective, data from 2016 found 
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that Crimean Tatar children receiving language instruction in the language numbered at 
4000, which made up only 11 percent of the total Crimean Tatar school-going population 
(Bocale 2016, 8). Compared to the already low levels in 2016, the lower number of recent 
graduates indicates that the language rights to support and develop their language are 
being directly and detrimentally impacted by Russian language laws and education 
policies.   
One of the key ambitions of the Crimean Tatar national identity and leadership is 
the revival of their heritage and culture. However, the reality of the situation is much 
different to the reality promised by the Russian Federation. Under the Russian rule, the 
culture and heritage of Crimean Tatars have really been hit by the Russian policies 
discussed so far, which are explicitly for the needs of Russians and Russian territorial 
integrity (Gotev, 2015; Coynash, 2015). It is most certainly the case, as it was with 
education and language policy in Russia, that the culture, heritage, and the means in 
which to spread that culture have also been the targets of state repressions. By looking at 
the state of Crimean Tatar media representation, heritage sites, and cultural community 
under Russian occupation, these repressions become clear, showing signs of intervention 
by the state to repress rather than promote and aid the development and rehabilitation of 
this minority group. 
 Today, Crimean media outlets are largely Russian, spoken in Russian, and state-
owned, thus limiting Crimean Tatar access to news and ties to Ukraine through the 
control of the media (UNPO 2018). Crimean Tatar media outlets were few to begin with 
before the annexation anyway, however, Crimean media stations and news channels are 
getting shut down under the Russian rule. An example of this is ATR, a pro-Ukrainian 
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Crimean Tatar news channel that was shut down on March 31st, 2015, for failing to 
register with Roskomnadzor, a Moscow based media regulator (Shevchenko, 2015). 
Sergei Aksyonov had accused the station, shortly before closure, of inciting multi-ethnic 
tensions in the region and promising Crimea’s return to Ukraine, indicating that the 
channel was one that was a target of Russian and Crimean officials, as it supported ideas 
and hopes that were against the Russian status quo in Crimea (Bocale 2016, 9).  Because 
of the fact that this channel was pro-Ukrainian, it was doomed for closure along with 
other news sources like QHA. Other Crimean Tatar news and cultural media that was 
shut down or removed from the Crimean Peninsula include the newspaper Avdet 
(Return), the news website “Crimean News Agency,” both of which failed in similar 
ways to register with Moscow (9). The case of Avdet also reflects the suppression of free 
press for Crimean Tatars through the anti-extremism laws, as the chief editor of the 
newspaper was summoned by the acting prosecutor of Simferopol for “extremist 
activity.” What such activity boiled down to was publishing information related to the 
boycott of the 2014 referendum, an action that under the interpretation of the law used by 
Russian and Crimean officials, was illegal and extremist (Fine and Ollman, 13; 
Euromaidan Press 2019). This sort of activity led to Russia shutting down those Crimean 
Tatar media sources that used “extremist” rhetoric and topics, which would include 
“’annexation,’ ‘temporary occupation’ and discussing ethnic repression” (Open Society 
Justice Initiative 41). While some of these banned or shut down media outlets for 
Crimean Tatars have survived elsewhere, as Avdet is still very active as an online news 
outlet (although only in Russian), it is only through loopholes in Russian law which does 
not require the registration of weekly periodicals with print runs of fewer than a thousand 
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copies (Euromaidan Press 2019). Data collected by the first International Human Rights 
mission in Crimea since the annexation found that media outlets and NGOs suffered in 
the re-registration process upon annexation. By 2017, 1852 NGOs were able to register in 
Crimea compared to 4,090 before annexation, and out of the over 3000 media outlets in 
Crimea at the time of annexation, only 232 found success in registering (Euromaidan 
Press 2019). These types of media outlets, especially ones catering to Crimean Tatars, 
were harassed by self-defense battalions and were sanctioned through Roskomnadzor for 
posting “forbidden content” (Uehling 2015, 14; Euromaidan Press 2019). It seems that 
even Crimean Tatars that have resorted to “citizen” journalism, where repressive acts 
such as raids are filmed and written about online in forums or through other forms of 
social media. Acts of documentation and awareness of the situation in Crimea by citiznes 
have been threatened by Crimean and Russian officials, with some arrested for social 
media posts in the past for talking about the repressions, the occupation or the quality of 
life in Crimea (Euromaidan Press 2019; Open Society Justice Initiative, 41-42). 
The control over Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian culture in the Peninsula by Russian 
authorities also includes the repression of symbols, monuments, and other physical and 
community-based representations of culture. For instance, individuals who celebrated 
Ukrainian symbols, figures, and historical dates would receive sanctions and warnings 
from the courts, such as displaying a Ukrainian flag (Open Society Justice Initiative, 19). 
The curators of the Ukrainian Cultural Centre of Simferopol were routinely interrogated 
and disrupted by Crimean authorities, to the point that under the weight of threats and 
potential FSB arrests, the Centre closed, unable to pay rent in May 2017, and the director 
fled to Ukraine (19). This was also the case for Crimean Tatar symbols of their history, 
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identity, and culture. The Khan’s palace in Bakhchisaray, built in the 16th century, was 
chosen for renovation by Crimean authorities, along with the Big Khan Mosque, built in 
1532. The restoration work was given to a Simferopol construction firm called Kiramet, 
and was contracted by Atta Group Architectural and Planning Holding, neither of which 
had any experience in restoration (Coynash, KHPG 2018; Zoria, Euromaidan Press 
2018). Kept secret, and without consultation and supervision with the Crimean Tatar 
community, the restoration project completely dismantled key parts and materials of the 
original structure, including the Tatarka tiles and authentic wood support beams, ignoring 
previous assessments on what work needed to be done. The shoddy work done by the 
inexperienced firm made the grounds resemble a demolition site, and the heavy 
machinery damaged the walls and murals (Coynash, KHPG 2018). Other “restoration” 
projects include the Great Mithridates Staircase, which is being replaced with concrete 
instead of an actual restoration of the site, further demonstrating the destruction of these 
Crimean Tatar cultural sites by modern Russian replacements (Zoria, Euromaidan Press 
2018). Complaints and lawsuits had been filed by Crimean Tatars concerned that the 
sites, particularly in the case of the Khan’s palace, were being destroyed and their culture 
attacked, only for the court to dismiss their claims.  
The cultural repressions did not just impact physical landmarks, but also places of 
knowledge and celebration of Crimean and Crimean Tatar culture. The head of the 
Crimean Tatar Academic Musical-Dramatic Theater, Bilyal Bilyalov, was sacked in 2018 
on false charges of extremism by the Crimean authorities. As reported by Euromaidan 
Press, Zair Smedlyayev, a Crimean Tatar activist and head of the Kurultai, believes that 
this act represents the continued attempts by the Russian government to repress Crimean 
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Tatar culture in Crimea. Bilyalov was not guilty of the crimes he was charged with, and 
he was not a political activist or “controversial” subject of Crimea. He was just a patron 
of the arts and Crimean Tatar culture, wanting to celebrate and ensure they survive 
(Goble, Euromaidan Press 2018). The “Russification” of Crimean culture can be 
witnessed in the museums that remained in Crimea after annexation. Most of these 
museums found their directors replaced by Russians, including Elvira Ablyalimova, the 
now former director of the Bakhchisaray Historical and Cultural Reserve, and with the 
new Russian directors came a shift in historical narrative (Ivanevych, QHM 2018). The 
Russians could change the narrative content of the museums to suit their take on history 
and their political or ideological lens for the depiction of history and culture. Through 
these actions, it becomes clear that the preservation of the culture and celebration of the 
cultures of Crimea that Putin and the Crimean authorities had promised during the 
annexation was, yet again, another false hope replaced with Russian operations to reshape 
the historical and cultural lay out of the land to fit their narrative and claims to Crimea by 
repressing the cultures of the minority and opposition groups. 
The state of Crimean Tatar language, education, and free press rights, as well as 
cultural and heritage restoration under Russian-occupied Crimea is dire. These areas of 
Crimean Tatar national identity that the Mejlis and Crimean Tatar activists have wanted 
to rehabilitate and help prosper for decades are gradually being repressed and replaced by 
Russian language, culture, and history. The Crimean Tatars are unable to do anything 
about their situation as their complaints and protest are swept away by the Crimean and 
Russian authorities. And if they go further, and get vocal about the repression and the 
shrinking of their culture, language, and media rights, they become targets of the anti-
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extremism laws on one hand, and receive threats, both officially and unofficially, on the 
other. These aspects of concern for the Crimean Tatar community and their national 
identity are not supported by the Russian authorities because it does not fit with their 
narrative and claims to the region. Thus, in order to make Crimea more “Russian,” the 
Crimean Tatar culture, language, heritage, and media are only obtrusive and surplus to 
the goals of the Russian Federation. If the Crimean Tatars had strong political 
representation in Crimea, maybe negotiations or compromises could be found. But as it 
stands politically, the Crimean Tatars find themselves isolated and repressed in that realm 
as well. 
 
Rights and Political Organization 
 So far under Russian rule, the rights of Crimean Tatars have come under siege, 
particularly for those that appear to threaten Russia’s territorial integrity and stability in 
the region. What makes the impact of these rights abuses by the authorities more severe 
and largely unchallenged is the status of the political sphere of the Crimean Tatars. The 
Crimean Tatar national identity has manifested itself no more clearly than in the actions 
and political leadership of the Mejlis and the Kurultai. The Mejlis was heavily active in 
fighting for Crimean Tatar rights and greater political representation under Ukrainian 
rule, so it would follow that unless these goals were either met under Russian authorities 
at the time of annexation, or were making large strides towards their completion under 
the Russians, the Mejlis would still be very active in Crimea for Crimean Tatar political 
and cultural rights. However, the reality of the political climate in Russian-occupied 
Crimea for the Mejlis and Crimean Tatar political representation is contingent on levels 
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of support given to the Russian claims for Crimea, claims that, outside of a few minority 
Crimean Tatar political groups, are opposed by the Mejlis, Kurultai, and Crimean Tatar 
activists. The political representation of the Crimean Tatars was met with the same 
treatment and suspicion through the same laws that have plagued vocal and/or politically 
active Crimean Tatars, leading to a situation where these vehicles of Crimean Tatar 
political organization and movement have been stunted by Russian and Crimean 
authorities. These efforts by the Russian and Crimean authorities to effectively stunt, 
silence, and remove the politically active members of the Crimean Tatar community fit 
perfectly with the rest of their actions of targeting those who question Russian 
sovereignty in Crimea. Included in political acts of repression by the state are the removal 
of the right to hold mass demonstrations and protests, the banishment and charging of 
Mejlis members and the Mejlis as a political entity in Crimea under the anti-extremism 
laws, and the negative impact on Crimean Tatar representation and voting on the 
Peninsula. 
 The use of the overly vague anti-extremism laws in Crimea allowed for the 
Russian authorities to impose limits, bans, surveillance, and arrests on those who they 
deemed to fall under the large umbrella of these particular laws. One area that was hit 
particularly hard was Crimean Tatar public protests and demonstrations. The ban was not 
only public protests or demonstrations against the Russian and Crimean authorities, but 
also included all other types of public gathering, including rather disturbingly, the 
commemorative events of the 1944 deportation. The ban on all mass meetings in Crimea 
was put into place in 2014 and was to last until June 6th, meaning that the Crimean Tatars 
could not legally gather in remembrance of the 70th anniversary of the deportation 
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(Korostelina 2015, 43). However, in June 2014, after the halt to mass public meetings and 
demonstrations was lifted, the Crimean Tatars were informed that any public protest or 
demonstration from them as a group would from then on would be illegal, as the Crimean 
authorities would not tolerate extremist activities (Fine and Ollman, 9). The only way that 
the Crimean Tatars could hold mass events like protests and commemorations of the 
1944 deportation was to obtain permission from the Crimean and Russian authorities. 
Permission was increasingly difficult to obtain, as it seemed that the Crimean and 
Russian authorities wished to control and vastly limit the Crimean Tatar’s ability to 
publicly remember the tragedy. In 2015, about 60 Crimean Tatars were detained and 
fined for an unauthorized motorcade during their annual remembrance. In 2016, the 
authorities prohibited the commemoration of the 72nd anniversary, with Crimean Tatars 
receiving warnings not to organize any gatherings, and school teachers forbidding 
Crimean Tatar students from skipping school to participate in the commemoration (Fine 
and Ollman, 13; United States Department of State 2017). The commemoration still took 
place peacefully, but Crimean Tatars were arrested for gathering without permit, 
displaying flags and other symbols in commemoration. Obtaining permission for public 
meetings of Crimean Tatars was not easy, and mostly ended in failure. The Crimean 
Tatars did not ask for permission to commemorate the 1944 deportation because they 
knew they would be denied. The authorities seem to do what they can to keep gatherings 
of Crimean Tatars who are not direct supporters of the regime or associate with pro-
Russian Crimean groups from occurring. Case in point the official denial to celebrate 
Oraza Bayram in the village of Razlivy, which was denied for “late submission notice,” 
even though the request was submitted a “day earlier than the law regulates” (QHA 
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2019a). Activist Enver Abselyamov, who had worked to have the event held, believed 
that in reality, the cause of the denial was that because they were not associated with the 
Kremlin-controlled “Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Crimea” (DUMK), they 
were told to deny the request (QHA 2019a). For the Crimean Tatars, particularly those 
who did not directly align themselves with the Russian government and who object to 
Russian occupation, and those with little political connection, massive public gatherings 
and meetings were almost impossible to obtain.  
With these types of gatherings banned, and permission hard-fought, but rare, the 
Crimean Tatars had two options: single person protests, which would remain legal under 
the law without advanced permission, and collective prayer. Regarding the latter, these 
prayers, which were typically the traditional Dua collective prayer, started out small, 
usually just large enough to fill a home or a yard, but then quickly outgrew their 
surroundings (Soboleva 2017, 56). The Dua collective prayers grew into hundreds and 
hundreds of people, and soon became more than just a prayer, but an act of public 
gathering that was not directly political. The meaning may have grown to possess 
political meanings, but the prayer helped the Crimean Tatars to commemorate and protest 
religiously, even though they would still get warnings and threats (57). Single person 
protests were legal in Crimea, and unlike mass protests, they did not require advanced 
permission. However, while the Crimean Tatars have taken to this form of protest, 
especially amongst parents of detained or disappeared Crimean Tatars, this has not 
stopped them from getting arrested or detained (QHA 2019b, Soboleva 2017, 56). The 
Crimean Tatars have ways of organization and protest that go beyond the ban of public 
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protest and gathering without expressed permission from the state, but even in these 
forms they suffer threats, detention, and repression from the authorities. 
What is most striking in these bans on public protest is the fact that the 
commemorations of the 1944 deportation are included. For many Crimeans, especially 
the Crimean Tatars, the Second World War and the 1944 deportation are incredibly 
painful memories and memories that are permanently tied to the national identity of the 
Crimean Tatars as the central event that unfortunately gave them the ability to unite and 
connect through collective hardship and the suffering of deportation and exile. By 
banning the commemoration within the first few months of annexation paints an image of 
the role the Russian state and the occupiers wanted to play in Crimea, controlling “the 
social process in which the living in Crimea must struggle with the war’s legacy: how, 
when and who to honor? How, when, and who to mourn?” (Uehling 2015, 14). Through 
the ban, the Russian and Crimean authorities have denied the Crimean Tatars the right to 
recognize their own memory of suffering, denied the public display of that right, and thus 
have seemingly denied the Crimean Tatars’ understanding and historical representation of 
the Second World War. The Crimean Tatars were not important to Russian plans for 
Crimea, as their commemoration was not part of the Russian narrative in Crimea and was 
banned, whereas there was no such halt to celebration for Victory Day, celebrating 
Russian victory over Nazi Germany (15). The Russian and Crimean authorities have 
ignored and repressed the cornerstone of Crimean Tatar national identity. 
Silencing the Crimean Tatars publicly was not the only way that they were 
repressed under Russian rule politically. The Russians began weakening the Crimean 
Tatar political structure of the Mejlis and the Kurultai, those that actively denounced the 
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referendum, annexation, and now Russian occupation. The Russian authorities had 
already found the Mejlis to be “the main political force that impedes the realization of 
strategic interests in the Crimea,” before the annexation, as shown in the operational 
documents of the FSB, as stated by Mustafa Dzhemilev, but after annexation the 
repression of those opposition groups went into full force (Dzhemilev, qtmm.org 2014). 
While the Russians attempted to co-opt the Mejlis, the fundamental disagreement with 
the annexation and the ownership of Crimea meant that Russian control over the largest 
political organ of the Crimean Tatars was not possible (Petrov 2016, 86). As a result, a 
number of repressive actions against the Mejlis and Crimean Tatar political opposition 
had taken place, and continue, since the annexation of Crimea. One of the first steps was 
the banning and exile of key Crimean Tatar and Mejlis political leaders, including 
Mustafa Dzhemilev, Refat Chubarov, and Akhtem Chiygoz, along with countless other 
activists. Dzhemilev was found a “persona non-grata” in Crimea by the Russian Federal 
Migration Service, and Chubarov was told that his and the Mejlis’s activities constituted 
extremism, illegal through the Article 280 of the Russian Federal Criminal Code, 
however Interpol has removed Chubarov from the wanted list (Interfax-Ukraine, 2015; 
Korostelina 2015, 43). By removing these key figures from the Peninsula and out of the 
Crimean public limelight, the Russian authorities acted to weaken the strength of the 
organized and vocal opposition to their presence by removing those who were most 
troublesome. Other actions include the raiding of Mejlis and buildings and the seizure of 
Mejlis materials and “evidence,” which occurred after the post-annexation local elections, 
which the Crimean Tatars had largely boycotted at the behest of the Mejlis. Laptops and 
documents were seized by the FSB and Crimean police, and after seizing the Mejlis 
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building, the authorities ordered the Kırım Fund Charity, the building’s owners, to evict 
the Mejlis, after which banning them from leasing or selling its properties (Aydın 2014, 
87). The homes of Mejlis members were also subject to raids and search-and-seizures, 
looking for extremist material, weapons, and explosives, under the same context as the 
raids on Crimean Tatar civilians and activists: under the guise of the law and territorial 
integrity (Korostelina 2015, 43). Most of the Mejlis leadership, now exiled in Ukraine, 
held a civic blockade of Crimea, resulting in further retaliation from Russian authorities, 
such as proclamations that the Mejlis had no legal basis for existence, that they had 
connections to ISIS, with the latter of the retaliatory measures foreshadowing the claims 
that would result in the biggest repression of Crimean Tatar political leadership in 
Crimea: the ban of the Mejlis (Coynash and Charron 2019, 17).  
At the beginning of 2016, Russian prosecutor, Natalya Poklonskaya, filed a 
request to ban the Mejlis, under the reasoning that the group had participated, and was 
continuing to participate, in “extremist” activities (RFE/RL, 2016). Her call for the 
banishment of the Mejlis labelled them as an extremist organization with terroristic 
tendencies. The eventual banishment of the Mejlis came to pass by the Russian courts on 
April 26th, 2016, thus signaling, as many feared, the possibility of tougher repressions on 
the Crimean Tatar people following its dissolution under Russian law and ban from 
operating in Crimea (Belitser, Today, 2016; Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, 
2016; RFE/RL, 2016; Coynash and Charron 2019, 17). After banishment, a clause in the 
court proceedings with the legal requirement that “any public mention of the Mejlis must 
include a disclaimer that it is ‘a forbidden terrorist organization in Russia,’” forcibly 
trying to remove any political, societal, and cultural power the Mejlis held in Crimea 
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amongst the Crimean Tatar community (Urcosta, 82). Found to be guilty of extremism by 
the Russian courts and Poklonskaya, the approximately 2500 Mejlis members now 
became “criminally liable” for belonging to a recognized terrorist organization, which, if 
convicted, could give them eight years in prison. Although in the case of deputy head 
Ilmi Umerov, he was placed in a psychiatric facility before being sentenced to serve two 
years in a colony settlement (Open Society Justice Initiative, 40). Like the events of 1944 
and earlier, the Mejlis, as the leading representative body of the Crimean Tatars, has been 
banned from the peninsula under the claims of extremism and being a danger to Russians 
and Russia’s sovereignty. The Mejlis are not an extremist or terrorist organization, but 
under the anti-extremism laws in Russia, their sentencing was quick and biased. What the 
ban does is remove the leadership of the Crimean Tatars from power, and remove the 
organization that represents them from legal activity, thus leaving those who supported 
the Mejlis and fear for their livelihoods in occupied Crimea without support and 
representation from above, leaving Crimean Tatars open to further repression unless they 
submit and give in to Russian rule. 
 Before the prosecution of the Mejlis, the representation of the Crimean Tatars was 
never strong in occupied Crimea. The constitution “reduced the total number of 
Parliamentary seats from 100 to 75, raised the number of single-seat constituencies to 75 
percent, and effectively barred the Mejlis from fielding party lists because only national, 
not local or ethnic, parties can compete in Russian elections,” effectively denying the 
Mejlis and the Crimean Tatars their own ability to represent themselves politically, 
similar to the situation under Ukraine (Blank 2015, 25). The Russian authorities also 
implemented representative bodies and supported the opposition groups of the Crimean 
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Tatars, such as Milli Firka, in order to undermine the influence of the Mejlis on the 
Crimean Tatar community. The success of these Kremlin-supported groups, such as the 
Mufti of Crimea and the Crimean Muslim Spiritual Board, the government-formed social 
movement Qirim, headed by expelled Mejlis leader Remzi Ilyasov and the vice-speaker 
of the State Council, servile to Milli Firka, was rather limited (Urcosta, 83; Petrov 2016, 
87). These Kremlin-supported groups that were successfully co-opted are minority 
political and religious groups amongst the Crimean Tatars, and never had the reach, 
influence and scope of the Mejlis. With the main representation of the Crimean Tatars 
now in exile and banned from Crimea, the Russian and Crimean authorities have 
removed the key drivers of the opposition, allowing for repressions to have stronger 
impacts on the Crimean Tatar populous as demonstrated during the 2018 Presidential 
election. In their exile in Ukraine, the Mejlis members urged Crimean Tatars to boycott 
the 2018 Presidential election, with Chubarov posting online “The Crimean Tatars will 
not take part in the illegal elections on March 18, 2018, which will be conducted by 
Russian invaders in the temporarily occupied Crimea,” believing that even though the 
Crimean Tatars were essentially pressured and blackmailed to vote, that they would 
abstain (Chubarov, UNIAN 2018). Crimean Tatars were on the receiving end of threats to 
their livelihoods if they did not participate in the vote, with threats of dismissal from jobs, 
threats which were followed through, along with various propaganda campaigns to get 
Crimean Tatars to vote (Coynash, KHPG 2018b; UNIAN 2018). Propaganda came in the 
form of getting children to take their parents to the elections through school education, 
the direct threats to their jobs and security, and included a fake Crimean Tatar pro-Putin 
rally which demonstrated the disconnect between the Russian authorities and the Crimean 
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Tatars, as the language used in the event slogan “Putin Forward!” was in Tatar, not 
Crimean Tatar, ignoring the differences in the Crimean Tatars as an ethnic group 
(Coynash, KHPG 2018a; Coynash, KHPG 2018b). It can be argued that the impact of the 
banishment of the Mejlis, the attempts to control political representation on the part of the 
Russian authorities, and the threats and propaganda of the 2018 Presidential election 
resulted in higher voter turnout amongst Crimean Tatars at 31.5 percent in urban areas 
and 44.9 percent in rural areas, turnout that has increased by double figures in each 
region type (Zimin 2019, 305). While it can be argued that the increased turnout of 
Crimean Tatars in the 2018 election represents a greater level of support for Putin and 
acknowledgement that their lives have gotten better under Russian rule, as Zimin would 
suggest, it must also be considered that because the impact of the Mejlis has been 
muzzled by the Russian Federation, the leadership of the Crimean Tatars in opposition to 
Russian rule has lost influential and representational power of the Crimean Tatars, 
allowing for Russian and Crimean threats and propaganda to have greater desired effects 
(304). With the 2018 Presidential election, the Russian Federation has provided ample 
evidence of their attempts to repress Crimean Tatar political representation and power all 
in order to stamp out opposition to their occupation of Crimea since the annexation. 
Crimean Tatar national identity, embodied by the leadership of the Mejlis and its 
supporters, has been politically repressed by the state. The repressions place the general 
Crimean Tatar community in the position to either dissent, and thus fall victim of the 
anti-extremism laws, or assimilate and support the current regime, all in support of the 





 Perhaps it was a perfect storm, but the events surrounding the referendum and the 
annexation of Crimea - the Ukrainian crisis, Euromaidan, war in Eastern Ukraine, and the 
Crimean referendum - allowed for Russia to act in Crimea as a state of exception, 
“wherein a sovereign power acts upon an implicit prerogative to declare when 
extenuating circumstances – a typically framed state of emergency – necessitate 
circumventing its own normative legal restrictions and procedures” (Coynash and 
Charron 2019, 19). Using the confusion and propaganda with the help of pro-Russian 
forces and authorities in Crimea, the Russian Federation was able to invoke the concept 
of “Russianness” within the territorial, historical, ethnonational, and political limits of the 
Peninsula (Charron 2016, 246). Through the annexation, Putin and the rest of Russia 
welcomed Crimea back home, finally “reunified” with the Rodina, while using the cover 
of war, conflict, and a state of exception as “not only the ideal occasion for involving 
depoliticized citizens but also an ideal occasion for justifying the repression of alternative 
views” (Rogov 2016, 45). The overall crisis situation in Crimea also created a political 
miasma in the Peninsula, one that complemented the Russian narrative in the region, 
which, like other crises, was “marked by an increase in the flow of one-sided information 
accepted by the public, as well as a decrease in tolerance for alternative points of view 
and the repression of those who espouse such views,” manufacturing a villain (35). In this 
case, the villain from the Russian perspective was the Ukrainian nationalists and their 
supporters in Crimea, including the Mejlis and the Crimean Tatars. Russia was keenly 
aware of the problem with the Crimean Tatars and the Mejlis, having failed to co-opt 
them during the referendum and annexation. This resulted in the various acts of 
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repression used, and still used, against the Crimean Tatars and the Mejlis by the Russian 
state. According to the lawyers of Open Society Justice Initiative’s report on “Human 
Rights in the Context of Automatic Naturalization in Crimea,” around 1,557 new laws 
have been imposed by the Russian Federation, with the Council of Europe demonstrating 
that the general perception of these laws and policies in Crimea are meant to be “more 
restrictive and had an impact on fundamental rights and freedoms” (13). Repressions took 
place through the use of these restrictive laws designed to disenfranchise and silence 
opposition, such as Article 280 and the 2018 updates to the linguistic laws. The 
repression of the Crimean Tatars took many forms, including targeting Mejlis, Crimean 
Tatar leadership, and activists, harassment, abductions, raids, arrests, pretrial detentions, 
and others discussed in this chapter. The answer to the question of why target the 
Crimean Tatars and their leadership is linked to their national identity. While there are 
plenty of Crimean Tatars who were pro-Ukrainian and wish for Crimea to return to 
Ukraine, it is not that they identify as Ukrainian or view it as their home. Rather, only 2.3 
percent of Crimean Tatars view Ukraine as their homeland, indicating that they preferred 
Ukraine because they supported the national identity and narrative believing the Crimean 
Peninsula to be the sole homeland of the Crimean Tatars (Charron 2016, 250). For 
Crimean Tatar national identity, the Russians have acted as the arbiters of their fate 
during Imperial and Soviet periods. Out of fear of return to these types of repressions, a 
reversal of all of the work that has gone to cultivating and rehabilitating Crimean Tatar 
culture, language, and representation, and the claim to Crimea as the homeland and not 
part of Russia, the Crimean Tatars and their leadership largely acted against Russian 
claims and Russian annexation. Just as suspected, the Crimean Tatars faced “categorical 
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violence based on the negative portrayal of Crimean Tatars has led to a denial of their 
rights, and the prosecution and harassment of leadership and ordinary citizens,” as 
Russians implemented laws and authoritative propaganda and actions designed to repress 
the Crimean Tatars into submission (Korostelina 2015, 44). With the Crimean Tatar’s 
fears about what may follow Russian occupation of Crimea realized, the repressions of 
this minority group were varied and came about formally through the law, and informally 
through various threats and abuses. The level of repression faced can now be categorized 
in the eight indicators of repression, allowing for comparison to the two other cases, and 
providing the data necessary to validate or invalidate the hypothesis of this thesis. 
 
- Voluntary	Movement	
As an indicator of repression, voluntary movement was, and is, indeed present in 
the Russian-occupation of the Crimean Peninsula. Crimean Tatars as well as Ukrainians 
and members of other groups have left the Crimean Peninsula of their own accord. “Soft” 
deportation is the main type of voluntary movement of people as a repression in Crimea, 
as the conditions of living are intentionally made to be unbearable to the point where the 
individual decides that they are better off leaving the land or even the country for another. 
This is the case with the Crimean Tatars as well as other minorities in Crimea, as the 
conditions and the impact of pasportizatsiya and the citizenship laws left some feeling 
like they were foreigners in their own country, unable to gain access to basic necessities 
for modern life, like work and health care. Other forms of voluntary movement come 
from individuals who were targeted and threatened by Russian and Crimean officials or 
by armed groups. Fearing for their lives and safety, these individuals would flee to 
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Ukraine. As of 2015, 10 thousand Crimean Tatars have left Crimea out of these “soft” 
deportations and the fear of Russian rule of law, and by 2018, the total number of emigres 
from Crimea (includes the Crimean Tatars) ranges between 100-125 thousand people. 
 
- Forced Movement 
Forced Movement is a repression present in the Russian-occupied Crimean 
Peninsula, and includes forced deportation, forced movement to the mainland, exiles 
from returning to Crimea, and uprooting and displacing people within Crimea. Forced 
deportations were part of the citizenship laws, where those that could not obtain Russian 
citizenship would be deemed “foreigners,” and forcefully removed from the Peninsula 
after 90 day periods every 180 days through court-mandated deportations. The provision 
of not recognizing dual citizenship in Crimea, the short deadline to obtain Russian 
citizenship and obtain a passport created scenarios where some Crimean Tatars became 
unwilling foreigners in their homeland, as seen with Sinaver Kadyrov. Russian 
immigration authorities are also able to decline granting citizenship to individuals, 
including those who are perceived to be threats to the integrity of Russian status in 
Crimea, those who opposed the referendum, and those who support the return of Crimea 
to Ukraine. Some prisoners would be moved to mainland Russia, usually Moscow, 
against their will to be detained there and tried as Russian citizens, regardless of whether 
or not they had Russian citizenship. Members of the Mejlis and their supporters could, as 
some did, find themselves either deported or exiled from Crimea, or banned from 
returning to Crimea, as was the case with Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov. Aside 
from key political repressions, other Crimean Tatars found themselves removed from 
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Crimea, as happened to Elvira Ablyalimova, who was forced to leave for the “mainland” 
(Ivaneyvch, QHA 2018). 
Under the reasoning of claiming illegally seized lands, the Russian and Crimean 
authorities have forcefully displaced Crimean Tatars within Crimea by removing them 
from the settlements that they have cultivated since the Return. While there were 
promises to resettle the displaced Crimean Tatars somewhere else in Crimea, there is 
little evidence that would support this promise’s veracity. “The Russian Federation’s 
occupation of Crimea has severely hampered free movement, including the denial of 
access, and the denial to leave, the territory of Crimea, both which are permission-based,” 
largely restricting the Crimean Tatars rights to their land, failing to help the rehabilitation 
process and cultivation of Crimean Tatar territory, and threatening more if other Crimean 
Tatar settlements were to be forced to relocate (Open Society Justice Initiative, 32).   
 
- Imprisonment 
Imprisonment has been widespread in various forms in Russian-occupied Crimea. 
In no small part due to the anti-extremism laws in Russia and the laws banning Crimean 
Tatar mass public meetings and protests without prior permission from the proper 
authorities, the detainment, arrests, and imprisonment of Crimean Tatar activists, Mejlis 
leaders, and Crimean Tatars questioning Russian authority in Crimea has been frequent. 
Under Article 280 of the Russian Federal Criminal Code, citizens who were suspected of 
terrorism or extremism, which under the law is not explicitly defined and does not 
necessarily require violent acts to qualify, included calls of separatism and, after 
annexation, included those who would declare “Crimea is Ukraine” or would label 
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Russian authorities as “occupying authorities,” would be in violation of the law and thus 
criminals. Crimean Tatars who found themselves under suspicion or labelled as 
extremists for anything from participating in pro-Ukrainian rallies before annexation to 
social media posts or reposts would be arrested and interrogated. The majority of targets 
were arrested and taken for “preventative interrogations,” often taken on trumped up 
charges as a means to threaten or remove vocal political opponents from Crimean society. 
One-man protests, which are legal in Crimea without permission, have resulted in arrests 
as well, even though the activities they were engaging in were allowed under law. One 
common charge was against alleged members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a pan-Islamic group that 
is banned in Russia, but legal in Ukraine. Russian authorities would use membership in 
this group, legitimate or not, as a sign of extremist activity, leading to more arrests, with 
some political activists sent to psychiatric facilities. Some arrests attempts have even 
turned deadly, as seen with the death of veteran activist Vezhdie Kashka during a raid by 
Crimean police. By imprisoning those who fall under the vague terms of the anti-
extremism laws, the Russian Federation could maintain control and intimidation over 
Crimean Tatar activists and opposition through arrests, pretrial detention, and long 
periods of interrogation. 
 
- Disappearances 
There have been a number of cases of disappearances and abductions of Crimean 
Tatar activists in Crimea under Russian and Crimean authorities. Of these abductions, the 
ones that return usually return deceased or severely injured and abused, as seen with the 
case of Asan Egiz, a vocal activist against the annexation, who was found beaten and left 
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on a highway, and Reshat Ametov, who was found dead two weeks after his 
disappearance on March 2nd, 2014, bound and showing heavy signs of torture. This case, 
much like the disappearance of Ervin Ibragimov, was caught of surveillance equipment, 
but no investigation ever really occurred, and no arrests were made, however unlike 
Ametov’s case, Ibragimov has not been found, dead or alive, since his disappearance on 
the 24th of May 2016 (Coynash, KHPG 2019). Other disappearances that have not been 
solved or recovered include Timur Shaimardinov, Islyam Dzhepparov, and Dzhevdet 
Islyamov, just to name a few. The Russian authorities have actively denied investigating 
disappearances, as seen with the botched abduction of rights activist Emir-Usein Kuku, 
who was saved by a large gathering of people drawing attention to the abductors. This 
turned into an FSB “search,” where he was beaten, and there was no investigation into 
that day’s events (Coynash, KHPG 2019). As of 2016, there are at least 10 known to be 
missing Crimean Tatar citizens.  
 
- Removal of Rights 
Under Russian occupation, the Crimean Tatars have seen many of their rights 
heavily restricted under the anti-extremism laws and the over 15 hundred new laws and 
amendments passed by Russian legislatures. These rights restricted include freedom of 
the press, freedom of assembly, a denial of language rights, freedom of speech, freedom 
of movement, violations of basic human rights, denial of citizenship, freedom to practice 
religion, rights of expression, property rights, and plurality of media among others. There 
has been no sign of these rights getting revived or supported by the Russian authorities 
 
 181 




Like the cases of Soviet and Ukrainian rule, much of the othering in this case is 
the legacy of the Soviet-manufactured history and culture of the Crimean Tatars, which 
has still not been addressed fully to this day, as evidenced by Russian textbooks still 
depicting Crimean Tatars as Nazi loyalists and collaborators unfairly, perpetuating the 
Soviet narrative under Stalin (RFE/RL 2019). Othering also occurs in the profiling, 
preemptive arrests, and labelling of certain citizens, political and religious leaders as 
extremists and terrorists, as well as the disappearances, harassment, and abuses of the 
Crimean Tatars, as seen with the boy beaten for speaking Crimean Tatar on the phone. 
While the Russian government had promised to help solve the problems of the Crimean 




Punishment of the Crimean Tatars in Crimea has already been noted in the 
imprisonment, othering, and both movement identifiers, but there are some other types of 
punishment that have not already been mentioned. In addition to arrests, psychiatric 
detainment, disappearances, deportation, displacement, harassment, beatings, Crimean 
Tatars have found themselves subjects of raids and search-and-seizures by Crimean and 
Russian authorities, looking for illegal and extremist literature, documents, and even 
 
 182 
drugs, weapons, and explosives. These raids were often the subject of bogus suspicions, 
and sometimes led to false charges against the individual or family whose home was 
raided. Mosques and madrasas were also subject to these raids, and placed under 
surveillance by the FSB with the installation of CCTV camera inside the religious 
centers. Crimean Tatars found themselves removed from their positions, such as Bilyal 
Bilyalov when he was removed as the head of the Crimean Tatar Academic Musical-
Dramatic Theater for extremist charges, even though he had no history of political 
activism, and museum directors found themselves ousted and replaced with Russian 
curators. During the 2018 Presidential election, Crimean Tatars were threatened with 
losing their jobs and access to certain rights, like health care, for abstaining from the 
election, threats that were followed through. 
 
- Cultural Destruction 
The Crimean Tatars have witnessed the destruction of their culture at the hands of 
Russian law and Russian authorities since the annexation. By banning mass gatherings 
and through attempts to muzzle Crimean Tatar events to commemorate the 1944 
deportation, the Russian authorities are denying one of the cornerstones of Crimean Tatar 
national identity, and keep them from educating future generations on the ethnic 
cleansing and from remembering the dead publicly in Russian Crimea. Russian and 
Crimean authorities also worked to undermine Crimean Tatar culture and history through 
the removal of Bilyal Bilyalov and the appointing of Russians to Crimean museums, thus 
silencing Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian historical and cultural narratives, replacing them 
with Russian historical narratives and Russian culture. Even though the Russian 
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Federation declared the safety and support of Crimean Tatar and ethnic cultures and 
languages, Crimean Tatar media sources, like Avdet and ATR, were shut down by 
Roskomnadzor. Crimean Tatar language rights and education have been continually 
undermined and usurped by Russian language instruction over the minority languages, 
even though Crimean Tatar has been declared an official language of Crimea. Mosques 
and madrasas are being raided and surveilled, infringing on religious rights. Crimean 
Tatar cultural and heritage sites have also faced almost literal destruction. The Khan’s 
palace and the Big Khan Mosque have gone under “restorations” by unqualified Russian 
firms with no restoration experience, which resulted in the removal of the original 
materials and support structures, leaving sites to look like scrap yards. The haphazard 
work also left damages to the murals and walls of the palace. The original materials 
removed would not be restored, but instead replaced with more modern materials, like 
cement, forever tarnishing the cultural sites, with no regard to the outcry from the 
Crimean Tatar community.  
The repressions of the Crimean Tatars at the hands of the state since the 
annexation in 2014 have been far more encompassing and volatile than the repressions 
under Ukraine, and have been less violent than the repressions under the Soviet Union. 
Under Soviet rule, seven of the eight repression identifiers were present before the 1944 
deportation and exile, while only six of eight were present during exile and post-
exoneration, based on the limited research available. Under Ukrainian rule, only two or 
three of the eight identifiers were present, with removal of rights referring to the limiting 
of political rights rather than a full removal. It is clear that the Crimean Tatars were faced 
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more repressions under Soviet rule than Ukrainian rule, but it is a different story with 
Russian rule.  
Compared to Soviet rule, the repressions under Russian rule appear to be more 
encompassing, as all identifiers are present in Russian-occupied Crimea compared to the 
six or seven out of eight during Soviet rule. However, it would be erroneous to determine 
which is the more severe regime in their repressions of the Crimean Tatars since the 
Crimean Tatars are still under Russian rule, so it is yet to be determined whether or not 
these repressions will weaken, disappear, or strengthen down the line in Russian territory. 
As of now, it can be stated that the Soviet Union, based on the 1944 deportation and 
special settlements alone, was the more repressive regime. What can be said is that the 
repressions under the Soviet Union were much more direct and aimed at the entire 
Crimean Tatar populace, whereas the Russian Federation’s repressions are more 
specifically targeted towards pro-Ukrainian Crimean Tatars and those who are against 
“reunification” with Russia. However, where the Soviet Union was direct and immediate, 
the Russian Federation is indirect and gradual, case in point language and cultural rights. 
Under the Soviet Union Crimean Tatar did not have these rights, and were not allowed 
them, so the Soviet Union was directly repressing the population. The Russian 
Federation, on the other hand, already under international scrutiny for the illegal 
annexation and human rights violations towards the Crimean Tatars, gradually weakened 
Crimean Tatar language and cultural rights, as seen with the new language law in 2018 
and the removal of Crimeans from Crimean museums, replacing them with Russians. The 
Russian Federation had declared their support for the Crimean Tatars, their rights, their 
language, and their culture, all of which have come under gradual repressions and arrests 
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under various new laws designed for Russian interpretation. The gradual assimilation of 
Crimea and Crimean culture into Russian culture and history while displacing ethnic 
minorities, including the Crimean Tatars through repressions undertaken by the 
authorities of Crimea and Russia, have all taken place under the Russian Federation. The 
reason for these repressions under Russian law was because the Crimean Tatar national 
identity could not be co-opted and assimilated into Russia’s. Crimean Tatar national 
identity is tied directly to the Crimean Peninsula, the Return, the remembrance of the 
1944 deportation, and the revival of Crimean Tatar language, history, and culture. This 
revival of the Crimean Tatar history, language, culture, and heritage was gradually 
progressing under Ukrainian rule, and while things were not perfect, the raison d’etre of 
the national identity was being fulfilled. Under Russian rule, the tenets of the national 
identity, which were at odds with Russian occupation since the illegal process of the 
referendum and annexation, as their resistance made them a target for Russian repression 
upon the illegal annexation, or “reunification” from the Russian official standpoint, 
would be directly at odds with the Russian Federation’s designs and claims to Crimea. 
Thus, in this most recent and current case involving the Crimean Tatars, the Crimean 
Tatars, especially those who have voiced opposition to Russian legitimacy in Crimea and 
treatment of the Crimean Tatars, have found themselves subjects of various state 
repressions that, while are much more severe than under Ukraine and less physically and 
ethnically destructive than under the Soviet Union, are more controlled, gradual, and 
culturally and historically harmful to their national identity, in danger of disappearing 
through the silencing of opponents and the assimilation of those with no other choice but 




The Survival of Crimean Tatar National Identity 
 
In what culminates in the latest and most historically and culturally charged 
encounters between the Russian rule and the Crimean Tatars, the Russians quickly 
identified the Crimean Tatars and the Mejlis as targets of repression, as they were the 
loudest of the opposition to the annexation and their narratives for reclaiming Crimea. 
The repressions came down in the various forms, supported by laws and the law 
enforcers, leaving the Crimean Tatars little to do to counteract the repressions beyond co-
optation and surrender to Russia’s reality. President Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin, and the 
Crimean authorities, including Sergei Aksyonov, had promised to celebrate and support 
the rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatars, but it still remains unclear whether these calls 
for support were genuine, but contingent on Crimean Tatar support of Russian legitimacy 
in Crimea, or if they were just formalities and dressing to win over the Crimean Tatar 
community. What is clear is that the Crimean Tatars and their leadership did not fully 
support Russian legitimacy in Crimea, and the Russian authorities used their authoritative 
power and laws to actively repress the population. And while one may argue that these 
repressions were only targeting those opposed to Russian state presence in Crimea, as 
there were pro-Russian Crimean Tatars and organizations, such as Milli Firka and the 
Mufti of Crimea; there are repressions that seem to target the entire population, rather 
than just the Mejlis and their supporters. The repression of language education rights at 
the hands of the 2018 linguistic law, the deprivation of the right to assembly and protest, 
which drastically hinders the commemoration of the 1944 deportation, the harassment of 
Crimean Tatar civilians, the poor “restorations” and “renovations” of Crimean Tatar 
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cultural sites and the removal of non-political figures like Bilyal Bilyalov on false 
charges demonstrate Russia’s willingness to impose repressions on the entire Crimean 
Tatar community. The Crimean Peninsula, at the center of this conflict between Crimean 
Tatar national identity and the Russian Federation’s plans for Crimea, became the land in 
which the conflict takes place, reflecting the hypothesis of this thesis, as: States are likely 
to immediately repress ethnic or minority groups that they have just acquired (whether 
through territorial expansion, land acquisition, border restructuring, emigration, etc.) if 
the state’s goals and ambitions are in direct conflict with the national identity of a 
minority group, and that minority group acts in solidarity to oppose or cry foul the 
actions of the state.  
The Crimean Tatar people fight on in the face of these repressions, rejecting the 
Russian occupation, as Dzhemilev cries: “We appeal to our compatriots and ask them not 
abandon Crimea however difficult it may be – Crimea is our homeland!” (Dzhemilev). 
While the Crimean Tatar people face grave consequences under Russian occupation for 
dissent, it has not stopped the Crimean Tatars still in the peninsula. In the early protests 
right after the annexation, Crimean Tatars marched chanting “Ukraine is Crimea! Crimea 
is Ukraine!,” a sentiment that was reflected during the screenings of “A Struggle for 
Home: The Crimean Tatars,” a documentary that recalls the history of the Crimean Tatar 
people and the recent annexation (Bryttan; Gromads’kye Telebachennya). In the 2016 
Eurovision song contest, the winner was a Crimean Tatar singer who goes by the stage 
name Jamala. Her song, “1944,” recounts the mass deportation of the Crimean Tatars 
from Crimea under Stalin. In an interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty she told 
RFE/RL. , “’Now the Crimean Tatars are on occupied territory,’ ‘And it is very hard for 
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them. They are under tremendous pressure. Some have disappeared without a trace. And 
that is terrifying. I would not want to see history repeat itself’” (RFE/RL 2016). Her song, 
which represented Ukraine, also came to represent the Crimean Tatars as well. Giving a 
ray of hope to the Crimean Tatar people in the year that the Mejlis were banned. While 
the Crimean Tatars have detailed the abuses and repressions at the hands of the Russian 





















 The answer to the opening research question – why and how might a state, having 
just acquired an ethnic or minority group, repress the said group following its acquisition 
– comes down ultimately to the relationship between the national identities of minority 
groups and the power and agreement, or lack thereof of, between the minority’s national 
identities and the goals of the state in which they reside. My decision to focus on national 
identity as the leading explanation made it necessary to identify a minority or ethnic 
group through the culmination of ideas and understandings that create a sense of unity, or 
“nation,” much along the lines of Anderson’s “Imagined Community.” This “nation” 
would be defined by these unifying ideas, like culture, language, heritage, and, in the case 
represented in this thesis, suffering. Once unified around this national identity, the group 
would possess direction and goals that may or may be apart from the concerned state’s 
own sense of national identity and goals. If the state’s own sense of national identity and 
goals were to be in opposition to the goals of the minority group, the group’s leadership, 
now mostly unified under this national identity, would likely be able to voice coherently 
and uniformly their complaints. What would follow from the state is the repression of the 
group as a response to perceived threat to their sovereignty. This would be entirely more 
possible in situations where minority or ethnic groups find themselves under a new state 
power, as the minority group may find itself at odds with the state if the state’s ambition 
runs counter to the minority groups own ambitions. This led to my central hypothesis: 
States are likely to immediately repress ethnic or minority groups that they have just 
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acquired if the state’s goals and ambitions are in direct conflict with the national identity 
of a minority group, and that minority group acts in solidarity to oppose or cry foul the 
actions of the state. The question now is how did the hypothesis measure up in the 
evaluated case, and where future research lies.  
 The Crimean Tatars became that test case for evaluating the efficacy of the 
hypothesis, with particular attention paid to three periods in their recent history: the exile 
and post-exile period under the Soviet Union, the return to Crimea and life under 
Ukrainian rule, and the current situation under Russian rule in the occupied Crimea. Their 
history with repression and the development of their national identity linked with the 
most infamous example of repression, or better stated as downright ethnic cleansing. The 
1944 deportation, provided a rich case with a unique history and a strong sense of 
national identity. Crimean Tatar national identity became synonymous with the collective 
memory and history of the deportation, and the desire to return back to Crimea as their 
homeland provided the starting point for the analysis, with each subsequent case arising 
from the changes to the states in which they found themselves. In each case, it is 
necessary to understand that the national identity of the Crimean Tatars remains bound to 
the Crimean Peninsula, their “homeward bound-ness,” and became the center of each 
case and the evaluations of state repression. In my analysis, I applied eight identifiers of 
repression: Voluntary movement, forced movement, imprisonment, disappearances, 
removal of rights, othering, punishment, and cultural destruction. The cases were 
evaluated for levels of repression based on the quantity of the repressions by the state and 
their levels of implementation.  
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 In the first case for evaluation, the Crimean Tatars were subjected to repressions 
from the Soviet Union, both before and after the deportation and exile, with a focus on 
the post-exile and post-exoneration. In this case, six out of the eight identifiers were 
present, indicating that the Soviet Union enacted repressions upon the Crimean Tatars. At 
this point in the history, Crimean Tatar national identity was still forming, but its 
formation was centered around the desire to return to Crimea, whereas the Soviet Union 
did not allow this because of the narrative that they had created for the Crimean Tatars 
after the deportation. The Crimean Tatars’ national movement was considered a dissident 
movement, and the Soviet Union’s ambition in Crimea was both for military purposes 
with the Black Sea fleet based in the Peninsula, and for other purposes, such as Politburo 
members vacationing in the peninsula. In this case, the Crimean Peninsula was the focus 
of both the Crimean Tatars and the Soviet Union, both wanting the land for their own 
interests.  
 For the second case, I looked at Crimean Tatars under the Ukrainian rule, and this 
was a case that on the surface worked as a counterexample for the Crimean Tatars, now 
in Crimea.  Under the Ukrainian rule they had a refined sense of national identity, 
strengthened by their return, yet the repressions they faced were of a lower level than 
those under the Soviet Union. Only three, at most, of the eight identifiers were present, 
othering, punishment, and to a certain extent, removal of rights, indicating that while 
some repressive measures existed, ultimately, the Crimean Tatars fared better under the 
Ukrainian rule. However, a closer scrutiny of the case demonstrated that the Tatars faced 
greater repressions under Ukraine once Yanukovych rose to the Ukrainian Presidency, as 
a result of the attitude towards the Crimean Tatars instilled in Crimeans and Ukrainians 
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by the Soviet legacy, and from the Crimean authorities themselves, even in disregard for 
the Ukrainian law. Ultimately, the Ukrainian government’s largest blunder against the 
Crimean Tatars was in their fully inept attempts to aid and fund their rehabilitation. 
Repressions from the Ukrainian rule did not really occur until Yanukovych’s regime 
because Ukraine’s goals for Crimea did not clash with Crimean Tatar ambitions for their 
culture, heritage, and language in Crimea, largely because Crimea holds more importance 
to the Crimean Tatar ambitions than it does for the Ukrainians. 
 In the last case, the annexation of the Crimea Peninsula by the Russian 
Federation, and the Crimean Tatars finding themselves under the Russian rule for the first 
time in the 21st century, many instances of state repression began to appear. This case 
fulfilled all eight of the identifiers of repression: voluntary movement, forced movement, 
imprisonment, disappearances, removal of rights, othering, punishment, and cultural 
destruction. While repressions did not rise to the level of the 1944 deportation and the 
placement of Crimean Tatars in Special Settlement that occurred under the Soviet Union, 
the pervasiveness of repressions against the Crimean Tatars in Russian-occupied Crimea 
is impossible to ignore. These repressions happened because the reactions and responses 
from the Crimean Tatars to the referendum and the annexation directly threatened 
Russian ambitions and, as they would say, the territorial integrity of Russia. Russia 
officially wanted to protect the interests of Russians in Crimea, while unofficially 
wanting the economic, financial, and military benefits of Crimea. The Crimean Tatars 
viewed the referendum and annexation as illegal and illegitimate, with many fearing a 
return to previous repressions that they had suffered under the Russians before, perhaps 
even another removal of the population from Crimea. In a slight reflection of Brubaker’s 
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triadic nexus, the Crimean Tatars become the minority group stuck in a losing battle with 
the homeland nation, Russia, and its support of the Russians in Crimea, all without an 
external group to which they belong offering any assistance in their struggle.  Crimean 
Tatar objections became the focus of Russian repressions, but they targeted the whole of 
the community through some repressions that could not have been targeted against those 
individuals in opposition, only towards the group as a whole. Again, in this last case, the 
Crimean Peninsula was the center of repressions as the Crimean Tatar leaders wanted 
Crimea returned to Ukraine and Russian occupation to end; these demands were in clear 
opposition to the Russian historical, ethnonational, and military claims on Crimea. 
 Through the evaluation of these cases involving the Crimean Tatars, it is clear that 
my hypothesis stands unrefuted. The Crimean Tatars suffered the most repressions in 
cases where their national identity, which was tied to the Crimean Peninsula as their 
homeland, was at complete odds with the state’s direction and goals in Crimea, as is the 
case with the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. Those cases where both parties 
have deep-rooted connections and plans for the Crimean Peninsula involved the highest 
levels of state repression based on the identifiers. The case of Ukrainian rule proves this, 
as the Crimean Tatars suffered the least repressions from the state, with the level of state 
repression only increasing with Yanukovych’s rise to power. While Crimea is part of 
Ukrainian territory, Ukraine just lacks the same connection to the Peninsula as the 
Crimean Tatars, and their actions as a government never targeted the Crimean Tatars or 
would cause a backlash from the Crimean Tatar leaders. The rise in the level of 
repression in the Ukrainian case can be explained by Yanukovych’s largely pro-Russian 
viewpoints, which would also have included common viewpoints with Russian towards 
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Crimea. Throughout these three cases involving a single minority group, the evaluations 
show that the trends of state repression on recently acquired ethnic or minority groups are 
in line with the hypothesis.   
 Of course, there are a few potential problems with the conclusion about the 
hypothesis and the case, as seen with the potential validity of the first case. The evidence 
and data collected was limited by external factors, resulting in evaluations that are thus 
limited in much the same ways. Also, the identifiers of repression are fairly vague and 
can be argued as lacking any real evaluative power, given their role to categorize the 
repressions of a state in order to develop the “bigger picture” rather than creating a 
simple scale in which to measure repression. The identifiers are not meant to provide a 
means of numerically evaluating the severity of repressions, instead they exist to show 
how a state represses by identifying the avenues in which they do so. There is also the 
potential criticism that the results of the evaluations are not exclusive to the hypothesis 
queried in the first chapter. Other hypotheses, such as one where the hypothesis is testing 
how levels of democracy impact the levels of repression, would reach similar conclusions 
to this thesis’s hypothesis given the results. While this is a valid criticism, it does not 
negate the power of the hypothesis as an explanation for the results, it only delivers a 
different, but potentially equal hypothesis. Additionally, the efficacy of a secondary 
hypothesis that works with the evaluations falters in the usage of the identifiers, using 
them more as a numerical valuation instead of a means to establish the repressive 
landscape. This type of hypothesis would also require additional research and testing 
regarding nuances in levels of democracy and types of repression used. Other hypotheses 
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could work with this research, but not without alterations to the variables and evaluation 
of the cases. 
Other issues that cannot be addressed in this thesis are the influences of not only 
long and rich histories between the groups involved in each case, but also respective roles 
they played in each case, as the Russians have a history of repression against the Crimean 
Tatars. Issues such as these do not necessarily pose a problem for the hypothesis and the 
conclusion of its efficacy in relation to the Crimean Tatars, but in the cases, as imperfect 
fits to the thesis question, themselves. The issues instead arise from the cases, as some 
may potentially argue that there is something akin to a self-fulfilling prophecy in these 
cases because of the history between the Crimean Tatars and different iterations of 
Russian power. While this is not necessarily the case, as the Russian Federation did not 
have to repress the Crimean Tatars, and could have devoted more effort to co-opting the 
Crimean Tatar Mejlis and leadership instead, it does bring up a number of outlets for 
future evaluation and testing of the hypothesis. Proven by the cases presented, the 
hypothesis requires testing that goes beyond the scope of this thesis to prove its 
usefulness and potentially broader application. There is a lack of cases geopolitically, 
such as cases outside of the former Soviet Union, as they may bear different results. Also 
missing is how the hypothesis fares when addressing cases where the minority group and 
the state have little to no shared history, expressed in case of colonialism for example. 
Multiple cases in one state is another avenue that could offer further research 
opportunities, instead of comparing different regimes to each other on levels of state 
repression against one minority group, multiple case in one state would provide data on 
levels of repression from one state upon multiple minority groups, allowing for 
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comparisons between minority groups instead of states. Regardless, the avenues for 
future research are open, hopefully more research will better establish the relationships 
between the state and minority groups, and the motivations for repression against them. 
Just as future research is on the horizon in state repression, the continuation of research 
into the repressions of the Crimean Tatars also persists, as long as Russia remains in its 
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